By Masoud Sadrmohammadi
As the results of the U.S. presidential election became clear, various political factions and groups have expressed differing views on the potential impacts of Donald Trump’s return to the White House on Iran. On the first day following Trump’s declared victory, Iran’s currency market reacted negatively, with the Iranian rial losing value against the U.S. dollar. However, within two days, prices returned to their previous levels, indicating that Iran’s currency market, heavily influenced by international political developments, showed less sensitivity to Trump’s win over time. This suggests that the initial excitement in Iran’s public sentiment over Trump’s victory has subsided.
Yet, the stabilization in Iran’s currency market does not imply that Iran’s analytical and political environment has moved beyond the challenge of dealing with Trump. Conservatives and reformists are once again positioning themselves against each other, and the nature of diplomatic relations with the U.S. under Trump has become a new point of contention among Iranian political actors.
Conservatives: “America is the Great Satan; it doesn’t matter who is president”
The conservative stance on America is shaped by a view of inherent hostility, asserting that over the past 45 years, the U.S. has consistently sought to harm Iran. Conservatives believe that no number of concessions or softening will change this dynamic, as America’s actions are fundamentally antagonistic. Mohammadreza Mohseni Thani, a member of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, stated, “Trump is no different from others like Biden; perhaps he even holds a bit more authority to advance U.S. political interests.” Alireza Zakani, the hardline mayor of Tehran, echoed this view, saying, “For the resistance movement, it doesn’t matter who is president in the U.S., as God’s will to support the resistance is greater than any other force.”
The conservative newspaper Kayhan, known for its staunch stance, used the headline “America is the Great Satan; it doesn’t matter who is president” on the day Trump’s victory was announced, underscoring their unwavering position.
Reformists: “Perhaps it’s time to drink the poison chalice”
Opposing the hard line approach, reformists are wary of the severe consequences of a full-blown confrontation with Trump. They argue that Iran cannot sustain a serious political, economic, and military confrontation with the U.S., urging Iranian society and political leaders to consider the necessity of adapting to a challenging reality. The expression “drinking the poison chalice,” used in Iranian political language, refers to the reluctant acceptance of an undesirable, but unavoidable course of action imposed upon the country’s leadership.
This sense of apprehension about Trump’s return is reflected in statements from reformist figures like Ali Shakouri Rad, who referenced the impact of Trump’s sanctions, stating, “Democrats pursue a ‘no war, no peace’ policy regarding Iran, but Trump’s approach is ‘either war or peace,’ which could bring new challenges for Iran.” Ahmad Zeidabadi, a prominent reformist politician, also emphasized Trump’s unpredictability: “If Trump causes trouble in our region, how should we respond? Our capabilities are limited, while his administration’s power is massive… Our biggest problem is that we have no clear idea how he intends to handle global crises, especially in the Middle East.”
In summary, while conservatives maintain their stance of unwavering resistance, reformists are concerned about Iran’s capacity to endure further conflict and suggest it may be time for a pragmatic shift in Iran’s foreign policy.
Tehran’s chosen strategy: Caution without retreat
Despite various viewpoints from journalists on both sides, Iran’s core challenge in crafting a policy towards Trump remains the unpredictability of his actions in the White House. Iranian policymakers are uncertain whether Trump will return with the same approach he took four years ago—imposing harsh sanctions that strained Iran’s economy and aimed to incite unrest—or whether he will recognize recent geopolitical changes in the Middle East and adopt a more restrained stance.
In his first term, Trump dismantled the JCPOA, the outcome of years of intense negotiations between Iran and the West. He ordered the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, an Iranian national hero, in a foreign country and imposed severe economic pressures on Iran by restricting oil sales and blocking all financial transactions with regional partners. Additionally, he bolstered Israel’s position in the Middle East and aligned Gulf countries with Israel, a move perceived by Iran as a deliberate strategy to isolate it regionally. These memories have left Iranian policymakers with serious reservations about engaging with Trump again.
Official Iranian government representatives, including the Foreign Ministry spokesperson and the Foreign Minister, have stated that Trump’s return will not alter Iran’s policies, which are firmly based on its national interests. However, behind these statements, Iranian politicians are undoubtedly considering new approaches for the country’s future under potential renewed U.S. pressure.
Likely, to brace for potential U.S. sanctions, Iran will strengthen China’s role in its foreign policy, seeking to mitigate American pressures with Chinese support. Iranian officials anticipate that Trump’s approach to Ukraine and Europe might pave the way for reduced tensions between Russia and the U.S., which could influence Russia’s alignment with Iran in confronting the U.S. Consequently, China is set to become Iran’s primary political and trade partner, stepping in for Russia if necessary. This dynamic was previously experienced between 2017 and 2021, when China solidified its position as a reliable partner by purchasing Iranian oil despite U.S. sanctions.
Additionally, Iranian policymakers may send a message to Washington emphasizing that the war environment created by Israel in the region could elicit serious responses from Iran. Tehran aims to convey that any U.S. action against its vital interests could trigger significant countermeasures against American assets in the Middle East. Given the volatile war footing in the region, aggravated by Netanyahu’s aggressive policies, Iran asserts its right to take robust action against the U.S. and Israel if necessary.
Iran appears increasingly resolute in its belief that any threat to its critical interests should be met with a firm response. If a new wave of stringent sanctions or attacks on its infrastructure were to cross Iran’s red lines, Iran might feel justified in disregarding U.S. boundaries and could even surpass the severity of the October 1 operation against Israel. U.S. forces in the Middle East could also face direct retaliation from Iran.
Alternatively, if Trump adheres to his promise to end global conflicts, there is a chance he may opt for de-escalation in the Middle East, recognizing the costly burden that Netanyahu’s policies place on the U.S. In this case, Trump could shift from military confrontation to a political and security-oriented engagement in the region, potentially avoiding the path to war.
The Iranian opposition and hopes for new opportunities
The radical Iranian opposition based abroad has consistently accused the Democrats of not doing enough to dismantle the Islamic Republic, believing that a Democratic president is more likely to pursue diplomacy rather than hard-line tactics against Iran. With Trump’s previous approach to Iran from 2017 to 2021 in mind, this opposition group sees his potential return as an opportunity to intensify pressure on the Iranian government.
The opposition argues that Iran will not show any flexibility toward the U.S., thereby increasing the risk of severe political and even military confrontation. They believe this period is a historic chance to destabilize Iran, disrupt public morale, and push the U.S. toward stronger collaboration with Israel in striking Iran’s infrastructure.
Following its highly criticized stance on the Israeli strikes on Iran and its perceived support for actions against Gaza, the opposition has lost legitimacy among Iranians within the country. Consequently, they have few options other than leveraging opposition to the Islamic Republic as a pretext for obtaining material support from the Pentagon, CIA, U.S. State Department, and certain European security foundations. They aim to position themselves in Washington as a pressure tool against Tehran, hoping to secure increased funding for their activities.