By Mohamed Sabreen, Cairo / Egypt
The fall of the Assad family regime was inevitable, and perhaps the most eloquent thing that was said about it by the Syrians is that the roots of the regime collapsed a long time ago due to tyranny, sectarianism, corruption, and betting on others to protect and continue the regime, and displacing its people inside and outside Syria, until it became a burden that its generals, soldiers, and allies were no longer willing to defend. Now the regime has fallen, and the future of Syria is unknown, but the moment forces everyone to stop and study the lesson of the fall of Assad. In the midst of all this, the ghosts of chaos loom over the Middle East, and it is painful that the fall of the Syrian regime does not represent an end but rather the beginning of a long marathon to reshape the balances in the region in light of the enormous conflict between international powers over the region. I think that the coming period carries many concerns, the most dangerous of which is that the ghosts of chaos loom over the region, and it also carries with it the “hardest test” for Türkiye’s relationship with the Arab countries, and perhaps in the midst of a Turkish state of euphoria over what happened, some may make a mistake, which provides “sufficient ammunition” to demonize Türkiye, replace the Iranian threat with the Turkish threat, and exploit the West for some Turkish statements. That it hides intentions and ambitions in the Arab lands. Here we will try to read the cards of Syria and the region after the fall of Assad.
The beginning of explaining what happened, and in an attempt to beautify matters, several reports were leaked that Bashar al-Assad had no other choice, and that Bashar had to make a quick decision to launch a political initiative that would open the door to dialogue with the opposition and preempt the launch of the (deterrence of aggression) operation. This was the essence of the urgent “advice” that Russia provided to the Syrian presidency. Here we note the immortal note regarding the delay in the decision, and the saying “little is too late” always applies to it, and the experiences of the region have taught us that the president’s men are often the guarantee of stability, or the opposite, and that “clowns and self-interested cheerleaders” are the shortest path to the abyss, and that our country needs strong institutions with a high degree of efficiency, and enjoys credibility, so that they can be the last resort to preserve the country in a moment of danger. According to advisor Rami Al-Shaer, who is close to Russian decision-making circles, after the attack began, about which Moscow had accurate information about its timing, size and objectives, it was too late, and the decision was quickly made in Moscow to arrange a safe exit that would ensure that the country would not be dragged into a destructive sectarian war whose results would be disastrous. Al-Shaer said in recent press statements that the information available to Moscow about the preparations for a large-scale attack prompted it to take urgent action 48 hours before the start of the attack on more than one axis, and the Syrian authorities were informed that forces affiliated with the armed factions would advance towards Aleppo and from there towards other Syrian cities. According to Al-Shaer, urgent contacts were made via hot channels with the Turkish and Iranian sides, the aim of which was to try to stop the operation and move towards initiating a political dialogue, but Moscow soon realized that the final decision had been made and the factions would not back down from launching the attack. If we accept the veracity and accuracy of Al-Shaer’s account, then we are facing one of the Arab tragedies – and it seems to be Russian – which is related to “the surprise that the decision has been made.” Perhaps what casts doubt on the accuracy of the details of the poet’s story is that, days before the fall of Bashar’s regime, Russian newspapers were suggesting the end of the Assad regime, and even began to enter the phase of “What are Russia’s lessons in Syria?” The Russian writers stopped at a shocking remark: “In a few days, the terrorists were able to seize nearly one and a half Syrian provinces, which the Russian army, along with the Syrians and Iranians, had taken many years to regain.” I think that the matter does not need much explanation, as Assad’s Syria has become a “heavy burden”, and the regime forces have lost the desire and ability to fight, and Russia and Iran no longer have the desire to preserve a regime that is no longer able to continue. Despite all the importance and necessity of Syria for Russia and Iran, they have concluded that it is not important to liberate Aleppo again, but rather more important to learn lessons from the current success achieved by the militants, and here are the facts revealed that all parties have rushed to put the finishing touches on the fall of the regime, and to carry out a process of transferring power with the least losses, and in a way that preserves the minimum interests of all.
Lesson of the fall of the Assad family regime
Here, perhaps, the first lesson is that no one fights other people’s wars, but fights his own battles, and stops according to the calculations of national security and the interests of his state in the first place. The second lesson is that freezing the war does not lead to victory. It only leads to the rearming and equipping of an almost defeated enemy, who can then pounce on you at an opportune moment. Russian writers say that if it seems to someone that we are talking about Syria, where (the militants were not eliminated, but a truce was reached with them in 2020, and now the right moment has come for them), we say no, we are talking about Ukraine. The third lesson is that political will is sometimes more important than short-term expediency. In 2019-2020, Russia, Syria and Iran had the opportunity to clean up the Idlib abscess, but Türkiye opposed it. Russian writers warn that Russia may find itself in a similar situation if it does not force the West to accept all its conditions by force of will. It is not limited to refusing to freeze the conflict with Kiev and forcing it to recognize the Russian regions, but rather it is about ensuring that what remains of Ukraine no longer poses a threat to Moscow at all.
The most important lesson remains the “awareness of the peoples”, and that they learn that preserving the homeland is their responsibility in the first place, and that cohesion and dialogue are the most important thing in these difficult moments, and that “he who covers himself without the consent of his people” is naked, and he and his homeland are at the mercy of the wind, and at the table of wolves who only know their interests, and do not fight the wars of others, and that “there are no alliances, but temporary partnerships”, and at the moment of truth when the flood comes, everyone puts the most precious thing they own under their feet in a desire to survive.
The challenges of the next day
After the fall of Assad, there are major challenges, in light of the multiplicity of visions regarding the path to building the new regime, especially in light of the presence of armed factions, societal division, and bitterness left by the previous regime due to its crimes that require fair trials, not revenge, vengeance, and new bloodbaths.
The truth is that the current scenes of the armed factions entering Damascus indicate that there is still a commitment to the instructions of the Operations Authority, which is supposed to manage the political and military situation, and called on people not to attack government institutions and not to shoot in the streets, and to consider everyone who laid down his weapon and did not kill people safe, and stressed respect for all sects and denominations in Syria, which fear revenge, especially the Alawites. It is true that these are reassuring beginnings, but they are not enough because the upcoming files will be much more difficult, especially with regard to two main files, the first is related to the future of the armed factions, and whether they will be integrated into the institutions of the new state?, and are the bases of the largest faction, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, ideologically prepared to integrate into new security and military institutions that are based on a democratic national doctrine in order to avoid what happened in Iraq in terms of the existence of regular state institutions and parallel militias? This challenge is not easy, far from the “open” speech that seemed positive to Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, on international channels because the bases of his organization still carry ideas that are against the democratic civil state. The second challenge is the interaction between the interior and exterior, and how the new Syria will be built in light of the presence of external interventions that have affected the choices of some Syrians. During Bashar’s era, the door was opened to external interventions to protect him, so he brought Russia and Iran, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, and even the Houthis came to Syria with militias from Pakistan and Afghanistan. As for the armed factions, Turkish support is certain, so will Syria move from an alliance with Iran that interferes in its most delicate internal affairs to an alliance with Türkiye? The challenge of building national independence that interacts with the world and the region is not an easy matter, especially in light of Türkiye’s keenness to besiege the Kurdish factions and establish a buffer zone, and also Russia’s keenness to maintain influence or bases on the Syrian coast. The internal and external challenges are great, and it will become clear in the coming days whether the Syrian people are able to overcome them or not.
Reproducing the ruling power
Perhaps the first test is the success of the force that overthrew Assad in gaining international acceptance and legitimacy. The force that carried out the operation came under the name “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” but it was quickly recognized as a new incarnation of “Jabhat al-Nusra,” which was the Syrian branch of “al-Qaeda.”
Whoever redesigned this force, as a “new and improved product,” wanted to achieve three goals:
The first was to transform it into something resembling a regular army with military uniforms, weapons, and high-quality equipment, and plans to establish an administration in the occupied areas.
The second goal was to distance it from the jihadist tendency by claiming that it would protect religious minorities and avoid the usual jihadist rhetoric that terrifies hearts.
Third, to market it as a liberation army whose primary goal is to expel unspecified “foreign occupiers.”
However, the use of the name “Bilad al-Sham” (Sham) places a question mark in front of the “liberating force.” By using this medieval term instead of “Syria,” which jihadists have long considered foreign because it was used under the French mandate, the group and its supporters implicitly deny the existence of a Syrian nation-state.
Instead, they see a vast, ungoverned territory that could be reshaped in a variety of ways, including by creating multiple mini-states that reflect current realities on the ground.
Over the past decade, Syria has been divided into fiefdoms, with Russia, Türkiye, Iran, the United States, the remnants of ISIS, and the Damascus authorities controlling parts of the territory through local elements or imported mercenaries.
Partitioning Syria
The idea of dividing Syria into statelets is most prominent in the Turkish media, but it is also echoed elsewhere
Over the past two years, Türkiye has taken several steps in this direction by establishing an administration in areas controlled by its allies in Idlib and imposing the Turkish lira as the local currency.
It has also begun “encouraging” some Syrian refugees in Türkiye to return home as employees of Turkish companies, often.
The capture of Aleppo by the “Shamian” force would enable Ankara to revive the Turkish economic presence in Syria’s industrial heartland.
Before the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, there were more than 400 Turkish companies operating in Aleppo, including many small and medium-sized enterprises, representing more than $50 billion in direct investment, the second-largest project in the country after the one implemented in Libya.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have another interest in redesigning Syria as a galaxy of mini states: to eliminate the Kurdish threat that the Syrian state has supported under the Assad family since the 1970s.
Some in Turkish political circles see the creation of “artificial states” after the fall of the Ottoman Empire as an act of vengeance by Western powers against the Turkish caliphate, which for centuries represented an Islamic challenge to Christendom’s goal of world rule.
Erdogan has always viewed the treaties imposed on the Turkish Republic, especially the Treaty of Lausanne, as an affront. Next year marks the centenary of that treaty and its legal expiration, which Erdogan has alluded to as an opportunity to “correct the injustices committed against Türkiye.”
In Erdogan’s view, this could reopen Turkish claims—if not sovereignty, at least “special rights”—to parts of Iraq and Syria.
The events of the past week, by shattering the illusion of a restabilized Syria, have emboldened those who see Syria as an artificial state. However, the pro-Erdogan Turkish political circles forget that all nation-states are artificial, because none of them fell from the sky completely.
It is worth noting that the Turkish Republic, founded in 1924, is only 22 years older than the Syrian Republic, which was born in 1946 with the end of the French mandate. Independent Iraq was born only 8 years after the Turkish Republic.
In a recent article titled “Enemies in the Form of Friends,” the well-known Iranian writer Amir Taheri warns that the argument that dividing the region into small states would reduce the risk of war is also unsustainable. An example of this is Gaza, which is not a state.
Denying the existence of a Syrian state with the full right to statehood and the territorial integrity of its territory poses a threat to the security and stability of the entire region.
Anyone who knows the facts on the ground knows that while the term “Sham” (Sham) is an ambiguous verbal characteristic, the word Syria refers to a national identity that is difficult to deny.
This sense of “Syrianness” began to take shape shortly after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Those who deny the existence of the Syrian nation cannot pretend to be friends of Syria or advocates of stability in the Middle East.
5 Possible Scenarios for Syria
At the same time, the Turkish newspaper “Sabah” recently considered that the change of power in Syria may be accompanied by 5 possible scenarios for the development of the situation, which may lead to the division and collapse of the Syrian state.
Scenario 1:
The establishment of the Syrian Democratic Republic through an alliance of opposition parties with their various factions and ideologies.
According to the newspaper, despite the difficulty of achieving this scenario, it will receive the support of Türkiye, Russia, the United States and European countries, as this option will preserve the integrity of Syria.
Scenario 2:
The declaration of the establishment of a “Syrian Islamic Republic” with the core of the terrorist organization “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham”. In this scenario, the administration of Syria will be in the hands of representatives of the Salafist movement who “do not bear ideological hostility to Israel and the United States”.
Scenario 3:
The establishment of an “anti-Shiite state under the control of Israel” in Syria. The doctrine of this state will be based on confronting Iranian influence, imposing a siege on the Lebanese “Hezbollah” and depriving it of the logistical and military support provided by Tehran.
Scenario 4:
The establishment of a “Federal Syrian Republic” under the auspices of the United States. In such a scenario, according to the newspaper, “Syria will be divided into small, scattered states similar to the Balkan states.”
Scenario 5:
Syria will be divided and disintegrated and a civil war will break out in it again, which will eventually lead to its complete collapse.
Israel begins dividing Syria
On the other hand, Rafael Fakhruddinov and Yevgeny Pozdnyakov, in an article in the Russian newspaper “Vzglyad”, believe that Israel has begun dividing Syria, in their explanation of the future of Syria as Israel wants it. The writers point out that Israel entered Syria for the first time since 1973, and there are reports of the presence of Israeli army tanks 20 kilometers from Damascus.
The writers attribute to the Israeli expert in international relations and national security, Simon Tsipis, saying: “Now Israeli tanks have approached the outskirts of Damascus, but, as far as we know, the Israeli army does not plan to occupy the Syrian capital. We will try to destroy as much military equipment, aircraft and ships belonging to Assad’s forces as possible. We will disarm Syria so that weapons do not fall into the hands of jihadists and extremist Islamic groups, and we will leave. But most likely, part of the territory in western Syria, for example, Quneitra, will remain with Israel.”
“As for the social and political side of the issue, in the near future the confrontation between the various factions in Syria will intensify. After that, there will be a centralization of power, the bandits will be eliminated or expelled, and the West will find controllable figures and put them in leadership positions. They will eventually sign a peace treaty with Israel without mutual claims,” the Israeli expert adds.
The Israeli expert concludes that as a result, Israel will have a less aggressive neighbor. He believes that another part of the Syrian territory will be occupied by the Kurds. Israel has normal relations with the Kurds. We welcome such changes.
He says, “Türkiye can occupy northern Syria. Here we do not see any problems either. Israel is a great friend of the West, and Türkiye is a member of NATO, so no questions should arise between us.
Accordingly, what remains of the current Syrian opposition will fall under Western protection. It is clear that they will not make any attempts to regain the lost territories. Small groups of extremists can be neglected.
Egyptian point of view
In contrast, Dr. Mohamed Fayez Farahat, head of the Al-Ahram Foundation, presents an important vision in a recent article entitled “Difficult Questions in Damascus and the Region”, and monitors the main lesson from the fall of Assad. He says that this lesson confirms itself repeatedly, “which is the danger of sacrificing the national state, and the danger of sacrificing the regular national armies.” What the region has been going through since 2011, and even since 2003, confirms this lesson, such that it can be said that the region is further away from stability and security as it moves away from the stability of the national state and the regular national armies, and the weaker the national state and the regular national armies, the greater the chances of instability and the deeper the state of chaos. This inverse relationship is confirmed in the event of the availability of two additional conditions, the first of which is the state of pluralism and ethnic and religious division within society, and the second is the sectarian and demographic entanglement with the countries of the region; the deeper these divisions and entanglements, the greater the chances of the repercussions of the collapse of the state and the national armies spreading outside their borders Direct.
Farhat explains that the importance of this conclusion is that it establishes the necessity of building a rapid regional consensus on saving the Syrian state, based on redefining the nature of the crisis and the nature of the ongoing conflict in Syria. There are political and security concerns among a number of regional parties that cannot be denied, but there are also strong Arab interests linked to Syria and the region, which cannot be ignored, denied or overlooked by any other party. Therefore, when regional and international parties deal with the Syrian file, they must stop at presenting their security concerns without this coming at the expense of determining the fate and future of the Syrian state or Syrian society, as these matters must remain the property of the Syrian people only. This also means the necessity of starting from another given, which is the necessity of preserving the Syrian army as a primary condition for preserving the Syrian state. Here, we must draw inspiration from the experiences of other countries in the region. There must be a strict distinction between the Syrian army and the Syrian regime. This distinction is necessitated by the serious repercussions that could affect everyone in the event of the collapse of the Syrian state and its regular army, based on the specificity of the Syrian file within the region, based on the previously mentioned conditions.
Farhat demands that there be a political process to manage a transitional phase, inspired by the lessons of the existing cases of stumbling in the region. There are basic conditions known to build a political process that can be implemented and sustained, so that it serves the interests of stabilizing the Syrian state and building a stable, inclusive political system. The first of these conditions relates to this political process being national and owned by the Syrian people and Syrian political forces, starting from formulation to implementation. The second condition is to free this process from complete dependence on external balances, so that external parties do not have the right to disrupt this process or exercise the right to veto it.
Once again, with an understanding of the security concerns of the regional parties, the Syrian state must only deal with these concerns, and in a way that does not come at the expense of its sovereignty and national security. The region’s experiences say that removing the regime may represent the easiest link in the process of change, but the most difficult is the process of building an alternative system. The same experience also says that without the presence and maintenance of national armies, the construction process becomes more difficult and may not even begin at all.
A test for Al-Julani
A reassuring speech that is hoped to be a sincere expression of a desire for comprehensive national reconciliation that Syria is in dire need of today. So far, the speech of the leader of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” who now goes by his real name “Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa,” instead of his nickname “Abu Muhammad Al-Julani,” seems promising. This speech was coupled with a positive initiative represented in preserving state institutions and demanding that the existing government continue to handle business so that there is no vacuum.
Syria has entered a completely new phase in its history, which has been filled with varying disturbances since the coup against the union with Egypt in 1961. What happened in 2011, in one of its dimensions, was only the result of an accumulation of disturbances whose dynamics cannot be stopped without a serious national dialogue leading to reconciliation. This may seem difficult, but it is not far-fetched. The beginning may be with a dialogue among the armed factions, and with the opposition abroad, “the National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.” The agreement to work against Bashar al-Assad’s regime does not mean that they agree on what comes after it.
These factions must have a specific program to present to the people, and on the basis of it, they must negotiate with various parties, including the remnants of the Baath Party, which it is hoped will be dealt with better than what happened to its counterpart in Iraq. This will be a test of Sharaa’s talk about “a conquest without revenge,” and what was stated in Statement No. 1 of the opposition factions.
As for settling the chronic conflict with the “Syrian Democratic Forces” groups led by the Kurdish “People’s Protection Units,” it may be a greater test. This conflict has drained significant Syrian capabilities and resources over many decades, although its solution is easy if the national interest is taken into consideration, or above any other consideration. This solution does not necessarily have to be similar to what happened in Iraq, especially since the Kurds’ demands can be met within the framework of specific and limited autonomy.
But this path, which could end Syria’s difficult years, depends on the position of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as the largest faction among the armed factions if Sharaa continues the approach he began in recent days.
A war for oil
On the other hand, the wars in Syria are unlikely to end here. One possibility is a war for oil.
Syria has never been a serious player in the global oil market. But the fields are under the control of pro-American forces, and the new authorities need to supply themselves and the areas under their control with fuel, which Iran previously provided to the government of Bashar al-Assad.
Igor Yushkov, an expert at the Russian state-run financial university, says that the groups that Türkiye has controlled in recent years are located in poor areas and do not control oil fields. So, now that the government has changed in Syria, the oil war may begin.
“Taking over the wells is also essential for Türkiye. On the one hand, Ankara considers the Syrian Kurds terrorists and wants to destroy their livelihood; on the other hand, the Turkish authorities have an interest in taking control of a group of fields so that the new authorities can at least supply themselves with fuel and relieve Ankara of this burden. Therefore, among the latest news is the outbreak of fighting between the “opposition” and the Kurds. According to the Daily Sabah, the Syrian National Army has taken control of Manbij, located in the north of the country, east of Aleppo, from the Kurds.”
The Turkish role
At the present moment, many Turkish experts believe that we are at the beginning of a new Middle East, free from the foreign intervention that has plagued the region for a long time.
While the end of the Assad regime heralded a new era in Syria, it also announced Türkiye’s evolution from a regional power to a global game maker.
Although “Russia and Iran’s focus on other fronts” and the 13-year “fatigue” in Syria were the reason for moving the dynamics of the process, Türkiye was undoubtedly the mastermind of the process that disrupted the plans of all these powers, including the United States, Russia, Iran and France.
On the one hand, Türkiye eliminated the terrorist state project of the terrorists supported by the United States in the region with its operations, and on the other hand, it succeeded in curbing the policies of Assad’s supporters, Russia and Iran, in Syria through the Astana formula. In other words, the table held in Doha was a table that declared the bankruptcy of all the plans of Russia, Iran and the United States in Syria. Through this table, Türkiye announced to the world who is the decision-making state in the region.
Turkish experts say that Türkiye has been taking the initiative from the first minute for a smooth transition to a new governance structure that reflects the wishes of the Syrian people who have suffered a great tragedy. In the minutes when Assad fled to Moscow, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was holding a meeting with the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran in Doha.
“All minorities in Syria must be treated fairly. A new government must be formed in an inclusive manner and the opposition forces must unite. We have been in intensive contact with regional and international actors in the past week. We will do our utmost to restore peace and security in Syria,” Fidan said after the meeting. The fact that this speech came after a meeting with representatives of the two countries that have kept Assad in power for 13 years was significant.
In 13 years, Türkiye has taken steps to prevent the establishment of a terrorist state on its borders despite its alleged allies and the terrorist organizations they support, while abiding by international law and teaching the world a lesson by welcoming more than 3 million Syrian refugees.
“Ghosts of Chaos” looms over the region
Ultimately, a major effort and understandings are needed to pave the way for a UN-led political mission in Syria to implement Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a Syrian-led political transition. Although the UN is not perfect, it is best suited to this task because it will respect the resolution by allowing Syrians to lead their own national future and act as a neutral party in the process. This process could be ensured by the main international players – the United States, Russia and Türkiye – in cooperation with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan, given their influence over the main Syrian groups.
Once a UN-backed political process and key stakeholders are established, a national dialogue could begin, perhaps within or alongside a Syrian constitutional committee representing all the main Syrian groups. At present, the main Kurdish elements are excluded from the now defunct mechanism – a reality imposed by Ankara, given its opposition to the PKK-affiliated People’s Protection Units (YPG), the main component of the Syrian Democratic Forces.
If HTS’s supposed support for inclusive governance is real, some argue that including Syrian Kurds and granting them some autonomy in northeastern Syria might be an appropriate move.
Kurdish autonomy would require a grand bargain between Türkiye and the United States, given the former’s rejection of any such outcome in Syria. However, such talks would be essential to ensure that Washington’s Syrian partners are protected and represented. Most important, they would allow the United States to withdraw its forces from northeastern Syria, a crucial point for the country’s future and to determine the extent of its military commitments in the region.
Most experts agree that any political process must be accompanied by a massive reconstruction effort to avoid repeating similar mistakes in other post-Arab Spring countries. Ultimately, any new governance process will need the buy-in of its people. If those people see that a failed government run by a motley crew of former warlords is failing to improve their lives, anti-government forces will succeed in bringing it down.
Finally, intensive efforts at local peacebuilding are needed across Syria. The country’s fault lines remain strong after nearly 14 years of conflict, with a deep mistrust that runs along traditional ethno-sectarian lines.
International powers such as Europe, China, Russia, the United States, and Arab states should support stabilization efforts by providing low-cost development aid and international grants to stabilize the country. In the absence of local efforts to build social cohesion and a failed political process, renewed fighting or fragmentation of the country could spell the end of Syria.
Ultimately, it is in the interests of the United States, Russia, Türkiye, and all regional states to commit to a framework that ensures Syria’s stability, territorial viability, and political transition. Smart policy is what ensures sustainable stability in the heart of the Middle East. Ignoring the situation risks renewed fighting that undermines the foreign policy priorities of these major powers.
No need for early celebration
From another survivor, there are justifications that prompt Türkiye to celebrate the fall of Assad. Erdogan’s government can rest for a while because it got rid of the costly and exhausting refugee crisis, and its success in leading the scene of removing Assad and negotiating the engineering of Syria’s future. However, the Turkish elite must be careful with its speech at the moment of euphoria of victory, and it must not send the wrong messages to the Arab world.
It is most likely that Türkiye’s troubles have not ended, but have begun, and there are many enemies of Ankara who do not hide their desire to divide Türkiye, and are working with all their might to contain the rising Türkiye, and most importantly, demonizing Türkiye and establishing the concept of the “Turkish danger” as an alternative to the Iranian danger, and preventing natural rapprochement between Türkiye and the Arab world.
I believe that the fall of Assad represents the most difficult test of Türkiye’s rapprochement with the Arab world, and this crisis provides an opportunity for cooperation, and allaying the fears of Arab capitals from the agenda of reviving “neo-Ottomanism”, and Türkiye’s dominance over decision-making in a number of Arab capitals. If Türkiye does not hasten to control its official discourse and the euphoria of the Turkish elite, Türkiye will be making the biggest mistake by repeating the Iranian mistake with its elite talking about Iranian hegemony and expansion in the Arab world. Most likely, the influential Arab countries want a normal partnership that grows and may reach an alliance between equal parties and will not accept a relationship of hegemony or interference in their internal affairs.