By Masoud Sadrmohammadi
The sudden and unopposed fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, which has been the central topic of global political discussions over the past three weeks, has also captured attention in Iran. This event holds particular significance for the Iranian government and people because it directly ties to Iran’s regional strategy, which has been a crucial part of its security and political agenda in the region over the past 40 years, especially in the last two decades.
The fall of Assad, coming immediately after the ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel and while Hamas is facing its most difficult situation in Gaza—with no sign of flexibility from Israel to stop the genocide there—has suddenly raised questions about the effectiveness of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” strategy and its success in the current and future Middle Eastern landscape.
The presence of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah’s strength in Lebanon, and Hamas’s active role in Palestine were all considered strategic assets for Iran in maintaining a deterrent power against Israel. However, within just one year, these assets have been lost—through the assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders and finally the fall of Bashar al-Assad. This situation has placed Tehran in an unprecedented position, requiring the development of new policies to address the emerging challenges.
While some politicians in Tehran remain optimistic about the future, arguing that the current blows to the Axis of Resistance are natural setbacks that occur in any prolonged struggle, others warn about the domino effect of these losses, even likening the situation to the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to these analysts, while Israel has lost much of its former moral legitimacy and is now widely regarded in global public opinion as a criminal regime, it has nonetheless gained the strategic upper hand.
Israel’s newfound sense of empowerment may drive it toward direct actions against Iran, potentially delivering severe blows to Iran’s strategic interests within its own borders.
It is essential to note that, as the Gaza war prolonged, the analytical discourse in Iran was divided into two camps:
Strategy of patience to reduce costs
The First Group: This group argued that Iran should avoid falling into the trap of Israel’s war. According to them, Israel, by provoking Iran, aimed to shift its war in Gaza from a confrontation with defenseless civilians to a war with Iran. In such a scenario, the genocidal crimes in Gaza would be overshadowed, and Israel would gain an opportunity to portray itself as a victim, securing international support from the U.S. and Europe. Therefore, this group believed that Iran should engage with Israel at the minimum possible level, avoiding escalation into a broader conflict that could inevitably draw in the U.S., NATO, and regional Arab countries. This group cited Iran’s severe economic challenges, public dissatisfaction with the government, the president’s death, internal political shifts, the risk of attacks on Iran’s oil infrastructure, and the potential loss of its primary income sources as critical reasons to steer clear of this war.
Strategy of delivering the first blow
The Second Group: In contrast, this group believed that Israel had decided to sever Iran’s influence in the Middle East. They argued that if Iran did not deliver a painful blow to Israel and escalate tensions to a level that would deter Israel from targeting Iran’s strategic interests, the costs of inaction would be far greater than the arguments anti-war advocates presented. From this group’s perspective, a confrontation with Israel, where Iran delivers hard blows, is a matter of strategic survival. On the other hand, refraining from confrontation at this point would only delay an inevitable death in the future—not the destruction of the Islamic Republic but a decline in Iran’s status as a regional power. This group believed Iran could achieve significant deterrence against Israel by delivering severe blows, as demonstrated in two of Iran’s missile attacks, which showcased its technological capabilities, and by shifting its nuclear strategy toward producing and testing nuclear weapons. An assessment of the Islamic Republic’s actions over the past year suggests that Iran adopted the first group’s viewpoint but did not entirely refrain from targeting Israel either.
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad, these two factions have increasingly moved toward confrontation and are now reevaluating the “Axis of Resistance” strategy.
Abandoning the Axis of Resistance
According to the first group, Iran, as a regional power, does not possess the necessary capacity for prolonged international engagement, particularly in light of the forty years of sanctions and the intensified measures over the past decade aimed at crippling the country. This group argues that Iran has no choice but to align itself with a larger international power, such as Russia, China, the United States, or the European Union. They attribute Iran’s 13-year success in Syria to Russia’s cooperation with Iran’s regional strategy, which aimed to neutralize the United States and thwart Western plans.
This group believes that Iran should not bear burdens beyond its capabilities. While all Arab and Muslim countries in the region have limited their responses to the Palestinian issue to mere verbal condemnation of Israel, Iran should avoid plunging itself into direct conflict with Israel. Iran has already borne significant costs in its confrontation with Israel and Western plans to secure the regime’s safety, while failing to achieve objectives such as ensuring its national security and improving the welfare of its citizens. As a result, the fall of Bashar al-Assad has left Iran in a state of strategic ambiguity and uncertainty.
Under the current circumstances, Iran must make difficult decisions and adopt a policy of turning inward, refraining from unnecessary political and military expenditures on the Axis of Resistance. This policy would signal to the West, particularly the United States, that as long as Israel does not harm Iran’s vital interests, Iran sees no need for confrontation with the regime and will not take actions to threaten Western interests in the region. Such an approach would both manage tensions between Iran and the West and create economic and political breathing room for Iran.
According to this faction, the Axis of Resistance strategy is a failed approach, and persisting with it will only impose additional unnecessary costs on Iran.
Emphasizing the Axis of Resistance
In contrast, the second faction argues that retreating from the strategic policy of resistance against Western plans in the region will pave the way for further retreats by the Iranian government, shifting the battlefield from external arenas to domestic ones. At a time when the concept and foundation of the Resistance are under maximum attack, abandoning this strategy would be akin to opening the gates of the fortress to the enemy. Instead, they assert, this is precisely the time when the most robust support for the Resistance should be provided.
Engaging with Israel and supporting resistance governments and groups is seen as a natural part of Iran’s national identity, which has defined itself with an anti-imperialist stance since the early 20th century. This identity has successfully positioned the fight against imperialism as an essential component of Iran’s national character.
This faction accuses the first group of exaggerating the severity of the country’s situation. They believe that Iran, with effective management, accelerated decision-making in strategic matters, improved bureaucratic performance, and, most importantly, strengthened relations between the government and the people, can define a new sphere for itself. Major shifts in the governing discourse, they argue, are only feasible when the leadership is confident in its control over the situation.
Under the current circumstances, any tendency to alter Iran’s anti-imperialist discourse—interpreted as a retreat—would only double the pressure from Israel and the U.S., forcing Iran into maximum changes in its ideological and political-security orientation.
Confronting reality
While each of the two discourses mentioned above has its own supporters and is competing within the system of the Islamic Republic, one point remains clear: there is a consensus on the need for change in Iran’s current political situation, both domestically and internationally.
Over the past five decades, three main approaches have emerged to ensure the security of the Middle East against Israel and to curb its ambitions:
- Governmental confrontation with Israel: This theory, rooted in Arab nationalism, failed following the lack of success by leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and ultimately the Assad family in their struggles against Israel.
- Normalization of relations with Israel: This theory, currently pursued by Arab Gulf states, suggests that the best way to control Israel is by establishing relations and creating shared interests with it.
- Reliance on popular power: Known as the “Axis of Resistance,” this theory posits that the most effective way to confront Israel is to focus on empowering grassroots movements against it and meeting their needs for the fight. By strengthening these grassroots movements, a spontaneous yet coordinated axis can emerge, enabling maximum pressure on Israel.
However, the passivity of the region’s people in the face of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, the severe blows inflicted on Hezbollah and Hamas, the assassinations of the key intellectual and organizational leaders of these groups, the siege of Yemen and Israel’s attacks on the country, Iraq’s incomplete cooperation with resistance groups, the political pressures from pro-Western factions in Lebanon against Hezbollah, and, most significantly, the diminished financial and military support Iran can provide to various groups—all these factors are driving Iran toward reconsidering its perspective and approach to the “Axis of Resistance.”
Looking at the experience of the past year and a half following the Gaza war, it seems that Iran is pursuing a middle path between the two aforementioned theories. On the one hand, Iran appears inclined toward flexibility and pragmatism on certain issues, while on the other, it is steadfastly holding onto some of its core values. Iran’s next steps will likely depend on the nature of the response it receives from the U.S. and the West to its flexibility.
In any case, it can be argued that Iran is facing a new reality and has no choice but to adapt to the demands of this new reality.