Milei’s wave

How he provokes the people and the mistakes of the left.

By Yunus Soner

Having taken ower power in December 2023, Javier Milei has comleted his first year as Argentine president. He has since then changed the country’s economic policy drastically, but also led fundamental changes in political culture.

Andrés Rodriguéz is veteran politician of the left New Encounter. In interview, he explains why the Argentine left has been defeated and what these changes are.

Let us start with what changed with Milei in political culture.

Well, after Milei, nothing will be the same anymre, because an era is coming to an end. This as an era where consensus, non-violence, tolerance in some way, dominated Argentine politics from the dictatorship until now. Everything was consensual, everything was to build agreements. Yes, there was an ideological framework, there was an ideological framework, but all sectors had a kind of consensual mandate. Milei came to break that in Argentine politics.

Perhaps the most bizarre expression of that consensus was Alberto Fernández and his idea of building a consensus, this idea of let’s all be friends, let’s get along, democracy explained as consensus, as agreement, as not being extremist.

That was so overacted on the part of Alberto Fernández that perhaps it influenced more in some sense in the weariness of people in that way than his economic policy that was also bad. This talk about inflation is important without a doubt, but the form to exercise politics, Milei’s use of the idea of caste linked to those who are dedicated to politics in all senses, in any political space, convinced more in the people than even the economic question.

Why did the Left back then loose the elections?

The problem is that until the last election, we explained everything through excuses: We can’t do this because, we can’t do that because…

Well there is a tiredness of excuses. To the national and popular space, the left, whatever you want to call that in Argentina, we are left without promise of the future, we do not promise anything to the people, we do not build an expectation of improvement and that Milei promises.

What was in contrast to that Milei’s proposal?

Milei proposed order. A kind of order.

See, left movements in Argentina used to protest a lot, cut streets, stop traffic etc, when negotiating. That had turned to a daily habit, causing interruptions in daily life. They did this until a certain agreement was achieved.

Now, the country is calmer. Obviously, there is repression, threats etc. But protests have stopped. And the people are happy with that. This is a form of Bukelization (President of El Salvador who applied harsh state measures against criminal gangs and other actors in his country, UWI.)

In Argentina it is said that there is always a pendulum: the national and popular space wins, all economic policy goes to one side, loses, and it goes to the other side: Bteween liberalism and statism. Now, the Argentine population is tired of that pendulum.

The population was tired of our excuses, and also of our consistent reference to how bad things were 10 years ago. Our struggles of the past do not find echo in today’s generation.

Now, I don’t think that Milei’s policies, especially the economic ones, will result in anything good for the people. But that don’t mean that the left will have the according alternatives or answers.

The increase in rates of poverty is already alarming. The cut in benefits for the people comes on top of that.

In fact, Milei’s basic idea is the following: There is those who work, especially in the agriculture, and who do earn dollars. And for him, the rest does now work but relies on state. They get subsidies, rent support etc. He works on the duality of those who work and those who are lazy.

That causes a thought in the people’s minds: Whoever has a job, considers himself as a diligent person, and opposes those claimed to be lazy.

But catch that: who ever gets a payment from the state is now considered ınproductive and lazy. That includes even people who are working in the university as researchers abd academics. They are considered privileged and lazy at the same time. Here, the working poos are provoked against the intellectuals.

In accordance with that, pressure increases on scientists: They must produce results more rapidly that pay out. Along comes the argument that the private sector should lead the development of technology etc.

And if you listen to the streets, to theb ordinary people, you will see that a lot of them are convinced of these thoughts. Private is productive, state is laziness, is the equation.

This has to a certain degree started during the COVID pandemic. I’ll give you an example: There was the mechanic, who had a repair shop. During the pandemic, it was closed due to safety regulations, and he was deprived of his income. On the other side, a lot of middle class people started working from their homes, also as a health measure.

Then, this mechanic takes a look around, and I have to emphasize that neighborhoods are very mixed in Argentina, so he takes a look and sees how the academics and state employees not even go to work and keep on earning their wages. And the mechanic blamed it on the state, even more that the government, the state.

And there came Milei, promising not to regulate, not to prohibit, and also not to to subsidize. He started his political career during the pandemic, as an anti-vaccination personality. And that mechanic and others in his situation were his first supporters.

The mechanic meanwhile did receive state support, but was ashamed of it. And Milei promised to liberate him from the shackel and the shame. And promised the government of the mechanic.

What is the political culture Milei promotes?

It is one of the potential. He promotes the potential, the “you can do it”, the belief o

In oneself. It is very masculine, very tribal if you will. They are very provoked, and I don’t know how they will cope with failure.

This is a new style of politics. They do not form part of a consensus culture, where today one agrees in one point, the next day, disagrees in another, while institutional channels mediate disagreements. They actually reject these instutional channels.

Is this a kind of end for the bourgeois democracy?

We have a crisis of state at the global level, which we can detect as a crisis of democracy. In that sense, yes.