By Mehmet Enes Beşer
The autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, nestled in Central Asia under Uzbekistan’s sovereignty, has long been a simmering cauldron of separatist tensions. Recent protests in 2022 against proposed constitutional changes—which sought to revoke the region’s autonomy—highlighted the fragility of its political status. For the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), a bloc promoting solidarity among Turkic-speaking nations, Karakalpakstan presents both a challenge and an opportunity to demonstrate its conflict-resolution capabilities. This crisis tests whether OTS can transcend symbolic gestures to address the complex interplay of historical grievances, environmental collapse, and governance failures driving unrest.
During the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Karakalpakstan was granted autonomous status within Uzbekistan, with a provision for a 2013 independence referendum that never materialized. This unfulfilled promise, coupled with Tashkent’s heavy-handed governance, has fueled resentment. The 2022 protests, triggered by attempts to erase the region’s constitutional right to secede, underscored the disconnect between central authority and local aspirations.
The region’s identity is tied to the Karakalpaks, a Turkic ethnic group whose language and traditions have survived centuries of external domination. Yet, Soviet-era gerrymandering—which attached Karakalpakstan to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and finally Uzbekistan—ignored ethnic cohesion, embedding a legacy of political marginalization.
Beyond history, Karakalpakstan’s separatist impulses are inextricably linked to ecological disaster. The near-total disappearance of the Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth-largest lake, has devastated livelihoods. Soviet irrigation projects diverted rivers feeding the sea, leaving behind toxic dust bowls and collapsing fisheries. Over 90% of the Aral’s volume has vanished since the 1960s, displacing communities and creating a public health crisis. This environmental catastrophe has eroded trust in Tashkent. Locals perceive the central government as indifferent to their plight, focusing instead on extracting Karakalpakstan’s natural resources, including oil and gas reserves. The Aral crisis exemplifies how ecological neglect can morph into political instability—a lesson for Central Asia’s climate-vulnerable states.
OTS, comprising Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Turkic states, has positioned itself as a mediator in regional conflicts. Yet, Karakalpakstan is its first major test in peacemaking.
OTS could leverage Türkiye’s diplomatic heft to facilitate talks. Ankara’s nuanced ties with both Tashkent and ethnic Turkic groups—bolstered by cultural affinity—position it as a credible mediator. In 2023, Türkiye brokered a water-sharing deal between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, showcasing its capacity for pragmatic diplomacy. Replicating this model in Karakalpakstan would require discreet backchannel negotiations, avoiding the public posturing that often derails such efforts.
Sanctions and isolation rarely curb authoritarian regimes, as seen in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Instead, targeted economic aid could alleviate Karakalpakstan’s distress. OTS might champion microfinance initiatives for agriculture or fund renewable energy projects to mitigate water scarcity. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), active in Uzbekistan, offers a cautionary tale: infrastructure investments lacking local buy-in breed resentment. OTS must ensure projects prioritize Karakalpak voices—for instance, reviving the Aral Sea through transboundary water management.
Moreover, OTS’ emphasis on shared Turkic heritage could help reconcile identity tensions. Expanding educational exchanges and preserving Karakalpak language programs would counter assimilation fears. However, cultural outreach must avoid appearing as a Trojan horse for Turkish or Uzbek influence.
OTS’ success in Karakalpakstan will reverberate beyond Central Asia. Russia, which delisted the Taliban as terrorists in 2024, has courted OTS members through forums like the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. Meanwhile, China eyes the region’s resources, offering tariff-free trade to the Taliban while ignoring its abuses. If OTS falters, external powers could exploit the vacuum, undermining Turkic solidarity.
For Uzbekistan, conceding greater autonomy to Karakalpakstan would set a risky precedent amid its own struggles with ethnic minorities. Yet, repression risks radicalizing the population, as seen in the 2022 violence. OTS role is not to impose solutions but to create pathways for incremental reforms—a middle ground between Tashkent’s rigidity and separatist demands.
OTS’ response to Karakalpakstan will define its relevance in a multipolar Asia. Unlike the EU or ASEAN, it lacks institutional muscle, relying instead on cultural bonds. To succeed, it must prove that Turkic unity is more than rhetorical—transforming shared history into actionable policies.
Karakalpakstan also underscores the urgency of integrating environmental security into diplomacy. The Aral crisis is not merely a local tragedy but a warning: climate-induced displacement and resource conflicts will reshape Eurasia’s political landscape. OTS, by addressing these intertwined challenges, could pioneer a model for holistic conflict resolution—one that balances sovereignty, sustainability, and human dignity.
As global powers pivot to Asia, the Turkic world’s ability to navigate this crisis will determine whether it emerges as a cohesive bloc or fractures under the weight of its contradictions. For Karakalpakstan’s people, the stakes are even higher: their future hinges on whether regional diplomacy can translate ambition into action.