By Islam Farag, from Cairo / Egypt
As is its custom, the Middle East remains a volatile landscape, a region in perpetual flux where alliances and strategic calculations shift faster than its actors can anticipate. Over the past few years, coalitions formed for and against the Arab Spring; then, as interests and objectives evolved, new alignments emerged—uniting former foes and dividing old friends. These shifts occurred under various banners: the war on terror, the confrontation with Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, the containment of Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and the alternating stances toward the Assad regime in Syria.
In almost every instance, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stood in the same trench. However, in recent weeks, the strategic alliance that endured for decades has finally fractured.
A Sudden and Decisive Decision
Riyadh took a sudden and decisive step by launching a military strike on the port of Al-Mukalla in Yemen. The port was viewed as a primary gateway for supplying weapons to the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a proxy force backed by the UAE that was preparing to secede. Furthermore, Riyadh issued a stern warning to its former ally, setting a deadline for an expedited Emirati withdrawal from Yemen.
Only a decade ago, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were primary partners in the military campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis. The two nations, alongside Egypt and Bahrain, coordinated a blockade against Qatar. They also pursued nearly identical regional policies, such as supporting the transition in Egypt against President Mohamed Morsi and collaborating in the global war on terror.
While recent years saw a degree of economic rivalry—centered on attracting regional headquarters for multinational firms or disputes over OPEC’s oil policies—few observers expected the relationship to escalate into an open confrontation of this magnitude. Today, Riyadh is mobilizing its full political, economic, and diplomatic weight, rallying regional allies for what can be described as a comprehensive “purge” of Emirati influence in the region.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia executed rapid political and military maneuvers that neutralized the STC. It moved to fund the “Nation’s Shield” forces as a local military alternative to curtail the influence of pro-Emirati factions. In Somalia—which recently annulled agreements justifying the presence of Emirati forces—the Kingdom provided massive financial and military support to the central government in Mogadishu to assert its sovereignty and prevent the secession of “Somaliland.” In Sudan, Riyadh has joined forces with Cairo to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which enjoys unprecedented military backing from the UAE.
Rational and Justified Moves
According to observers, Saudi Arabia’s steps are rational and justified as an attempt to protect its national security, which had become vulnerable to secessionist proxies backed by Abu Dhabi.
In Yemen, the Kingdom—having spent hundreds of billions of dollars to prevent Houthi hegemony—can no longer tolerate the emergence of a separatist entity in the south that owes its loyalty to a foreign power. The success of such a separatist project would effectively grant the UAE exceptional control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, particularly given Abu Dhabi’s de facto control over the Yemeni island of Socotra.
In Somalia, Saudi Arabia could not remain a bystander as Emirati influence expanded across the Red Sea through diplomatic and financial support for Somaliland. Such a development would have handed Abu Dhabi the strategic keys to the Red Sea—a vital pillar of Saudi national security that cannot be compromised. Similarly, allowing Sudan to descend into state failure and partition at the hands of the RSF would have meant ceding influence over a critical maritime corridor to the UAE.
The Saudi Awakening
While analysts understand these Saudi moves, many are surprised by what appears to be a sudden awakening. The separatist projects supported by the UAE in these three countries have been evident for years; why move only now?
It is difficult to believe the Kingdom simply “woke up.” Rather, politics is the art of dealing with shifting variables. Many observers believe that the events of the last two years fundamentally altered Riyadh’s priorities. What was once viewed as mere economic competition over ports is now seen as a comprehensive plan to encircle and besiege the Kingdom. These facts crystallized following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation in 2023 and the subsequent prolonged Israeli war on Gaza.
Prior to that operation, Saudi Arabia seemed on the verge of joining the “Abraham Accords” and normalizing ties with Tel Aviv. However, the war completely upended the regional equation. Instead of pursuing that path to secure U.S. concessions for a regional alliance against Iran, Riyadh found itself facing a new reality.
The war revealed that Tehran was not the invincible force once imagined, nor were its regional proxies capable of further threatening their neighbors. Conversely, Israel appeared vulnerable against a resistance lacking sophisticated weaponry. Riyadh found an opportunity to assert its regional leadership without entangling itself with a party accused of genocide in Gaza.
The “Cat’s Paw”
This new landscape presented threats that Riyadh had not previously prioritized. Chief among them was the realization that Tel Aviv—once excluded from Gulf perceptions of immediate threats—was willing to act against any Gulf state to serve its interests. This was evidenced when Tel Aviv targeted Doha to assassinate Hamas leaders to pressure negotiations, despite Qatar being a high-level U.S. ally.
Most importantly, the war revealed that Emirati maneuvers—previously viewed as efforts to secure economic interests in Yemen, Somalia, or Sudan—were, in fact, the “cat’s paw” for Israel. These moves were part of an Israeli agenda to dominate the entry and exit points of the Red Sea, a vital artery for global trade and a cornerstone of Arab security for powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
This became undeniable when Israel’s unusual recognition of Somaliland coincided with the STC’s push for secession in Yemen, alongside clear evidence of Emirati supplies of advanced weaponry to the RSF in violation of international resolutions. For years, the UAE and Israel have pursued a shared vision to control the Bab al-Mandab Strait by dominating maritime hubs from Socotra and Mayun Island in Yemen to Berbera and Bosaso in Somalia.
Abu Dhabi found in these corridors strategic assets to compensate for its small geographical size. With the Abraham Accords, this ambition transformed into a joint project with Tel Aviv to turn the Gulf of Aden into a “security lake” under their control, securing Israel’s trade route to Asia far from international scrutiny. Emirati investments became a veil for Israeli maritime control and strategic depth.
New Alliances
In response to the rapid developments in Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan, Riyadh’s reaction was swift. It has sought to coordinate with regional states harmed by Emirati influence, particularly Egypt. Cairo, burdened by economic challenges, faces a direct threat from Emirati actions in Sudan and Somalia, as well as Abu Dhabi’s support for Ethiopia in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute.
Following a period of cool relations, a flurry of diplomatic activity has occurred between Riyadh and Cairo, coinciding with the Saudi moves in Yemen and the Sudanese army’s resurgence. This has sparked talk of a potential “Great Power Alliance” comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye against Israeli-Emirati “overreach.” Pakistan, linked to Saudi Arabia by defense pacts and a recent supplier of arms to the Sudanese army, could be a fourth pillar.
The secessionist tendencies fueled by Israel and the UAE could serve as the catalyst for this quad-alliance to defend regional security, especially as the Iranian threat has receded and the rhetoric of its proxies has been proven hollow. If such an alliance succeeds in thwarting the plans of Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, it would represent a historic opportunity to redraw the map of regional cooperation, ending the era of conflicts and rivalries between major regional states and denying Israel cost-free gains at the expense of Arab peoples.
However, while Saudi moves present an opportunity, they may also trigger countermoves from the opposing axis, potentially leading to clashes in different theaters and reshuffling the deck once again in a region defined by its fragile and shifting alliances.