As regional tensions escalate between Washington and Tehran, Iraq finds itself once again at the heart of the storm, with growing activity from armed militias and volunteer groups ostensibly “defending Iran” amidst a complex political and security landscape.
Just one day after the first round of US-Iranian negotiations in Muscat, which concluded without any clear results beyond an agreement to hold further meetings, Iraq witnessed a significant escalation. This escalation was marked by announcements of volunteer recruitment and on-the-ground movements, reigniting fears that Iraq is becoming a battleground in the escalating regional conflict.
Concerns are mounting about Iraq’s future, particularly given the political crisis surrounding the next prime minister. The US opposes the return of Nouri al-Maliki to lead Iraq, while Iran supports the controversial politician.
Meanwhile, there is a desire, both domestically and internationally, for the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, to remain in office. These concerns are compounded by fears of a resurgence of sectarian violence and the return of ISIS. Where is Iraq headed?
“Suicide Brigades”
In the latest alarming development on the Iraqi scene, thousands of civilians in Diyala province announced their readiness to volunteer to support the security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces, while also affirming their willingness to defend Iran should it face any external threat.
The announcement came during a public gathering in a district of Muqdadiyah, where it was confirmed that lists of volunteers, comprising approximately 5,000 individuals, would be submitted to the relevant operations command. This move has raised widespread questions about its political and security implications, particularly given the explicit link between volunteering and confronting “American intervention in Iran.”
Days earlier, armed factions, including Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, began recruiting volunteers to join formations they have dubbed “Suicide Brigades.” This recruitment drive, accompanied by religious and political mobilization speeches, emphasized preparedness to confront any potential targeting of Iran, marking one of the most significant escalations in months.
The Sectarian Game
Many Iraqis fear that the Americans want to use Iraq to incite sectarian conflict between Iran and other countries in the region.
At the same time, Arab and Turkish elites see the need to fortify Iraq and send a clear message that there will be a regional response to the Americans rejecting any attempt to reignite sectarian conflicts, and that they will not allow a new tension between Iraq and Syria.
The likelihood of a new sectarian war erupting in Iraq increases if war breaks out between Iran and the United States. In that case, there is a risk of the armed conflict spreading from Iraq to neighboring countries, especially if Israel and American mouthpieces give the conflict with Iran a sectarian dimension, potentially pushing the Iranian elite to become involved under the pretext of providing direct aid to the Iraqi government.
Conversely, Washington might resort to using ISIS in this dirty war, which necessitates confronting the organization’s operations and thwarting its plans to advance on Baghdad, as witnessed in Iraq and Syria during the height of ISIS’s rise.
Arab states and Türkiye understand that the current confrontation between the United States and Israel against Iran carries several risks, perhaps the most significant being the danger of the conflict erupting in the region along sectarian lines.
Arab-Turkish-Pakistani axis
Therefore, an Arab-Turkish-Pakistani axis is attempting to prevent this dangerous scenario. The Gulf states and Türkiye are making significant efforts to strengthen economic cooperation as one of the most important safety nets for Syria and the rest of the region. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa recently spoke to a delegation of Egyptian businessmen about his aspirations for economic integration and joint projects between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Well-informed Arab sources revealed a major struggle to influence US President Donald Trump and the deep state institutions to work towards regional stability, reject policies of chaos and the use of militias, and prevent a recurrence of “sectarian wars.”
If Egypt, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Türkiye, Pakistan, and the rest of the Arab states, succeeds in pulling the US-Iranian confrontation back from the brink, it will have created a turning point in preventing the region from exploding and will mark the emergence of a powerful bloc capable of altering the course of US foreign policy, as it did in Gaza.
Veto Against Maliki
These developments come within a broader context of tension, following a clear American veto against the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister. This veto opened a new chapter of tension between Washington and political forces and armed factions close to Tehran, who view the American position as direct interference in the process of forming a government in Iraq. This has been met with numerous demonstrations in the capital, Baghdad, condemning Trump’s veto.
A Difficult Test for the Government
Observers believe that the timing of these moves, coinciding with the American military buildup in the region, the deployment of aircraft carriers, and the reinforcement of military bases, cannot be separated from an attempt by some factions to increase pressure and send political and military messages that extend beyond Iraq’s borders at a complex regional juncture.
For his part, security affairs researcher Abdul Ghani al-Ghadhban said, “The calls for volunteers and military preparations outside the official framework of the state indicate the seriousness of the stage Iraq is going through. Any involvement or declaration of readiness to fight outside the borders will be interpreted internationally as an Iraqi position, even if it is not a government decision.”
Al-Ghadhban added that “these moves give Washington additional justification to expand its political and security pressure on Baghdad and place the government before a difficult test of its ability to control weapons and prevent the country from becoming a proxy battleground.”
Government Monitoring
In contrast, Iraqi security sources say that “Baghdad is monitoring the field movements and gatherings taking place in some provinces and is dealing with them very cautiously, keen to avoid any escalation that could drag the country into an open regional conflict.”
Will Iraq Escape the Escalation Between Washington and Tehran?
A source, who requested anonymity, revealed that “the government’s official position is based on protecting Iraqi sovereignty and preventing the use of Iraqi territory or Iraqi society as a platform for any external conflict, while adhering to diplomatic channels and de-escalation.”
There are growing concerns that the continuation of these movements will complicate the security situation, especially with talk of the participation of Iraqi armed elements in events inside Iran, and the accompanying statements accusing Iraqi factions of involvement in suppressing protests there. This threatens legal and political repercussions that could extend to Iraq’s international relations.
ISIS Between Syria and Iraq
Iraqi authorities begin trials of ISIS prisoners amid political division. The transfer of ISIS detainees from prisons in Syria to Iraq continues. The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council announced that it has begun taking the necessary legal and logistical measures to try members of the organization.
Transfer of ISIS Prisoners
This operation is being carried out by air by US forces. According to security information in the Iraqi capital, more than 500 ISIS detainees have already arrived in Iraq from Syria. The Iraqi government has tasked the intelligence services, national security, and the National Security Advisory with interrogating the detainees. Iraqi intelligence described the Iraqi members of the ISIS detainees transferred to Iraq as the most dangerous.
Informed Iraqi sources revealed that approximately 130 Iraqis have already arrived in Iraq. These individuals are wanted by Iraqi authorities on arrest warrants. The ISIS prisoners have been transferred to two prisons: one in Mosul in the north of the country and the other in Nasiriyah, south of Baghdad.
The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior says that the transfer of the terrorist elements from among the ISIS prisoners is proceeding without any problems, and that there is coordination with both the American and Syrian sides to implement this plan. Reasons for the Slow Transfer Process
Meanwhile, security reports in Baghdad spoke of the slow pace of transferring ISIS prisoners, attributing this to two reasons: The first reason is that the operation requires complex security and logistical arrangements.
The second reason is the position of Nouri al-Maliki, the nominee for the next Iraqi prime minister, who announced his opposition to the decision to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq. This may be the main reason for the slow pace of the transfer process.
Maliki’s Opposition
On the other hand, informed Iraqi sources revealed the position of Nouri al-Maliki, the nominee for the new Iraqi prime minister, who opposes the transfer of ISIS prisoners from prisons in Syria to Iraqi territory.
There have been several interpretations of Maliki’s position. One interpretation is that Maliki’s stance on the ISIS prisoners is an attempt to cancel the operation altogether or limit it to Iraqi nationals only, according to his vision.
Another interpretation is that Maliki’s position is a message of pressure on other countries, indicating that they must take custody of their citizens who are ISIS detainees, and that he will not compromise on this issue. The third interpretation is that he plans to use this issue to achieve security, political, and economic gains from the Europeans and Americans.
In contrast, the Iraqi Judicial Council adopted a different stance and announced that it had begun preparing the procedures for the trials of the detained jihadists transferred from Syria.
Does this imply that Baghdad might accept the continued presence of foreign ISIS prisoners in its custody? Many experts believe that the position of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council was striking and entirely different from that of Nouri al-Maliki, and it is clear that the Council has prepared itself to try members of the organization.
The Iraqi Judicial Council’s statement hinted that when sentences are issued against the organization’s prisoners, these sentences will also be served within Iraq. This means that the Iraqi authorities are preparing themselves for the organization’s continued presence within Iraqi territory for extended periods.
Baghdad’s Flexibility
An important point, coinciding with the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council’s statement, is that there were also political reports from within the Shiite circle affiliated with Maliki, indicating that Baghdad is prepared to deal flexibly with the so-called foreign jihadists from ISIS, specifically those from European countries.
The Experience of Al-Sudani
When nations take a step forward after years of setbacks, retreat becomes a costly option, one that nations pay for with their prosperity and stability. In the Iraqi experience, the question is no longer who assumes power, but rather which path deserves to be pursued. Hence, the reappointment of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani for a second term stands out as a decision concerning the fate of the nation more than it concerns names or alliances. It is a moment of testing for Iraqi political acumen: either to consolidate stability and build upon what has been achieved, or to return to the cycle of faltering beginnings that exhausted the state and burdened society.
Al-Sudani did not assume the premiership under ordinary circumstances, but rather at a time of heightened regional tension, where international conflicts intersected on Iraqi soil, directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, he managed this heavy legacy with composure and in the language of statecraft, avoiding being drawn into sharp polarization and prioritizing national interest over the politics of alliances.
A Balanced Policy
This was clearly evident in his balanced foreign policy, particularly in relations with the United States and Iran. He successfully established a delicate equation: protecting Iraqi sovereignty without provocation, openness without subservience, and communication without dependence.
This precise balance was not an isolated diplomatic achievement, but rather a domestic safety valve. While the region was boiling with conflicts and proxy wars, al-Sudani managed to steer Iraq away from the brink of explosion and protect it from being drawn into conflicts that would have easily reproduced chaos. Just one year after assuming office, the region faced an unprecedented escalation, yet Iraq remained cohesive, maintaining its relative stability, which reflects the nature of al-Sudani’s political leadership.
Partnership with the Arabs
At the Arab level, al-Sudani redefined Iraq’s relationship with its regional neighbors based on partnership, not favoritism, and on mutual interests, not alignment. Baghdad was no longer a marginal player on the Arab map, but rather a point of equilibrium, a rational voice capable of uniting rather than dividing. This Arab openness was not merely reflected in statements, but also in a growing political and economic presence that restored Iraq to its rightful place, which had long been absent.
Restoring Confidence
On the economic front, the features of this transformation began to materialize tangibly. The Sudanese government succeeded in restoring confidence in the Iraqi investment climate, a confidence that is only granted when indicators of stability and seriousness are present. The strategic agreement with Total Energies in the energy sector, and the expansion of partnerships with Siemens and General Electric in the electricity sector, represent a clear return of major companies to the Iraqi market after years of hesitation. Furthermore, the “Development Road” project has become the hallmark of a new phase, one in which Iraq is being redefined as a regional economic hub, not merely a resource-consuming country.
These major projects, along with oil field development contracts and memoranda of understanding in the petrochemical and clean energy sectors, reflect a growing international conviction that Iraq is moving in a more stable direction. Global companies do not invest in a vacuum, nor do they pour billions of dollars into a country where they see it capable of protecting its commitments and managing its economy with institutional wisdom.
A Policy of Achievement
Domestically, government performance was characterized by a shift from rhetoric of intent to a policy of achievement. Service and infrastructure projects that had been postponed for years were launched, and development was treated as a sovereign matter that directly impacts the daily lives of citizens. Most importantly, these projects were not left to their usual fate but were subject to direct monitoring, in a serious attempt to break the pattern of stalled projects that had become a symbol of failure in previous phases.
The Absence of Sectarian Discourse
Socially, Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani oversaw a significant shift in the language of governance. Sectarian rhetoric completely disappeared from state discourse, replaced by the concepts of citizenship and equality. The government treated Iraqis as citizens, not as constituent groups, and as partners in the state, not as pawns in conflict. This approach contributed to easing tensions and fostered a general feeling that the state had regained its neutrality thanks to a government fulfilling its national role.
The Courage of Continuity
In this context, the responsibility of the Coordination Framework emerges as the most prominent political actor in the coming phase. The issue is no longer simply a matter of changing names, but rather a decision concerning the protection of an experiment that, over the course of three years, managed one of the most complex periods the region has witnessed, and spared Iraq the cost of sliding into destructive conflicts.
The reappointment of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani for a second term should not be viewed as a mere option, but as a necessity to solidify a path that has begun to touch the very core of the state. It is a message that Iraq has finally decided to reward stability, safeguard achievements, and grant time to those who have proven their ability to lead through storms. In a country exhausted by political fragmentation and incomplete experiments, continuity today appears to be an act of political courage and a genuine guarantee that Iraq will not regress, but will instead move steadily towards a stable, balanced state, capable of preserving its sovereignty and building its future.
Maliki Is Not the Solution
Amid a stifling political crisis, numerous criticisms have erupted regarding the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki for the Iraqi premiership. In a scathing article titled “Nouri al-Maliki… The Old Version of the Same Disaster,” Iraqi writer Karam Ni’ma argues that Nouri al-Maliki has never been a solution for Iraq, neither during his eight years in power, nor in the decade following his downfall, nor at any point in the country’s collapse since 2003. The man has always been part of the problem, not part of the solution. Today, with the escalating talk of his potential return to the premiership, the country seems to be deliberately being led to a replay of the tragedy, as if 22 years of bitter failures and corruption were not enough to convince the political class that ruin cannot be recycled. Maliki’s return is not a passing political event, but a historical setback that takes Iraq back to square one, to the moment from which all our crises began: sectarianism, corruption, state collapse, and the rise of ISIS. The Magnitude of the Disaster
The writer reveals that he had access to a limited-circulation American study released this week that provides an accurate picture of the magnitude of the disaster that could await Iraq if Maliki returns to power.
The study states: “Maliki no longer possesses the stature he once had, and his alliances today are the product of Iranian pressure, not his own strength.” This sentence alone suffices to understand the nature of the situation: a man returning not because he is capable, but because he is wanted by Iran and its militias in Iraq. He returns not because he has a project, but because he is part of a larger project.
The Weakest Link in Iran’s Influence Chain
The writer argues that Maliki is returning because he is the weakest link in Iran’s influence chain, and because Tehran wants a controllable version, not a leader with an independent will. This alone makes his return a recipe for a new explosion, because Iraq does not need a weak man with a sectarian thirst for revenge, but rather a state capable of protecting itself from the likes of him.
For Iraqis, Maliki is not just a politician, but a symbol of a dark era. The study states: “Maliki represents the model of a vengeful state that practiced exclusion under the banner of de-Baathification and the suppression of Sunni terrorism.” This is not merely an academic observation, but rather a testament to a wound that has not healed.
Bitter Choices
Many Iraqi politicians and writers warn that Maliki’s return would mean a return to exclusion, a return to sectarian rhetoric, and a return to the feeling that the state does not belong to everyone. This alone is enough to push the Sunnis back to three options: withdrawal, boycott, or explosion. All of these options reproduce the events of 2013 and 2014, the moment that preceded the rise of ISIS. Maliki does not understand that exclusion does not build a state, but rather creates a monster waiting for the opportunity to emerge from the rubble.
As for the Kurds, they know Maliki well. They know his volatility, his unfulfilled promises, and his constant clashes over oil and border issues. The study states: “Maliki’s return could push the Kurds once again toward the option of independence.” This is not an exaggeration, but a realistic reading of the history of the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil. The man who ignited the 2014 crisis with the Kurdistan Region and pushed the Kurds to hold the referendum in 2017 is perfectly capable of reopening the same wound. Maliki doesn’t understand that Iraq cannot be governed by the logic of an overbearing central government, and that the Kurds will not accept a return to the era of threats and political blackmail.
Maliki has become a burden. Well-informed Iraqi sources revealed that even within the coordinating framework that encompasses the pro-Iranian parties and militias, Maliki is not a “leader of the moment,” but rather a burden. The sources say that “Maliki’s return will lead to an escalation of protests and Shiite-Shiite tensions that could reach the point of armed confrontation.” It’s important to remember that Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Movement, still harbors resentment and a desire for revenge against Maliki after the latter first fought him and then prevented him from forming a government following his movement’s victory in the previous elections.
All of this accurately describes Maliki’s nature within his own environment. He is a fierce opponent of the Sadrist Movement, an enemy of the generation of change, and a symbol of corruption and subservience to Iran. His return will reignite internal divisions within the Shia community itself, transforming Baghdad into a battleground between factions united only by mutual animosity.
Many experts argue that Maliki fails to grasp that today’s Shia are not the same as yesterday’s, subservient to the myth of sectarian rule, and that the October generation cannot accept the return of a man who embodies the worst aspects of the political system.
Available indicators also reveal that Iran doesn’t want Maliki because he is strong, but rather because it desires a weak, controllable version of him. “Iran is pushing Maliki to the forefront on the condition that he remains weak and under its supervision.” This means his return is not an Iraqi decision, but part of an Iranian project to recalibrate its influence after its regional decline. For Tehran, Maliki is not a leader, but a tool—a man who can be used to implement what no one else can, a man who can be sacrificed when his usefulness is over. This alone makes his return a danger to Iraq, as the country does not need a prime minister who acts as a political proxy for another state.
The entire region will pay the price if Maliki returns. The Return of the Arab Boycott
On another front, the American study revealed that “Maliki’s return will prompt Saudi Arabia and the UAE to freeze their investments, Türkiye to escalate its military operations, and the United States to impose sanctions.” This means that Iraq will enter a new period of regional and international isolation, just as it did in previous years. Maliki does not understand that the world has changed, that Iraq cannot live in isolation, and that the economy cannot recover while in conflict with all regional and international powers.
What next?
There remain four possible scenarios for al-Maliki’s return, all of them grim. One is a weak, besieged government that collapses within two years; another is a resurgence of sectarian violence and Shia-Shia and Sunni-Shia clashes; a national reconciliation that is impossible and incompatible with his history; or a deceptive international consensus that leads to a protracted regional conflict. Each of these scenarios is not merely a possibility, but a natural extension of the man’s experience in governance. Al-Maliki fails to understand that time does not move backward, and that the Iraq he left in 2014 is not the Iraq he would return to today.
In short, al-Maliki’s return is not just a political mistake, but a historical sin. It is a reproduction of a phase that created ISIS, legitimized militias, deepened divisions, and pushed Iraq to the brink of collapse.
I believe that the Iraqi political elite understands the gravity of the situation. They understand that Iraq today needs a state, not a leader living within a self-created lie, as the Iraqi writer Karam Ni’ma says. Many believe that Iraq needs a national project, not a man consumed by sectarian hatred against the majority of his people. It needs a future, not a rehash of an old script that destroyed the country. At this moment, it seems that Maliki’s return is not an option, but a return to square one, to the tragedy that Iraqis thought they had overcome, only to find it returning in a more fragile, more dangerous form, more capable of shattering what remains of the state.
