By Mehmet Enes Beşer
As Bangladesh moves to re-calibrate its geopolitics and economy in the background of evolving Indo-Pacific dynamics, whether Bangladesh will be able to become a full-fledged member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is gaining traction yet again. As its economy grows, and it hopes to be a manufacturing and logistics hub for the region, Dhaka’s desire to be more integrated with ASEAN is only natural. But membership can be a blessing for Bangladesh in the form of greater trade, diplomacy, and strategic diversification, but it is no panacea. APEC membership can be the right decision, but only if undertaken in the framework of realism, preparedness, and strategic anticipation.
ASEAN is a handsome club at first glance. It has combined GDP over $3.6 trillion, more than 670 million individuals, and its integration into world supply chains makes it one of the most dynamic parts of the world economy. For Bangladesh, graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2026 and the prospect of losing preferential trading benefits, ASEAN regional infrastructure would offer a valuable new regional economic cooperation and trade facilitation platform. Diversification of markets is not for Bangladesh—it is a requirement. Asean’s rising profile in the international trade opens up a possibility for Bangladesh to diversify from its over-reliance on some large markets like the EU and the US.
There is also a very good strategic case. With Indo-Pacific increasingly being in the midst of emerging geopolitics between China and the United States, the small and medium powers are already confronted with a world that is growing more polarized. ASEAN has long been a platform for hedging, a multilateral diplomatic community, and a functional issue-based alliance that allows the member countries to exercise agency. For Bangladesh, whose foreign policy is to balance India, China, and Western powers, ASEAN is model and platform as well as buffer. Entry would assist perhaps in elevating Dhaka’s stature in regional security, connectivity, and climate resilience discourses, matters of which it is currently poorly represented.
But ASEAN membership is no smooth or rapid journey. The club is famously consensus-driven, incrementally slow, and reluctant to admit new members whose political, institutional, or economic arrangements do not conform to ASEAN standards. Bangladesh’s political institutions, regulatory habits, and diplomatic practices diverge from the Southeast Asian model in some rather deep ways. Moreover, ASEAN is itself struggling with internal cohesion—from the Myanmar crisis to South China Sea maritime disputes. The inclusion of a new South Asian member may well serve to occasion institutional overreach, mandate dilution, and future geographic identity issues.
Preparedness is also an issue. To benefit meaningfully from membership in ASEAN, Bangladesh must undertake serious domestic reform. The infrastructure has to be upgraded to regional level, rule of law regimes up to ASEAN standards, and institutional capacity developed for productive multilateral interaction. Being present at the table is not enough; effective participation requires preparation, diplomacy, and constant policy harmonization. Most ASEAN members’ Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a good case in point—ascending to such free trade agreements without first developing domestic industries, labor laws, and investment systems could backfire.
It is also to be remembered that ASEAN is not a magic pill. Though economically enormous, intra-ASEAN trade is minimal, and its consensus culture can constrain firm action during times of crises. The response of the bloc to crises such as the Rohingya crisis—where the policy of non-interference of ASEAN came into contradiction with the scale of the human tragedy—told us about the extent of its diplomatic clout. Bangladesh does not have to overestimate the potential of ASEAN as a regional guarantor or political patron for issues of direct national concern. However, full membership is not the sole alternative.
Bangladesh could also pursue gradual integration in terms of observer membership, sectoral dialogue partnerships, and membership of ASEAN-created forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the East Asia Summit (EAS). Membership through BIMSTEC or the Bay of Bengal Initiative (which consists of some of the ASEAN countries) may also be regional bridging. These measures allow Dhaka to gradually move towards policy convergence with ASEAN models and build trust, credibility, and diplomatic capital with the group. Here, ASEAN can’t be envisioned as a terminal point but a direction—a strategic vector in which Bangladesh will lean, to chase its long-term aspiration of connectivity, economic strength, and diplomatic influence.
The shift, therefore, needs to be gradual, measured, and home-led. ASEAN membership is no magic bullet, but it is a message: that Bangladesh is willing to think regionally, act multilaterally, and stake its own claim in the new Indo-Pacific order. Whether such a course will succeed will ultimately be based on Dhaka’s ability to absorb the issue of integration and become as much a partner as an investor in regional peace and prosperity.
For Bangladesh, the ASEAN dream is within reach—but only if it chooses to make it part of a broader, conscious change in how the country thinks about where it is and how it thinks of itself as part of Asia and part of the world.