By Yasin Okyay
Serbia has signed a security agreement with Israel, marking a significant step forward in military cooperation between Belgrade and Tel Aviv.
The agreement, approved under an “urgent procedure” by the parliamentary Defense Committee of Serbia on April 29, 2026, is essentially the formalization of a relationship that has been deepening for quite some time.
Titled the “General Security Agreement on the Exchange and Mutual Protection of Classified Information in the Field of Defense”, the agreement covers all levels of classified information within the defense industry. It provides a framework for the sharing of sensitive information related to joint ventures and contracts, the sale of weapons, technical know-how, software, and defense technologies, as well as regular visits by expert delegations to military facilities in the partner country.
One particularly notable aspect of the agreement is that, although its contents are not classified, the signatories have agreed that “neither party, nor anyone acting on its behalf, shall publicly disclose or communicate anything related to the implementation of this agreement or any of its provisions.”
Another such provision states that any future dispute between the two parties “shall not be subject to any domestic or international tribunal or court, nor to any national or international law.”
Dragana Trifković, General Director of the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Serbia, assessed the agreement in her responses to questions from Yasin Okyay.
What has become of Serbia’s military neutrality?
How do you assess the agreement? How important is it in the relation between Serbia and Israel?
The security agreement between Serbia and Israel is problematic from the standpoint of Serbia’s foreign‑policy position and the principles Serbia itself invokes, above all military neutrality and respect for international law.
It comes at a moment when Israel is the subject of extremely serious international accusations and criticism regarding the war in Gaza, including allegations of grave violations of humanitarian law and genocide, which has led to deep divisions in European and global public opinion.
Adopted without public and standard parliamentary debate
An additional problem is that the agreement was adopted without public and standard parliamentary debate, and parts of the document are classified, which raises questions of transparency and democratic oversight in an area that is essential for Serbia’s security. Cooperation between Serbia and Israel in the security and military sphere largely takes place within the executive branch and within a relatively narrow circle of decision‑makers, with limited public discussion and insufficient parliamentary control.
From the standpoint of Serbia’s national interest, it is particularly problematic to enter into deeper military and technological cooperation with a state whose actions on the international stage are viewed as highly controversial and associated with high‑intensity armed conflicts. This may place Serbia in a position of increased foreign‑policy risk and weaken its own principled stance on territorial integrity and international law, and it may also have legal and security consequences that Serbian citizens are not even aware of.
For all these reasons, this agreement cannot be viewed as a neutral technical act, but rather as a political move with significant consequences for Serbia’s foreign‑policy position and its international reputation.
Drone factory of a profiteer of the genocide in Gaza
Given that even Europe’s pro-Atlanticist governments are trying to avoid close ties with Israel, how do you view Serbia’s stance in this regard to Israel?
In Europe, there is an increasingly visible distancing from Israel’s military policy, even in states that are otherwise firmly within the Western political bloc. The reason for this is the strong public criticism of the war in Gaza and the growing pressure from international institutions and the public regarding compliance with international humanitarian law. While European governments are trying to manage public anger and distance themselves from Israel, official Belgrade is moving ever deeper into a military partnership with a state whose military operations are under scrutiny before international courts.
In recent months, there has been a rapid and intensified militarization of economic relations between Serbia and Israel, reflected in the direct entry of foreign military corporations into Serbia’s industrial sector and a sharp increase in arms exports to an active conflict zone. Serbia has announced the opening of a joint drone factory with the Israeli company Elbit Systems, one of the key actors in Israel’s military industry, which has been described as controversial in international reports in the context of the war in Gaza. This is a company that UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese explicitly named as a profiteer of the “genocide in Gaza.”
At the same time, exports of ammunition and weapons from Serbia to Israel have recorded dramatic growth, increasing several‑fold in a short period (according to investigative media BIRN/Haaretz and customs data: Serbian arms exports to Israel — 2023: €1.4 million; 2024: €42.3 million; 2025: €114 million). These transfers are taking place despite earlier political statements about restraint and limitations on exports to conflict zones, which raises serious questions of consistency and political accountability.
Negative effect on Serbia’s relations with the Global South and majority‑Muslim states
Such moves may negatively affect Serbia’s relations with countries of the Global South, especially majority‑Muslim states with which Serbia has maintained relatively good and stable relations over previous decades. At a time when the Palestinian issue is one of the central topics in the foreign policy of these states, any perception of alignment may lead to serious consequences.
Pragmatism turning into inconsistency in foreign policy
Why did the Serbian government feel the need for this agreement?
The current government in Serbia demonstrates a high degree of political “pragmatism,” which increasingly turns into complete inconsistency in foreign policy. After a period in which government representatives openly supported democratic circles in the United States and took positions opposed to Donald Trump, we are now witnessing an attempt at a sudden shift toward the Republican administration, primarily through the deepening of military cooperation with Israel.
Such an approach does not appear to be the result of a clear state strategy, but rather short‑term geopolitical maneuvering aimed at preserving power and securing support from certain centers of influence. What is particularly problematic is that Serbia is increasingly reduced to an instrument of other actors’ lobbying interests, while its own national and state priorities are being neglected.
Despite Israel’ recognition independence of Kosovo
Israel inflicted a major blow to Serbia — one that is still being downplayed in Belgrade. In 2020, the Israeli government, with the mediation of then‑U.S. President Donald Trump, officially recognized the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo. Instead of this recognition producing diplomatic and political consequences, it was effectively relativized through the continuation of close cooperation and the signing of multimillion‑euro contracts in the field of armaments and security. In doing so, Serbia effectively rewarded a state that violated its key national interest.
The fact that official Belgrade did not freeze or reconsider relations with Tel Aviv after Israel’s recognition of Kosovo, but instead continued to intensify cooperation through military, security, and technological partnerships, points to a deep crisis of consistency in Serbia’s foreign policy. A state that invokes the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity on the international stage is simultaneously deepening its partnership with a country that violated those very principles in Serbia’s own case.
Such a policy can no longer be explained solely as pragmatism. It instead suggests a gradual abandonment of state‑building principles in favor of short‑term geopolitical calculations and the interests of the current leadership.
What is especially concerning is that this sends a message that Serbia is not prepared to defend its territorial integrity consistently and on principle, but selectively and in accordance with immediate political needs. If Belgrade does not respond seriously when a state recognizes the secession of part of its territory, a fundamental question arises: on what moral and political basis can it then expect other actors — such as Russia, China, and others — to respect and defend Serbia’s sovereignty regarding Kosovo and Metohija.
“Multivector” foreign policy of Vucic
Vucic also visited China recently. How do you see this visit in terms of his overall foreign policy?
The foreign policy of Aleksandar Vučić is formally presented as “multivector,” meaning an attempt by Serbia to maintain good relations simultaneously with the West, Russia, China, the Arab world, and Israel. His visit to China is simply a continuation of this approach, as Belgrade seeks to secure investments, infrastructure projects, and political support through cooperation with Beijing.
Lack of a clear strategy
However, the problem does not lie in cooperating with different global centers of power, but in the lack of a clear strategy and principled consistency. This is particularly evident in the case of Israel. Serbia has continued to deepen military and security cooperation with a state that recognized Kosovo, which stands in direct contradiction to the official narrative of defending territorial integrity and international law. At the same time, Belgrade is trying to maintain close relations with China and Russia, which do not recognize Kosovo and support Serbia in the UN Security Council.
“Serbia relativizes its own red lines”
The conclusion that emerges is that Serbia’s foreign policy is increasingly based not on the principles of international law and longterm national interests, but on opportunistic balancing and efforts to satisfy various centers of power. This raises the question of how sovereign such a policy truly is, and to what extent it represents an attempt to appease external actors for the sake of political survival and maintaining power, rather than a coherent strategic direction. The greatest danger lies precisely here — a state that relativizes its own red lines risks losing both political credibility and negotiating leverage over time.
For this reason, it can be said that Vučić’s foreign policy may bring certain shortterm economic and diplomatic benefits, but in the long run it carries the risk of eroding political credibility. A state that tries to please everyone while lacking clearly defined national priorities and principles from which it does not deviate may eventually lose both the trust of its partners and its own negotiating position.
Ultimately, Serbia will inevitably have to confront a fundamental question: does it truly intend to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity through cooperation with states that consistently uphold these principles, or will it gradually reduce itself to an instrument within the broader geopolitical interests of major powers — primarily Western centers of influence — in a time of global confrontation.