The forty-day war that the United States launched against Iran on February 28, regardless of whether it reignites in the near future, has ushered in a new era in the regional security architecture of West Asia. The principal facts demonstrated by the recent war were, first, that Iran is not a country that can easily be eliminated or absorbed. Over the past forty years, Iran has invested extensively in its military infrastructure and has attained such a level of power that it can enter a regional war within a matter of hours and possess the capacity to impose its demands even on two nuclear powers in the world. Naturally, Iran has certain deficiencies, including problems related to its air defense capabilities. However, the experience of the forty-day war, compared with last year’s twelve-day war, demonstrated that Iran has, on the one hand, moved rapidly to remedy these deficiencies and, on the other hand, entered into constructive cooperation with other global powers such as China and Russia. This situation will naturally affect Iran’s interactions with the countries of the region in the post-war period and the near future, as well as the way Tehran and the Arab capitals of the region perceive one another.
The second issue demonstrated by this war was that the security outsourced by Middle Eastern countries has failed to perform its intended function. Over the past several decades, the countries along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf have spent tens of billions of dollars to finance the costs of the American military presence in the region. Although everyone knew that these bases had been established with the aim of protecting Israel’s security and that Arab countries were paying for the security of Tel Aviv, from the perspective of these small states, the existence of these bases also functioned as a source of security for them. The recent war, however, demonstrated that these bases not only produced no security benefits for these countries, but would also create serious crises for them under actual wartime conditions. Because of the presence of these bases on Arab territory, Iran launched missile attacks against these countries. These states were, first, incapable of defending themselves and, second, the United States also proved unable to take any meaningful action to defend them.
The third issue raised immediately after the war concerns the future shape of the Middle East’s political and security architecture. The central question is whether the Middle East is on the verge of entering a phase of political and security collapse, or whether the current crises could serve as a prelude to the formation of a new regional order.
A Region That Is No Longer “Normal”
To answer this important question, there is no alternative but to acknowledge that the Middle East can no longer be regarded as a normal region governed by the conventional rules of international politics. In a normal region, states act on the basis of relatively clear cost-benefit calculations, recognize the red lines of the opposing side, and possess mechanisms for containing crises. In today’s Middle East, however, many of these rules have been weakened. States, non-state actors, extra-regional powers, and temporary alliances are all simultaneously influencing developments. Wars are also no longer limited to confrontations between armies. Air strikes, intelligence operations, cyber warfare, economic sanctions, assassinations, diplomatic pressure, media operations, and identity-based mobilization have all become components of a single conflict.
Attention to this point is one of the most important issues occupying the minds of Iranian policymakers. This is because, from the perspective of a significant part of Iran’s decision-making establishment, analyzing Iranian policy on the basis of models derived from stable regions of the world can be misleading. Iran is situated in an environment in which certain actors are not merely seeking concessions, but are pursuing its structural weakening, disintegration, or transformation of its political character. The most important factor influencing this issue is Israel, because Israel cannot simply be regarded as a state that has a disagreement with Iran over a security or nuclear issue; rather, Israel’s problem with Iran has geopolitical, ideological, and long-term dimensions. Consideration of the experience of the past several decades reveals the fact that Israel’s project extends beyond limiting Iran’s nuclear or missile capabilities, and that they are openly seeking the disintegration of Iran. Therefore, from the Iranian perspective, Iran should not assume that merely resolving one particular issue, such as the nuclear file, will bring all fundamental disputes with Israel to an end. Even if a nuclear agreement is reached, issues such as Iran’s missile capabilities, its regional power, its relations with resistance groups, and the country’s geopolitical position will remain. It must therefore be emphasized that Iran’s strategy should be based on the creation of sustainable deterrence. Deterrence does not merely mean possessing military capabilities; rather, the enemy must believe that any large-scale attack on Iran would impose costs exceeding its potential benefits. These costs may be military, economic, political, and regional.
Creating the Conditions for an American Withdrawal
From Tehran’s perspective, one of the most important means of strengthening Iran’s deterrence and ensuring regional security is the necessity of an American withdrawal from the region. Iran believes that, alongside exerting pressure on the United States by increasing the costs of war, it must also create conditions that reduce the costs of an American withdrawal for the countries of the region. In other words, Iran is seeking to establish a regional order in the Middle East without the United States, the principal condition for which is regional cooperation and synergy. Addressing the security concerns of America’s allies will be possible through the involvement of regional powers, including Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, Iran alone will naturally be unable to manage this environment. This initiative could include non-aggression agreements, maritime security arrangements, cooperation on energy, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and dialogue between Iran and the countries of the region, particularly the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
The most important problem under these circumstances is unconstructive regional rivalry. There is a possibility that, particularly at the instigation of the United States, certain regional countries may attempt to fill the vacuum created by the weakening of the American presence in the Middle East by pursuing maximalist demands and seeking to establish alliances that threaten the interests of other regional neighbors. Therefore, efforts to create a shared regional discourse, attempts to establish a regional mechanism of understanding, and particularly the utilization of other newly emerging regional institutions in the world to create a new balance are among the issues that occupy a prominent place in the thinking of Iranian decision-makers.
Peace Is Vital, and There Will Be No Alternative to Regional Cooperation
A logical analysis of the situation in the Middle East demonstrates the reality that Iran and the countries of the Middle East have reached a point at which they will either achieve stability and development through cooperation with one another, or all suffer as a result of successive wars and collapses. A crisis in one country will not remain confined within its borders. War can spread waves of migration, extremism, energy insecurity, the disruption of trade, arms races, and intervention by foreign powers throughout the region. Therefore, from Tehran’s perspective, Iran’s security is not defined through permanent confrontation with the security of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Türkiye, or other neighboring countries. Regional security is interconnected in nature. No country can achieve lasting stability while surrounded by failed states and permanent wars.
From this perspective, the concept of a shared destiny can serve as the theoretical foundation of a new regional order. Such an order should be based on dialogue, non-aggression, respect for territorial integrity, economic cooperation, and the reduction of security dependence on foreign powers.
In summary, it can be said that Iran does not face a simple choice between war and surrender. A range of intermediate options exists: deterrence, limited negotiations, regional cooperation, taking advantage of internal divisions within the United States, engagement with China and Russia, reducing economic vulnerability, and proposing an initiative for the gradual withdrawal of foreign powers.
At the same time, none of these options is sufficient on its own. Military power without a strong economy will be eroded; diplomacy without deterrence may lead to greater pressure; and reliance on China and Russia without a balanced foreign policy may create a new form of dependence. The discourse of resistance, too, if it leads to turning war into a matter of prestige and disregarding its human costs, may ultimately work against the national interest.
To move beyond the current situation, Iran requires a multidimensional strategy: preserving its defensive capabilities, preventing a prolonged war, opening channels for negotiation, strengthening the economy and internal cohesion, and presenting a regional plan that does not place the security of neighboring countries in opposition to Iran’s security.
The Middle East may be on the verge of collapse, but the current crisis simultaneously presents an opportunity to rethink the regional order. The fundamental question is whether the countries of the region will be able to establish their own mechanisms for coexistence, cooperation, and collective security before war and foreign intervention determine their future.