By Sergio Rodríguez Gelfenstein
When the Liberator Simón Bolívar arrived in Peru on September 1, 1823, he found himself in a very complicated scenario. There were strong contradictions between José de la Riva-Agüero and the Marquis of Torre Tagle. The country had two presidents, two governments and two Congresses. In Colombia, although the situation was better, there were also difficulties that delayed the authorization of Bolívar to go to Peru.
Bolívar summarized: “The Pizarros and Almagros fought each other; La Serna fought against Pezuela; Riva Agüero fought against the Congress, Torre Tagle against Riva Agüero and his homeland Torre Tagle; now, Olañeta is fighting against La Serna and, for the same reason, we have had time to rebuild ourselves and to stand in the arena armed from head to toe”.
Four months after arriving in the country, the Liberator managed to stabilize the situation and set out to begin preparing the campaign that would allow Peru to be definitively liberated from Spanish rule. But he became seriously ill and had to settle in Pativilca for two months in order to recover. The tabardillo or desert disease affected him in such a way that the Colombian diplomat Joaquín Mosquera who visited him in those days, seeing his physical condition, thought that the Liberator was living his last hours.
Observing him in such a situation and after Bolívar told him about the great difficulties he faced in Peru, Mosquera asked him what he was going to do. Looking at him fixedly and with a sparkle in his almost dull eyes, the Liberator without hesitation, replied: To win!
In those first months of 1824, while he was recovering his health, he dedicated himself to buying time, negotiating with the contending forces and waiting for Colombia to send him the long-awaited reinforcements. At the same time, he designed the strategy to defeat the Spaniards. In a letter to Tomás de Heres on January 9 he tells him that: “… enemies are not deceived except by flattering them.”
On February 10, in view of the critical situation of the country and when there seemed to be no other options, the Congress of Peru granted him dictatorial powers, so that Bolívar -with absolute freedom- could make the decisions that he considered correct for the leadership of the State and adopt the necessary measures that would lead to a successful resolution of the confrontation with the Spanish army.
At the end of that month, he began to give orders to his generals. His plan was to “cleanse” the country of the army, leaving only the guerrilla forces on the ground. He established three regions: one, the largest, was the one that had to be “cleansed”; the second, to the east of Trujillo, was proposed to obtain the necessary resources for the survival of the army and, the third, Trujillo himself, in which the resources obtained should be concentrated.
To achieve these objectives, a decisive role was played by the Cusco leader Marcelino Carreño who, in command of the Montonero guerrillas, inflicted heavy losses in forces and means on the Spaniards. This contingent, as well as Creole blacks who had been slaves and who made up the 8th battalion, would come to fulfill important missions in favor of the independence cause.
On March 7, the Liberator installed his command post in Trujillo. On April 12, a seemingly irrelevant event occurred. However, the Liberator, with his characteristic strategic vision, grasped its transcendence. The Spanish general Pedro Antonio Olañeta, noting that in October 1823, the monarchy had been re-established in Spain, expressed his loyalty to the king, rejecting the leadership given to the army by the Iberian generals in Peru, most of whom were liberals. Olañeta separated from the army and withdrew to Upper Peru with his division. In pursuit, the viceroy sent General Jerónimo Valdés in command of 4,000 men.
Bolívar detected that this fact exposed the opposing side to a situation of weakness and ordered them to go on the offensive without wasting time. Many, even most of his generals considered him a chimera and madness, but finally, his convincing rhetoric and confidence in a man who had often led them to victory, ended up persuading his subordinates who, more out of loyalty than conviction, accepted the instructions issued from the command post.
The combat order established that the troops would do the same as in July 1819 but in the opposite direction. In New Granada, the patriots had climbed the mountain range to cross it from east to west in order to take the Spaniards by surprise. Now, they would go from the west to the east to try to repeat the feat.
Bolívar envisioned two scenarios: the first, that Valdés would abandon the pursuit of Olañeta and return to the scene of the conflict, in which case the patriot offensive would take place in disadvantageous conditions, but, if Valdés did not return with his troops, victory would be certain.
In May, the army set out south. He had to travel almost 1000 km. through high mountains, some with snow at that time of the year until he reached Pasco, which had been designated as the place of concentration of the patriot contingent. General José De la Mar commanded the Peruvian army, having as chief of staff the Upper Peruvian General Andrés de Santa Cruz while General Sucre led the Colombian army, taking under his orders the detachments under the command of Generals Jacinto Lara (Venezuelan) and José María Córdova (New Granadan). His chief of staff was Irish Colonel Francisco Burdett O’Connor.
The High Command of the United Liberation Army was personally led by the Liberator Simón Bolívar, counting on Dr. José Faustino Sánchez Carrión, perhaps the most eminent, capable and efficient among all the Peruvian patriots in charge of political and civil affairs with the rank of minister. Bolívar always kept Sánchez Carrión at his side to guarantee the strategic conduct of the war.
While the displacement of the army was taking place, Bolívar, using that old adage of Julius Caesar of “Divide and conquer”, wrote two letters to General Olañeta, urging him to join forces to fight against the “common enemy”. On another level, it is worth highlighting the extraordinary work of logistical assurance organized by General Sucre along the entire route of the march, guaranteeing the supply of food for the troops and horses.
The patriots marched from north to south and the Spaniards in the opposite direction and in parallel. At some point they crossed paths a short distance away. The Spanish general of French origin José de Canterac, who was at the head of the royalist army, never imagined that Bolívar had been able to organize a large contingent, that Bolívar himself would be in command of it and that he would march south through the mountains and not along the coast, which was considered the logical maneuver for displacement. Once again, Bolívar’s trickery and strategic brilliance had made it possible to achieve the objective: the surprise was total.
When Canterac discovered the maneuver of the patriot army, it was already late, and he ordered a retreat. From above, the Republicans watched the Royalist movement. Bolívar gave the order to attack with the cavalry against the flank of the Spanish marching order. Foreseeing the imminent disaster, Canterac ordered the infantry to be brought to safety and confront the patriots with the cavalry. The battle of Junín had begun. It was August 6, 1824. Given the proximity between the two armies, this confrontation took place with spears and swords, not a single projectile was fired.
A decisive role came to play the Peruvian sergeant major Juan Andrés Razuri who was sent by his boss, the colonel from the River Plate Manuel Isidro Suárez to the command post to receive instructions from General De la Mar. In the heat of combat, the squadron under Suárez had remained hidden and sheltered by the rugged terrain. De la Mar’s instruction to Suárez was to save his unit. But when Rázuri returned from the command post and observed from the height that the royalists had dismantled and that their combat apparatus had been disrupted, contrary to the disposition received, he indicated to his commander that De la Mar had ordered to go on the offensive. The officer from the River Plate acted accordingly by beating the troubled Spanish troops who did not know where this squadron had come from. Such an action motivated the generalized attack of the patriots who achieved victory in only 45 minutes.
In Junín, the patriot army obtained 700 rifles and captured a large territory. Bolívar preferred not to pursue the Spaniards after the arrival of night. In addition, the soldiers were extremely exhausted not only from the combat, but also from the long days of forced marches before reaching Junín.
Despite the resounding defeat, the Spanish had saved the bulk of their army by protecting the infantry. Aware of this situation, Bolívar and the Republican generals set out to recover the wounded, explore the terrain and gather weapons. Likewise, it was vital to know what had happened to Olañeta.
By October, Santander had not sent the promised reinforcements. In the context created, such a contingent could play a decisive role in the final combat that was undoubtedly coming. On October 6, Bolívar met with the High Command and informed them that he was of the opinion that he should move to the coast to attend to matters of State and organize a new force to reinforce the army.
The Liberator appointed General De la Mar to replace him in the command of the army because he was the most senior officer, but the latter, in an act of extreme generosity, declined in favor of Sucre, arguing that the Cumanese had more experience and experience. Bolívar ordered Sucre not to fight until he was sure of victory. At that moment he should be the one to decide the place of the fight, not the Spaniards.
Thus, a sort of “cat and mouse” game begins in which Sucre, with great tactical skill, as well as cunning and strategic vision, mocks again and again the rabid persecution of the Spaniards who wanted to hunt him and the army.
At some undetermined moment during his trip to the coast, Bolívar receives a message informing him that the Colombian Congress had removed him from his position as head of his country’s army. In the same way, the extraordinary powers that had been granted to him for the fulfillment of his mission through a decree of October 9, 1821 were suppressed. The Liberator accepted the decision, appointing Sucre as the new head of the Colombian army. From then on, he continued to act only as dictator of Peru. The communication received indicated that the General Secretariat and the General Staff had also been abolished and that the powers that these bodies possessed had been handed over to Vice-President Santander, who was in charge of the executive power. Bolívar ordered Sucre and the generals to accept the decision of the Congress, which in the first instance had been resisted by the high officers of the army. Thus, unexpectedly and unintentionally, the time had come for Antonio José de Sucre.
His tactic of sneaking away and not facing combat was paying off at the same time as generating anxiety and despair on the Spanish side. On December 6, after more than two months of continuous movement, Sucre and De la Mar decided that the battle would be fought in the Pampa de Quinua.
On December 9, very early in the morning, Sucre harangued the troops, one by one to each battalion. He then gave the order to attack the 2nd. Division under the command of General José María Córdova, a Colombian, born in Antioquia, who stood up and pointed his sword at the front, harangued his soldiers to the cry of “Forward, at the pace of victors!”
The Antioquian was twenty-five years old, Sucre 29. They were generals made in war and battles. The extraordinary strategic leadership of the troops by Sucre was decisive, all the generals and high officers also had a great participation, which together with the unparalleled heroism and high moral solidity of the soldiers, led to victory. Sucre carried out his plan without alteration, exposing himself in the fighting. The battle lasted no more than an hour.
That same night the capitulation of the Spaniards took place. The patriot generals and Sucre personally, were concerned with protecting the prisoners, treating the wounded and respecting the hierarchies of the arrested officers.
At night, Viceroy La Serna, who had been wounded and captured in combat, appeared before Sucre. When he handed him his sword as a symbol of defeat, he said, “Glory to the victor!” Sucre, refusing to receive the trophy, replied “Glory to the vanquished!” and asked him to keep his gun.
A few weeks later, on December 20, Bolívar ordered Sucre to go to Cusco and then continue to Upper Peru that was still in the hands of the Spanish. On February 10, 1825, one year after the designation of Bolívar by Congress as dictator of Peru, the Liberator appeared before the highest representation of the Peruvian people to render an account of his actions. He said that he found it dangerous for a single man to concentrate all the powers of the State. He informed Congress that some Spanish forces that resisted defeat still had to be surrendered, but that once that mission was accomplished, he would return to Colombia to report to the Congress of his country on the fulfillment of the mission.
Congress did not accept his resignation, but Bolívar insisted on it. Likewise, he refused to receive a contribution of one million pesos that Congress had decided to grant him. Time and again the congressmen insisted, time and again, Bolívar objected to the emolument but at his insistence, he asked that this sum be given to Caracas, his hometown. That same day, February 10, the Congress of Peru granted Sucre the title of Grand Marshal of Ayacucho.
Two days before the battle, not knowing when it would occur but convinced that it and its outcome were inevitable, the Liberator addressed an appeal to the Heads of State of the new American republics formerly Spanish to meet in Panama in order to begin to build the necessary American unity. A new battle began. Two hundred years after Junín and Ayacucho, we are still committed to it.
[1] Phrase of the Liberator Simón Bolívar to characterize the Battle of Ayacucho