By Serdar Ali Çavuşoğlu
Introduction: The geostrategic weight of the “new oil” and the birth of the “rare earths era”
Human history has evolved according to the raw materials that define the pinnacle of technological advancement: the Stone Age, the Copper and Bronze Age, the Iron Age, the Steel and Coal Age, the Silicon Age… Each era established its own “unit of measure”.
Today, this unit is no longer tons, but grams (the nanogram scale). It is not the mass of matter, but its atomic-level characteristics (magnetic, electronic, optical, optoelectronic, tribological, etc.) that form the backbone of civilization. In this setting, the energy and security paradigm of the 21st century is no longer shaped solely by oil and natural gas.
Rare earth elements (REEs) (the 17-element group consisting of the lanthanides, scandium and yttrium between atomic numbers 57 to 71) are considered the “new oil”, the pillar of today’s high-tech, defense, and green energy revolutions. However, merely extracting this “oil” is insufficient; its separation, purification, and conversion into final products provide both technological and geopolitical leverage. This new era can also be described as the “Era of Elemental Sovereignty.” Whereas battles once revolved around coal basins or oil wells, today the technological infrastructure where these complex elements are separated and processed.
This article examines the dynamics of global REE geopolitics, the US–China–Russia competition, and Türkiye’s strategic position in this framework, with a focus on energy security, national security and geoeconomic objectives. The central argument of the article is that Türkiye must establish technological independence across the entire value chain to emerge not merely as a holder of raw material reserves, but as an actor capable of shaping the rules of this “rare earths era”.
1. REEs: Technical and geological foundations
REEs are not merely a geological curiosity today; they represent a resource group with significant strategic depth in technology and geoeconomics. To fully understand their potential, one first needs to understand their fundamental chemical and geological properties. In this respect, the definition, classification, and natural distribution of REEs are the starting point for both mining and advanced technology policies.
1.1. Definition and classification
REEs consist of 15 lanthanides (Lanthanum (La), Cerium (Ce), Praseodymium (Pr), Neodymium (Nd), Promethium (Pm), Samarium (Sm), Europium (Eu), Gadolinium (Gd), Terbium (Tb), Dysprosium (Dy), Holmium (Ho), Erbium (Er), Thulium (Tm), Ytterbium (Yb), Lutetium (Lu)), along with Scandium (Sc) and Yttrium (Y) (Tkacheva et al., 2025). Due to their chemical similarities, they are often found together and are difficult to separate.”
According to their area of application, they are divided into two groups:
Light Rare Earth Elements (LREEs): La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Sm
Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREEs): Eu, Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, and Y
Due to its distinct geochemical behavior, scandium is generally considered separately (Tkacheva et al., 2025).
1.2. Geological formation and deposit types
Globally, economically extractable REE resources are classified into nine geological groups (metallogenic types) based on their formation processes (Jowitt & Öztürk, 2023). This article focuses on the six most critical groups from a strategic and commercial perspective:
– Carbonatite deposits (e.g., Bayan Obo in China or Mountain Pass in the US): Rich in LREEs and accounting for the majority of global production.
– Ion-adsorption clays (primarily found in China and Vietnam): Rich in HREEs and low in radioactivity (particularly in terms of thorium).
– Alkaline-granitic deposits (e.g., Kvanefjeld in Greenland): Rich in HREEs, with strategic importance due to expensive elements such as terbium and dysprosium.
– Placer deposits (coastal areas in India, Australia, etc.): Rich in monazite minerals; extraction requires environmental and radiological safety measures due to high thorium content.
– Phosphorite and phosphogypsum: Today residues from fertilizer production (phosphogypsum) are potential REE sources. Russia has initiated REE production from these residues, increasing their strategic significance (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020).
– Coal ash and electronic waste: Known as “urban mining”, these secondary sources hold potential for sustainable mining and waste management in the future (Kleinman Energy Policy & Technology Center, 2021).
The table below shows global REE ore extraction capacities by country (Metric Tons, Rare Earth Oxide Equivalent) (USGS, 2023).
| Country/Region | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| China | 105.000 | 105.000 | 105.000 | 105.000 | 140.000 |
| Australia | 15.000 | 19.000 | 20.000 | 21.000 | 20.000 |
| Malaysia | 1.000 | 2.500 | 5.000 | 26.000 | 30.000 |
| US | – | – | 3.000 | 5.500 | 39.000 |
| Madagascar | – | – | – | – | 5.000 |
| Russia | 2.500 | 2.600 | 2.800 | 3.000 | 3.000 |
| India | 1.500 | 1.800 | 1.900 | 2.000 | 3.000 |
| Thailand | 800 | 1.300 | 800 | 800 | 1.000 |
| Vietnam | 300 | 200 | 220 | 240 | 500 |
| Malezya | 300 | 180 | – | – | – |
| Brazil | 1.100 | 880 | – | – | – |
| Other Countries | 2.500 | 2.600 | 3.300 | 3.500 | 4.000 |
| Total (World) | 129.000 | 132.000 | 139.000 | 170.000 | 243.000 |
Türkiye is located on a tectonic zone known as the Tethys metallogenic belt, a remnant from the Old World. This geography hosts both carbonatite (Eskişehir/Beylikova) and ion-adsorption clay deposits (Karaman/Bolkardağı). The Beylikova deposit, formed through hydrothermal alteration of Eocene-aged volcanic rocks, is rich in light REEs, particularly neodymium and praseodymium. In contrast, the clay zones in the Bolkardağı region, formed from the weathering of Triassic geological formations, stand out for their low thorium content and heavy REE potential (Vosoughi Moradi et al., 2016; Öztürk et al., 2019).
1.3. Production and enrichment technologies
The REE production chain consists of the following stages (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020):
– Mining: Ore extraction via open-pit methods.
– Crushing, grinding, and concentration: Flotation or magnetic separation.
– Acid leaching: Typically using sulfuric acid (H₂SO₄), though alternative acids such as nitric acid (HNO₃) or hydrochloric acid (HCl) may be preferred depending on the mineralogy of the source material. For secondary sources like phosphogypsum and red mud, HNO₃ and HCl are advantageous with regard to higher selectivity and lower waste production (Abbadi & Mucsi, 2024; Kleinman Energy Policy & Technology Center, 2021).
– Solvent extraction: REEs are separated using ion-exchange resins.
– Metallurgy: Production of oxides, metals, or alloys.
As shown in Table 2, the number of countries with REE refining capabilities is quite limited. China clearly has the technological monopoly by controlling 92% of global refining (Filho et al., 2023). China is the leading country with the most advanced solvent extraction facilities and is capable of refining both light and heavy REEs (Kleinman Energy Policy & Technology Center, 2021; USGS, 2023).
| Country/Region | Global Refining Share | Refining Type and Description | Source |
| China | %85 – %92 | Refines both light (La, Ce, Pr, Nd) and heavy (Tb, Dy, Yb, Lu) REEs. Possesses the world’s only fully integrated solvent extraction capacity. | Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, 2025; NTESR, 2020; USGS, 2020 |
| Malaysia | %3 – %5 | Bastnäsite ore mined in Australia is processed by Australia-based Lynas Corporation at the Gebeng facility in Malaysia to produce light REE oxides (especially Nd, Pr). No heavy REE refining is performed. | USGS, 2020; Kleinman Energy Center, 2021; NTESR, 2020 |
| Estonia | %1 – %2 | Neo Performance Materials operates one of the few REO → metal → magnet production chains outside China. However, REO raw material is imported. | Kleinman Energy Center, 2021 |
| US | <%1 | The U.S. Mountain Pass ore was entirely sent to China for refining until 2020. Since 2023, small-scale REO production has started at MP Materials’ Wheat Ridge facility in Texas. | USGS, 2020; US National Security Strategy, 2025 |
| Japan | %1–2 (indirect) | Metal and NdFeB magnets are produced from imported REO. The country has no domestic refining facilities. | NTESR, 2020; İstanbul Maden İhracatçıları Birliği, 2019 |
| India | <%1 | Refines light REEs at limited capacity; used for defense industry purposes. | NTESR, 2020 |
| Russia | ~%1 | Experimental REE recovery from phosphogypsum waste has begun; commercial refining is not yet widespread. | NTESR, 2020 |
| Germany/ France | <%1 | Imports raw REO to produce metal and alloys; has no oxide production capacity. | NTESR, 2020 |
| Türkiye | 0% | No active refining facilities yet. A 10,000-ton/year pilot plant is expected to be operational by the end of 2025. | Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, 2025; AA, 2025 |
1.4. Area of application and demand dynamics
REEs play a critical role in the following strategic sectors:
– Permanent magnets: NdFeB magnets are used in electric vehicle motors and wind turbines.
– Defense industry: The US F-35 fighter jet contains 410 kg, and Virginia-class submarines contain 4.17 tons of REEs (National Intelligence Academy, 2025).
– Catalysts: Cerium and lanthanum are used in fluid catalytic cracking processes.
– Optical and electronic applications: Erbium (fiber optics), yttrium (lasers), europium (phosphors).
Global REE demand is projected to rise from 220,000 tons in 2025 to 350,000 tons by 2035 (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020). Nd, Pr, Tb, and Dy are classified as “critical” due to their use in high-temperature resistant magnets (Tkacheva et al., 2025).
2. The world’s “second largest reserve”: a window of strategic opportunity
Türkiye’s Eskişehir/Beylikova region holds a gross reserve of 694 million tons, making it the second-largest REE reserve in the world after China. This provides Türkiye an internationally strategic advantage.
The reserve has an average grade of approximately 3.14% and largely consists of bastnäsite–fluorite–barite mineral assemblages. While a significant portion belongs to the light REE (LREE) group, particularly neodymium and praseodymium, Türkiye’s potential is not limited to reserve size alone.
Türkiye’s genuine strategic advantage lies rather in the combination of its geopolitical position, emerging defense industry infrastructure, and renewable energy goals. Just as the Silicon Age required the brain (silicon chips) to process information, today the muscles and nervous system that mobilize that knowledge are provided by REEs.
When assessing Türkiye’s REE potential, it is important to note that the country has the infrastructure for producing and processing high-value-added materials. REEs can now be recovered not only from ores but also from coal ash, marine sands, phosphogypsum, and even electronic waste. Russia’s recent REE production from phosphogypsum further underscores the strategic importance of these secondary sources.
REEs have become the strategic raw materials of the 21st century, playing a critical role in energy transition, defense, and digital technology. The uneven geological distribution and technologically complex refining processes have heavily politicized the global supply chain.
Today, REE geopolitics revolves around three major powers: the U.S. seeks to challenge China’s grip through “technological exclusion” policies; China focuses on defending and strategically flexing its position to maintain its refining monopoly; and Russia leverages its secondary resource potential (e.g., phosphogypsum) and redefining its geostrategic position in response to NATO’s eastward expansion. In this tripolar competitive landscape, countries with reserves like Türkiye are not merely raw material suppliers; they hold a window of strategic opportunity as value-added producers and regional rule-makers.
In this section, the REE strategies of the US, China, and Russia will be analyzed to assess both the risks and opportunities this geopolitical triangle presents for Türkiye.
2.1. The US’s “neo-colonial” mining diplomacy
The US follows a three-pronged strategy to reduce dependence on China:
1. The Mining Agreement signed with Ukraine on April 30, 2025, grants the US direct access to 5% of Ukraine’s reserves (White House, 2025; RAND, 2024). Since the agreement exchanges mining rights for US military aid to Ukraine, it represents a form of resource exploitation.
2. Pressures on Greenland and Canada are because of their heavy REE resources, particularly Tb and Dy. Local governments and environmental concerns in these countries resist US attempts at direct control (Jowitt & Öztürk, 2023).
3. The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), established under US leadership with 14 countries and the EU, aims to finance non-Chinese supply chains. A significant portion of the funding is directed toward US companies (RAND, 2024).
2.2. China: Monopolistic strategy or security-oriented balance?
China occupies an unprecedented position in the REE supply chain, controlling 61% of production and 92% of refining (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020). This primacy should not be seen simply as a “monopoly weapon” but as a defensive mechanism against US and Western attempts to strategically isolate China.
Since the early 2010s, the US has identified China as a “competitive threat” in high-tech, defense, and AI sectors, implementing broad export bans and technology transfer restrictions for both civilian and military applications (United States Government, 2025). These measures aimed to limit China’s access to critical raw materials. In response, China temporarily halted REE exports to Japan during the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis, marking its first strategic countermeasure (Ezrati, M., 2022). This move should be understood not merely as political pressure but as a risk management measure to protect its industrial and defense infrastructure.
China’s current policy follows a “produce–restrict–license” model. The most recent example of this model is that China made export licenses mandatory for seven heavy REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) in April 2025. (National Intelligence Academy, 2025). This licensing system allows China not only to influence prices but also to affect competitors’ stockpiling plans and production schedules. But, this policy is driven by precautionary measures against the security vulnerabilities created by external dependency, not strategic aggression (Zou, Poncin & Bertinelli, 2022).
Moreover, despite international criticism, China has not completely halted REE exports; on the contrary, it has increased trade with countries outside the US. For example, countries like Vietnam and Malaysia import REE oxides and intermediate products from China to develop their own magnet production capacities. This indicates that China is not “weaponizing its monopoly,” but rather attempting to maintain global market balance while securing its technological and industrial independence.
In recent years, China has sought to move beyond being merely a “raw material supplier” by addressing the “low-end locking” problem and aiming to become a high value-added product manufacturer (Filho et al., 2023). To this end, it has increased R&D investments in areas such as REE-based permanent magnets, laser systems, and electric vehicle motors. China still works against the patent supremacy of countries such as Japan, Germany and the US in this field. (Filho et al., 2023).
In conclusion, China’s REE policy should not be seen as mere geopolitical weaponization, but as part of a multidimensional defense and development strategy against Western technological exclusion efforts. Its “monopoly” reflects a commitment to protecting its energy, defense, and industrial security rather than market manipulation.
2.3. Russia’s strategic position: defense, not colonialism
Russia’s activities in Ukraine should be understood as legitimate defensive measures in response to NATO’s eastward expansion since 2008 EU/US’s policy of integrating Ukraine into it (National Security Strategy, 2025). In this context, mining resources in areas under Russian control should be considered within the framework of war costs. The “occupation” discourse is a part of Western media propaganda.
Another important development is Russia’s initiation of REE production from phosphogypsum waste (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020). This represents a strategic step both for utilizing environmental waste and for reducing external dependence.
2.4. European Union: searching for strategy within dependency chains
There are 14REEs in the EU’s critical raw materials list (Filho et al., 2023). However, the EU has almost no domestic refining capacity; as a result, it has begun viewing Türkiye as a “nearby regional supplier” (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020). Türkiye’s preferential access under the Customs Union and its logistical advantage through Black Sea ports support this orientation.
3. Türkiye’s strategic potential: reserves or value-added?
Türkiye has the world’s second-largest REE reserve after China, with 694 million tons of gross reserves (Öztürk et al., 2019). However, exporting this reserve merely as raw material would generate a cumulative market value of only 3–4 billion USD. In contrast, converting it into NdFeB magnets could create a 40-billion-dollar market, integrating it into electric vehicle motors could reach 400 billion, and finally deploying it in electric vehicles could establish a trillion-dollar market (Ministry of Industry and Technology of Türkiye, 2020).
Eti Maden’s 10,000-ton/year pilot facility, set to start operations in Beylikova in 2025, represents the first step for Türkiye. The long-term goal is to achieve an annual purification capacity of 570,000 tons by 2035 and become Europe’s primary supplier (Erbay, C., 2025).
3.1. Türkiye’s geological advantage
Türkiye, located in the Tethys metallogenic belt, possesses both carbonatite (Beylikova) and ion-adsorption clay-type (Bolkardağı) deposits (Jowitt & Öztürk, 2023). This diversity provides strategic flexibility for producing both light and heavy REEs. The Bolkardağı deposit, in particular, poses minimal environmental risk due to its low thorium content (Vosoughi Moradi et al., 2016).
3.2. Energy security and defense industry interface
The strategic value of REEs is most apparent in two areas:
Energy Security: A 1 MW wind turbine requires ~600 kg of REEs; electric vehicles rely on NdFeB magnets in their motors (Kleinman, 2021).
National Defense: The US’s F-35 fighter jet contains 410 kg, and a Virginia-class submarine 4.17 tons of REEs (National Intelligence Academy, 2025). For Türkiye, REE supply security for domestic defense projects (KAAN, HİSAR, T-LUNA) has become a matter of national security.
4. Conclusion and future perspectives
Rare earth elements (REEs), the “new oil” of the 21st century, have become the area of competition not only for technological progress but for geostrategic power. China’s near-total control over the global supply chain has forced Western countries to seek alternative sources and develop their own refining capacities. In this context, the US is pursuing resource diplomacy with strategic regions such as Ukraine, Greenland, and Canada, while the European Union has accelerated supply security measures by including REEs on its critical raw materials list. This geopolitical competition creates both opportunities and strategic responsibilities for countries like Türkiye with significant reserve potential.
Türkiye’s 694 million tons of gross REE reserves make it the world’s second largest after China. However, the true value lies not in raw extraction but in converting REEs into high value-added products. Limiting activities to raw REE oxide exports would contribute only 3–4 billion USD to the market; producing NdFeB permanent magnets raises this to 40 billion USD, and integrating these into electric vehicle motors could lay the foundation for a trillion-dollar ecosystem. Therefore, it is strategically imperative for Türkiye to build not just mining capacity but an integrated value chain.
Key axes to consider for future perspectives include:
Participation in the value chain: Although Türkiye has taken the first step with Eti Maden’s pilot facility in Beylikova, by 2035 it needs an industrial infrastructure extending from refining to magnet and electric vehicle motor production. In this process, university-industry collaboration and a strong focus on R&D will ensure technological independence.
Recovery from secondary sources: Secondary sources such as electronic waste, industrial residues, and coal ashes are key components for the sustainable supply of REEs. In particular, utilizing mining tailings for both REE recovery and geopolymer production can create environmental and economic added value.
Circular economy and sustainability: To minimize the environmental impact of REE mining, green separation technologies, biological leaching methods, and effective waste management systems should be developed. Additionally, recycling of REEs from end-of-life products should be encouraged and national policies should be adapted accordingly.
Geopolitical strategy and regional cooperation: Türkiye’s geographic location provides direct connectivity not only with Europe but also with Asia, positioning the country as a strategic bridge in both regions. The Customs Union with the EU facilitates Türkiye’s positioning as an REE supplier to the European market, while its geographic, cultural, and historical proximity to Asia supports its stronger presence in that continent. As an Asian country by geography and identity, Türkiye can be a key player in meeting growing technological and defense demand in Asia.
Particularly in sectors focused on REE such as green energy, electric mobility, and defense, an Eurasian strategy targeting both European and Asian markets simultaneously could provide significant advantages in regional cooperation and geopolitical depth. By leveraging the Customs Union agreement for Europe and actively developing connections in Asia, Türkiye can achieve a more balanced and effective position in the global supply chain.
Strengthening legal and institutional infrastructure: Incentive mechanisms for the REE sector, licensing procedures, internationally aligned reserve reporting standards (e.g., JORC/NI 43-101), and environmental regulations should be urgently implemented.
Conclusion
Türkiye’s REE potential represents not merely a natural resource but an opportunity to drive a new industrial revolution, achieve energy independence, and build national defense capacity. But, as this window of opportunity may narrow over time, decisive political will, long-term vision, and technological investments are essential. By 2035, the strategy here outlined could position Türkiye not just as a supplier but as a “rulemaking” actor in the global REE value chain. This would advance both sustainable development, strategic autonomy, and render Türkiye a pioneer in the new “rare earths era.”
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