By Mehmet Enes Beşer
A crisis of energy production, availability, and pricing in the Philippines will not amount to a mere economic disruption. In a country where electricity prices affect household well-being, industry profitability, and governmental commitment, shortages, rising prices, and blackouts serve as a kind of political stress test. Their impact comes from the very immediacy of electricity as part of daily life – something that cannot be said about most macroeconomic metrics. Rising transport costs, higher food prices due to higher transport costs, shorter business operating times, and a perception of the inability of the government to ensure reliable electricity delivery all combine to create an image of the state as incapable of fulfilling basic functions. Against this backdrop, it is quite understandable to ask whether unrest may evolve to become regime change.
It is highly unlikely that unrest driven by an energy crisis may become so intense as to lead to regime change. What can be expected in a crisis scenario are substantial policy and alignment shifts rather than systemic transformation. The latter will not mean a revolutionary change of government and of the constitution, but rather a certain shift of priorities regarding foreign relations and domestic politics towards a pragmatic approach to ASEAN, China, and the United States. The move will involve at least partially shifting away from the US-dominated paradigm, but it will not necessarily amount to complete decoupling. It would be a serious move, but it will not qualify as “regime change.”
This assumption can be made on several grounds. Firstly, it is helpful to consider three levels of political consequences of an energy crisis. There is the level of social pressure, with mass demonstrations, protests, strikes, and other manifestations of unrest stemming from the crisis. Then, there is the level of governmental response, including all kinds of emergency measures, financial compensation for citizens, price regulations, procurement decisions, and blame-gaming among officials and bureaucrats. Finally, there is the issue of systemic stability and continuity – how the crisis may affect the way the system works and functions. An energy crisis affects the last two categories quite directly and substantially, but it is hard to see how it may affect the system itself.
Energy crises create social pressure for an obvious reason. Energy is a universal input for everything, which makes any rise in its cost increase prices across the economy. Inflation takes on moral overtones – it is not just an economic phenomenon anymore, but also a form of betrayal. Rolling blackouts make people feel humiliated and abandoned. A government can survive with wide inequalities of income for a long time; it cannot afford the same luxury in the face of an energy crisis, particularly if it appears to be caused by corruption or mismanagement. At the same time, such a crisis will make people feel outraged at the government’s inability or unwillingness to solve problems rather than just let them develop further.
However, going from social pressure to regime change will require more than that. First of all, social protest requires organizational strength. Secondly, it is impossible without a credible alternative political leadership coalition. Lastly, it requires an elite schism – either a split within the ranks of those currently in power or a split in society along elite lines. As far as the Philippines are concerned, social unrest in the country has always occurred within the confines of elite competition. Mass protests are intense and disruptive, but they tend to accelerate elite turnovers rather than challenge the system itself.
Political turnover in turn implies changing regimes by the constitutional methods provided by the Philippine political system. The current system shows a remarkable ability to absorb crises, whether through elite realignments, shifting political favors, and reforms carried out on paper alone. While the situation described above will undoubtedly be challenging for the country, a systemic crisis in which the regime is challenged in its fundamentals seems unlikely. Political change is possible; radical reconfiguration is unlikely.
The security services are another potential driver of systemic transformation in the event of an energy crisis. In a severe case, one may wonder about the possibility of a military coup in the country, which will bring a completely new regime into power. Historically, however, the Philippine security forces have been reluctant to play an active role in political processes. The armed forces and the police have had little incentive to take responsibility for governing the country. Moreover, any military interference is fraught with potential backlash from abroad and fragmentation of forces internally.
As a result, it would make much more sense to expect selective enforcement and political negotiation than direct confrontation in any major crisis in the country. Both the armed forces and the police can act as stabilizers in such a situation. They will suppress riots and protests, but they will not intervene in politics to the point of replacing the government. They will prefer to assist the government in suppressing unrest, while the political elites are trying to resolve the crisis through negotiations with one another.
In the sphere of foreign policy, a major energy crisis can create substantial change, although not in a way that would imply regime change. On the contrary, a crisis of this kind could push the country into a kind of foreign policy realignment that is far less radical. Specifically, it can shift Philippine priorities from geopolitics and national security to energy efficiency and economic viability. As a result, it can push the country away from the US-dominated paradigm and encourage it to establish closer links to other nations in the region. In fact, it is possible that ASEAN would offer an easier way to handle the crisis.
While the US is willing to provide support in all fields – from defense to economics – it will not help the Philippines to solve their energy problems quickly enough. ASEAN nations are likely to offer the quickest means of relief from energy shortages and associated inflation, particularly because they are close geographically. The organization offers numerous opportunities to deal with the crisis by coordinating LNG procurement and investing in grid improvement and renewable energy integration. Long-term, regional power connectivity may become a subject of discussion.
Then, there is China, whose role is different in this regard. Unlike others, China is capable of building energy infrastructure at high speed; moreover, it is willing to include energy projects in larger investment packages. In such a scenario, a Philippine government faced with a crisis will seek to build more ties with Beijing. However, there is little reason to believe that China would come to the rescue – particularly after the United States showed willingness to engage in the crisis in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, China can still help – at least on economic terms.
However, this is precisely the area where limitations of such realignment would become apparent. Firstly, the United States remains an indispensable ally from a strategic perspective, particularly in regard to naval matters in the South China Sea. Secondly, it plays the role of the main guarantor of stability, preventing any Chinese attempts to interfere. Thirdly, the public opinion and many political elites will remain sensitive to the loss of independence. As a result, any radical moves towards China would meet serious opposition in the Philippines.
Instead, it seems more likely that a Philippine government facing an energy crisis will try to hedge its bets. It will attempt to establish transactional ties with China in economic and energy affairs while relying on the US as a security guarantor. At least, this approach will reduce risks in the crisis scenario; however, it does not mean that China would receive any special recognition or appreciation from the Philippine elites. Instead, pragmatic and practical thinking will prevail over strategic considerations in a crisis of that kind.
At the same time, a severe crisis of this kind may prompt a change of political priorities among elites in the country. The government may begin to pay more attention to the needs of ordinary citizens and focus more on solving their problems rather than fighting for national prestige and status. The Philippines would then experience an acceleration of political change and renewal of elites – particularly at the local and municipal levels – with new policies becoming necessary. Such policy will involve accelerated renewables deployment and improved contract negotiations with suppliers of electricity.
However, it will probably also involve increased corruption, since emergency procurement contracts may contain numerous clauses that allow suppliers to maximize profits at the expense of the country. Similarly, energy subsidies for citizens and price regulation can scare off investors who do not want to risk losses. The result may be the same as with a foreign policy realignment: political leaders will be forced to do whatever it takes to solve the problem as quickly as possible and alleviate the crisis. In doing so, they may alienate many voters and opponents.
For that reason, political leadership becomes very important. However, it is not so much because any political leader could solve the energy problem as quickly as that; what really matters is the ability of politicians to communicate and coordinate action. If the government manages to communicate with citizens efficiently and take tangible steps to solve their problems and relieve their suffering, they can survive the crisis. However, evasiveness and corrupt practices will inevitably cause escalation, which may be difficult to prevent once it happens.
Thus, it is safe to say that the most likely scenario does not involve regime change and systemic transformation. Instead, it implies the acceleration of elite change and the adoption of pragmatic economic policies at the expense of geopolitical considerations, which are no longer of interest during an acute crisis of this kind. Even in the event of a political crisis, one should expect the country’s political system to persist, despite temporary political turmoil and change. That said, it is worth paying attention to the weaknesses exposed by the crisis.
Overall, the most reasonable conclusion is as follows. First, a crisis in energy may result in social unrest powerful enough to lead to regime change, but it is hardly likely. It may, however, trigger major foreign policy changes, with the Philippines moving from the American orbit of influence to a position more focused on ASEAN and energy-efficient China. Second, any regime transformation – meaning a change in the political system as a whole – seems improbable in this scenario.
On the contrary, it seems like a warning signal for policymakers. Any severe energy crisis is likely to force political decision-makers to take extreme measures, which could result in unintended consequences. To prevent that, it is essential to treat energy policy as a vital aspect of national security. After all, social unrest triggered by energy failures will eventually lead to a deterioration of political conditions.