By Mohammad Reza Moradi, General Director of Mehr News Agency’s Foreign Languages and International News Department, from Tehran / Iran
For more than three decades, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East has rested on a relatively simple premise: Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf, would outsource part of their security to an external power, while Washington would act as their security guarantor through military deployments, bases, air-defense systems, and intelligence networks.
The recent war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has put this equation under serious scrutiny. The question is increasingly difficult to avoid: Does the U.S. military presence still provide deterrence, or can it itself become a source of vulnerability for host countries during wartime?
There is no definitive answer yet. Arab governments continue to rely on security cooperation with Washington, and there is little indication that the United States is preparing for a broad military withdrawal from the region. Yet signs of change are emerging at the level of public opinion. This does not necessarily mean that Arab societies are becoming anti-American. Rather, it points to declining confidence in the assumption that regional security must necessarily be provided by an external power.
Jordan: A Changing Perception of Security
Jordan offers one of the clearest examples of this shift. In late July 2026, hundreds of Jordanian politicians, academics, lawyers, retired military officers and public figures signed an open letter calling for an end to the presence of U.S. forces in the country.
The significance of the initiative goes beyond the number of signatories. Jordan has long been one of Washington’s closest security partners in the region. Yet the recent war has generated a different calculation: a U.S. military presence that was previously viewed primarily as a security asset is increasingly being seen by parts of Jordanian society as a factor that could increase the country’s exposure to war.
This can be understood as a change in the perception of security. The question is no longer simply how effectively the United States can defend a host country. It is also whether the presence of U.S. forces could itself make that country a target.
When a Military Base Becomes a Target
The traditional logic behind foreign military bases is deterrence. A major power stations forces in an allied country to signal that any attack on that country would trigger a costly response.
But in wartime, the same military base can become a target. The more a host country provides infrastructure for foreign command centers, radar systems, aircraft, weapons storage or logistics, the more likely it is to enter the military calculations of the opposing side.
During the recent war, Iran made clear that countries allowing their territory to be used for military operations against Iran could not completely separate themselves from the consequences of the conflict. U.S. forces and facilities in several parts of the region subsequently came under attack.
This has created a new security dilemma for Arab states: what represents deterrence in peacetime can become a source of vulnerability during war.
What Does Arab Public Opinion Say?
The shift in perceptions did not begin with the recent war. Data from the Arab Barometer has already pointed to declining confidence in the United States in parts of the Arab world. In Jordan, favorable views of the United States fell by around 23 percentage points between 2022 and 2024, reaching 28 percent. In Iraq, the figure was also around 28 percent in 2024.
More important than overall favorability, however, is how Arabs assess the U.S. role in regional security. In one Arab Barometer survey, only 9 percent of Jordanians considered U.S. policy the more appropriate approach to maintaining regional security, compared with 43 percent who preferred China’s approach. In Egypt, the figures were 6 percent for the United States and 36 percent for China.
These figures should not be interpreted as evidence that Arab societies want to replace the United States with China. That would be an overly simplistic conclusion. What they do indicate is that the U.S. monopoly over the definition of regional security is weakening.
From American Security to Multilayered Security
The more significant development is the growing effort by regional states to diversify their security partnerships and reduce dependence on a single external power.
The Mecca security agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan can be viewed as one of the clearest recent examples of this trend. The agreement emphasizes defense cooperation, security coordination and a form of joint deterrence among the three countries.
Its significance lies not only in its military provisions but also in the combination of the three actors involved. Saudi Arabia is one of the Gulf’s most important economic and political powers; Türkiye is a major regional military and geopolitical actor; and Pakistan is a significant military power with nuclear capabilities. Their growing defense cooperation represents an additional layer of regional security outside the traditional U.S.-led framework.
This does not mean that these countries are abandoning Washington. Gulf states continue to rely heavily on U.S. military technology, weapons, intelligence and deterrence capabilities, and their defense relationships with Washington remain important.
But the recent war has demonstrated that complete dependence on a single external power can itself become a source of vulnerability during a crisis.
What is emerging, therefore, is less a “withdrawal from American security” than a move toward “multilayered security”—an arrangement in which the United States remains an important actor but is no longer the sole pillar of the region’s security architecture. Middle Eastern states are increasingly seeking to supplement external guarantees with regional alliances and indigenous security mechanisms.
Iran and the Changing Regional Calculus
The forty-day war produced another important strategic consequence: it changed how regional states calculate the costs of hosting foreign forces.
During the conflict, Iran demonstrated that in the event of a direct confrontation with the United States, it would regard U.S. military bases and infrastructure in regional countries as part of its deterrence calculations. The message for host countries was clear: a state that allows its territory to be used for military operations against Iran may not be able to completely shield itself from the consequences if the conflict escalates.
This does not mean that Arab public opinion has adopted Iran’s security narrative. Many Arab societies remain deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, regional influence and military capabilities.
But the war has highlighted a new contradiction: a society can simultaneously view Iran as a security threat and question its dependence on the United States for protection.
That contradiction is significant. The issue is no longer simply a choice between Iran and the United States. The broader question is how regional states can protect themselves without becoming arenas for competition between larger powers.
For this reason, the movement toward regional alliances and security mechanisms could become one of the most important long-term consequences of the recent war.
The End of America or the End of American Exclusivity?
The forty-day war should not be interpreted as the beginning of the end of the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Washington still possesses substantial military, intelligence and diplomatic capabilities in the region, while many Arab states cannot replace those capabilities in the short term.
What is changing is not necessarily America’s presence, but its exclusive position in defining regional security.
At the same time, what is changing in Arab public opinion is not necessarily a wholesale rejection of the United States, but a reassessment of the security function of its military presence. Bases that were once presented primarily as symbols of deterrence and stability are increasingly viewed by some segments of Arab public opinion as potential factors that could expose host countries to attack during a war.
The question, therefore, is gradually shifting from “Does America protect us?” to a more fundamental one: “Does the American military presence actually make us safer?”
Declining confidence in Washington’s security role, expanding cooperation with non-Western powers, and the emergence of arrangements such as the Mecca agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan all point to a changing regional calculation.
The future of the Middle East is therefore unlikely to be defined by the simple withdrawal of the United States. It may instead be defined by the end of American exclusivity and the gradual emergence of a more diversified, multilayered regional security architecture.