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06/29/2024

Bolivia: A coup for destabilization and forced early elections

Bolivia: A coup for destabilization and forced early elections

By Fernando Esteche

This week’s coup attempt in Bolivia has shaken not only the country but the entire continent, raising eyebrows even in Eurasia. This is due to the fact that the Bolivian government represents a path to independence, self-determination and industrialization in the so-called US backyard. Very soon after its failure, voices emerged in the country that claimed that actually a self-induced coup occurred in the country. The claim, first declared by the coup general himself, claimed that President Arce himself had induced the act to increase his popularity.

We spoke about the coup, its failure, the frictions within the popular front and the reasons and dimensions of crisis in Bolivia with Hugo Moldiz. Former Minister of Interior under then-President Evo Morales, Moldiz is an expert on international relations with several books on the Bolivian Revolution.

After the riot led by the General Zuñiga, several actors from a sector of the MAS (Movement to Socialism, Bolivian political party with majority in parliament that backed the election of current president Luis Arce, UWI) and the coup leader himself denounced a self-induced coup. What is your reflection on the subject?

So far there are 21 persons from the active military, passive military and some civilians have been arrested in less than 24 hours for their participation in the failed coup. The investigations have so far led to locating the origin of the planning of the coup in May of this year, and to identifying some actors, especially from the passive service, who participated in the 2019 coup against Evo Morales and who have some very active relationship with the United States Embassy.

Now there are four elements to consider about the statements of General Zúñiga, the former army commander, that he made while in Plaza Murillo in front of presidential palace. One; calling for the release of political prisoners, Jeanine Áñez, Fernando Camacho and others. Two; statements against the Bolivian democracy, declaring that there was no democracy but unrest. Three; pointing out that the people of the town were in their homes, with those moving to the square not being people but gangs of MAS; Four; the country was broken.

Zúñiga reveals that the coup did not succeed because the police did not join in despite a preliminary agreement and that other motorized army units did not arrive at the Plaza Murillo as had been agreed.

So, there are several elements that lead to dismantling the false self-coup hypothesis. We must see that those who today speak of a self-induced coup were, just hours ago, expressing their rejection of the attempted coup d’état, calling to defend democracy.

But when they realized that the coup was not going to succeed, and that President Luis Arce was going to emerge stronger from it, at least in the short or medium term, depending on how he processes this victory, they have moved on to the hypothesis of a self-induced coup. This aims to discredit and affect that level of strength with which Luis Arce has emerged from this attempted coup.

Bolivia’s economic situation

Could you describe the socioeconomic situation of the country, what are the problems it faces?

There are external factors influencing the Bolivian economy in addition to effects of the de facto government, where practically no public investment was made. Noteworthy the drastic decrease of gas production and export volumes to Brazil and Argentina, which were the country’s main source of income. Combining external and internal factors, obviously Bolivia should be in a very deep economic crisis, with hyperinflation, exploding unemployment.

Fortunately, that has not happened. The inflation is controlled, with Bolivia being the first or second economy in Latin America with the least inflation. Unemployment has rather decreased a little and poverty levels have also decreased in relation to even before 2019 coup d’état.

The effects of the economic model have given results, it has proven to be good both for times of prosperity and for times of difficulties such as those being faced.

Now, in this context there are two problems to be solved: one is the issue of the low availability of dollars and the second the shortage of diesel and gasoline.

The latter is in the process of being resolved after President Arce’s visit to Russia and meeting with President Vladimir Putin. Russia, as a member of OPEC, is collaborating so that Bolivia can resolve the issue of gasoline and diesel.

The issue of dollars is more complicated, there is a process of speculation, the agribusiness that grew a lot during Evo’s government, does not put dollars into or out of the Central Bank. Certainly, at times when there was a lot of money, this was not noticed. But at times of a decrease in income from gas exports, it is already very noticeable, so there is an issue there to further resolve the speculation that the banks and the agribusiness are doing. They are practically auctioning off the dollars that are in the country to the highest bidder in a clear expression not only so-called of economic liberalization in quotes but also of speculation. and they do it outside the country.

The Zuñiga coup aims to manifest a certain institutional instability. How does this instability show itself beyond the coup in regard to different powers and governance?

Bolivia is facing economic difficulties, but I think is too premature and politically motivated to speak of a crisis, at least understanding crisis as something structural. The country has difficulties derived from external and internal causes. It is very clear the effects of the post-pandemic era that to a greater or lesser extent have hit the economies of the world, particularly Latin America, growth in unemployment, high rates, also work on Bolivia.

Secondly, there is a convergence of objectives, especially between the Evista faction (the faction that supports former President Evo Morales, within the internal division of MAS, UWI.) and the far-right faction led by Fernando Camacho, who is in jail for the 2019 coup. There is a political construction that the country is in a state crisis or due to, at the very least, an institutional crisis. This has a lot to do with the issue of the judicial body, other countries called the judiciary, and even the electoral body and the problems that the vice president has in leading the plurinational legislative assembly. You must know that, according to the Bolivian the constitution, the vice president is the president of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.

So, and of course, and this adds to the issue of the Armed Forces, therefore, the hypothesis is that Bolivia is falling into an increasingly deep institutional crisis. According to that position, obviously the solution is political.

Claims of continuous instability

What they do not dare to say explicitly and systematically, although they have released some ideas, is that this political solution implies early elections, usually scheduled for 2025. There are ideas to hold these already in this year.

Likewise, we must also understand a little what has happened with the coup attempt, which is one of the ways to destabilize the legally and legitimately constituted government.

It goes along that to show that the judicial body has not been renewed by popular vote, as established by the Bolivian Constitution, which is the responsibility of the government. This is a bit of the narrative that is sold inside and outside the country.

Truth is that the plurinational legislative responsibility was incapable of reaching an agreement on a law of convocation and judicial elections for last year, since they had to have been changed on December 31. And since that did not happen and there cannot be an institutional vacuum, especially in the field of justice, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling or a judicial resolution by which all members of the judicial body, including themselves, remained in their functions until there are elections that should be this year.

In short, this coup plot is being proposed by sectors of the classic right but also of what is called this new right or that politically take right-wing positions as an expression of a crisis as well as a deep institutional crisis.

How to reunite factions of the popular front

With the current accusations, it seems to be very difficult to think of a unity of the popular sectors expressed through Evo Morales and Luis Arce… Is it possible to build that unity? What would be the possible paths? Would that unity resolve the electoral threat of neocolonialist proposals?

The possibilities of unity are increasingly distant. There are some bridges that are being established between both factions. But everything indicates a growing list of differences between one faction and another, especially with the Evo faction. This has begun not only to discredit the government of President Luis Arce, but even to disqualify the leaders of the founding organizations of the MAS. That has rather widened the differences and deepened them.

However, there are two central elements that could lead to a reunion under current conditions, without kisses or hugs, so that they can act together in the face of the 2025 elections, opening the possibility of continuing with the process of change and continuing with the deepening of the plurinational State and the path towards industrialization.

There are two conditions: one is to resolve the differences within the framework of the MAS statute. This implies that a Congress must be convened by the political leadership, which until now before the electoral body is that of Evo Morales, together and in consensus, as established the statute of the MAS, in consensus with its founding organizations.

For that to happen, Evo must recognize that some organizations that he has created, parallel organizations, have neither legality, nor representativeness, nor legitimacy, and that therefore he must be with the three founders, founding organizations, the Central Obrera Boliviana, who are supporting to President Luis Arce.

And the second condition is a democratic election of the candidates. Do not impose an idea either by hook or by crook, but rather that according to surveys, or an open or closed national consultation, or a combination of both, the candidate who best represents and has the best possibilities for the next elections can be chosen for general elections.

The US perspective on Bolivia

After the statements of the North American chargé d’affaires in the country, and the return of Arce from his trip to Russia, can we think that the possibility of strengthening the autonomous profile of Bolivia accelerated dismissal plans on the part of the US Southern Command?

Obviously, Bolivia has resources, lithium, the largest reserves in the world, and rare earths that are of interest to the United States, in addition to the interest represented by its geographical location, being in the heart, basically, of South America. And have social movements that, although they have been hit since before the 2019 coup, due to a kind of domestication that was carried out by the State, despite that, they continue to be highly politicized social sectors and fundamental for any emancipatory political process.

So, the United States has its sights focused on lithium, rare earths and Bolivia’s resources, and this has deepened in recent years. What bothers the United States is that, unlike even what happened during the government of Evo Morales, Luis Arce has strengthened relations with China, Russia and Iran. It is something that certainly makes the United States and, obviously, the Southern Command quite uncomfortable.

And yes, it must be understood that these US plans to destitute the government have been accelerated by the political position demonstrated by Luis Arce’s government through its foreign policy.

Opposition creates ungovernability

Can you list and describe some of the different agreements that were made in the congress of sectors of the MAS with coup opposition and that attacked governability and the economy?

In November of last year there was a renewal of the directives of deputies and senators. The Evista faction reached an agreement with Creemos and Comunidad Ciudadana, that is, with the extreme right and with Mr. Mesa’s party, which is right-wing, which were the two parties that were involved in the coup against Evo Morales.

Among their nine-point-agreement is a very important one, the due process for political prisoners and their release. What Senator Andrónico did with that agreement, an agreement signed by Evo Morales, was to recognize that there are political prisoners in Bolivia. This is a concept with which the United States, the OAS and others interfere with the revolutionary, progressive and left-wing governments and turn common criminals into political prisoners as a banner of agitation, mobilization and international depression.

This agreement has translated into an economic blockade until now against the government of President Arce. There are many economic laws, including credits, that have to be approved by the Legislative Assembly which have been blocked.

Some laws have been approved as a result of sectors that were going to benefit from their implementation, for example construction between cassette decks between provinces or between one department and another. The approval only came after several months, a delay with which they evidently aimed, not without reason, that the executive paid the price. Because people thought that it was the government that does not want to execute this or that project, when in reality the financing mechanism is practically frozen and blocked in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.

Then, for several months, the law of accession to MERCOSUR was kept in the archives of the Legislative Assembly. Not only was it halted, but in addition to that, they first rejected it and approved it then just two weeks ago. So, there is coordination.

And regarding the issue of judicial elections, they tried to impose a law that was prevented by the parliamentarian bench that works with Arce, basically to divide up again the magistrates and premises of the judicial body. So, there is a joint action, even a similarity of the narrative that is used against the government, a corrupt government, a government that protects drug trafficking, a government that attacks private property. Imagine, the Movement To Socialism as part of a private property narrative used against the government of Luis Arce.

Why the coup was stopped successfully

I want to close by pointing some aspects that in my opinion were fundamental to defeating the coup attempt, in addition to what was pointed out in the first point.

First; the rapid mobilization of the people to defend their legally and legitimately constituted government, not only in La Paz, where people began to flock to Plaza Murillo, but also in various parts of the country where rallies, concentrations and marches of support were held. to the president and defense of democracy.

Second; the attitude of Luis Arce, who even though they even offered him a helicopter to leave Casa Grande, which is the government palace in Bolivia, decided to stay and confront the coup plotters. He even went down to the door of the Quemado Palace, adjacent to the Casa Grande, to order the rebellious general to withdraw the troops. When the general told him that he was not going to do it, Arce was not intimidated at all. He has not left and never thought about resigning. Evidently, by that, President Arce has displayed a value, a moral and a political force.

Third; the rapid reaction of the international community, of progressive governments, of the left, even of others that are neither one nor the other, showing their full support to democracy and the legally and legitimately constituted government. Also, the social organizations quickly acted by calling for a national road blockade and an indefinite general strike until the coup plotter leaves in case the coup had turn into facts and had taken political power by force.

United World International

Independent analytical center where political scientists and experts in international relations from various countries exchange their opinions and views.

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