By Azar Mahdavan, from Tehran / Iran
The recent war between Iran on the one hand and the United States and Israel on the other is not merely a military confrontation at the regional level. It is also an event that has carried significant consequences for Iran’s domestic politics and the orientation of its foreign policy. The war occurred at a time when, in recent years, debate inside Iran over the question of “negotiation with the West” and how relations with Western powers should be managed had become one of the central themes of the country’s political discourse. At the same time, Iran came under attack precisely at a moment when a new round of negotiations with the West was underway.
It appears that the outbreak of the war, alongside the growing prominence of a discourse of solidarity in the face of an external threat, has also affected the alignment of political and social forces inside the country.
In this regard, we conducted an interview with Dr. Mostafa Najafi, a political affairs expert, which you can read below.
The impact of the war on domestic political dynamics
As you know, political currents and factions inside Iran can generally be divided into two broad blocs: first, a current that believes the solution to the country’s problems lies in “compromise and reconciliation” with the United States and the West; and second, a current that, while emphasizing the country’s independence and the importance of domestic and indigenous capacities for development, argues that compromise and dialogue with the West are not inherently sacred, but should take place under conditions in which Iran’s internal and national power has increased. The war imposed by the United States and Israel, which began in the midst of Tehran’s dialogue with the West, has so far had what kind of impact on the balance of power among political currents within Iran’s internal power structure?
The current war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran effectively functions as a turning point in Iran’s domestic politics. Under such conditions, the balance between the two main political blocs shifts. The current that views broad compromise with the West as the solution to the country’s problems faces a relative decline in influence in the short term, because the experience of war demonstrates that reliance solely on negotiations cannot necessarily prevent conflict. In contrast, the current that emphasizes independence, deterrence, and the strengthening of domestic capacities gains the upper hand. However, this does not mean the complete disappearance of the first approach; rather, it leads to its redefinition in the form of “negotiation from a position of strength.”
Iranian history shows that in times of crisis the discourse of “national unity” usually becomes more prominent. How do you assess the social atmosphere in the country during the days of war?
In the social and discursive sphere, the phenomenon of “national unity” tends to strengthen in response to external threats. This convergence is genuine and effective in the short term and can help reduce political and social divisions. In the longer term, however, these differences do not disappear entirely and gradually reemerge, though usually within a more limited framework and with a stronger emphasis on national interests.
From the first days of the war, officials in the United States and Israel have repeatedly claimed that Iran’s military and political structure has been “destroyed.” Considering the realities on the ground, what is your assessment of such claims?
Claims by the United States and Israel regarding the destruction of Iran’s political and military structure can largely be understood within the framework of psychological warfare. Iran’s governing structure is designed in a multilayered and relatively flexible manner and does not depend absolutely on specific individuals. Therefore, even if some senior officials are assassinated or removed, the resulting disruptions are usually temporary and do not lead to systemic collapse. At the same time, wartime conditions tend to make decision‑making processes more agile, faster, and more security‑oriented, while the role of military and security institutions in the administration of the country becomes more prominent.
Relations with the West and the orientation of foreign policy
In your view, under the current circumstances, which priorities will Iran’s foreign policy focus on: military deterrence, strengthening regional alliances, or increasing economic resilience?
In the post-war environment, Iran’s foreign policy will likely focus simultaneously on three main pillars. First, strengthening military deterrence in order to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Second, expanding and consolidating alliances within the so‑called Axis of Resistance in order to increase strategic depth. And third, enhancing economic resilience, which functions as a key foundation of national power.
Within this framework, relations with the West will not be completely severed, but their nature will change. Negotiation will no longer be viewed as the primary solution; rather, it will become a complementary instrument alongside hard power. In other words, engagement with the West will be pursued only if it is accompanied by an increase in domestic capabilities and conducted from a position of strength rather than from a position of need.
The future of the political system and internal structure
Although the declared objectives of the Trump administration and the Israeli government changed several times during the war—suggesting a degree of strategic confusion—what assessment do you think Washington and Tel Aviv had when they entered the war with Iran? How close have they come to achieving their goals, and how have national cohesion and the military, economic, and political resilience of Iranian society influenced the shift in U.S. and Israeli objectives?
The United States and Israel likely entered the war with Iran based on an assessment that emphasized internal vulnerabilities, social dissatisfaction, and the possibility of generating rapid instability. However, if Iran manages to pass through the war successfully, these assumptions will likely be regarded as a significant miscalculation. As a result, the initial objectives of the opposing side—which may have been relatively ambitious—are likely to be scaled down to more limited goals such as containment and control.
In this context, national cohesion and societal resilience play a decisive role. If Iran can maintain social cohesion, relative economic stability, and its military capabilities, the costs of the war for the opposing side will increase considerably, forcing them to reconsider and adjust their strategy.
Given the current trajectory and conditions of the war, which institutions or political currents in Iran are likely to gain greater influence within society?
In terms of the domestic power structure, wars of this kind typically lead to the strengthening of military and security institutions, as well as more pragmatic political currents. Actors who demonstrate the ability to manage crises and preserve stability tend to gain greater influence. At the same time, other political currents are usually compelled to moderate their positions and adapt to the new realities created by the conflict.
The future of the Middle East and the international system after the war
How do you assess Iran’s military performance in this war, particularly given the simultaneous challenges of internal fronts, separatist groups, strikes against sources of threat in several countries, and direct confrontation with the United States and Israel?
If Iran succeeds in managing a multilayered war—one that involves simultaneous confrontations on several fronts and direct engagement with major powers—it will likely be interpreted as evidence of the effectiveness of its model of asymmetric deterrence. Such an outcome could elevate Iran’s regional standing and further consolidate its position as an active and influential actor in the Middle East.
In the international arena, there appears to be a broad consensus that the United States and Israel launched an unnecessary and unilateral war against Iran in the midst of negotiations. What impact could such a war—and similar unilateral actions by Washington and Tel Aviv—have on the current structure of the international order?
At the international level, the outbreak of a war widely perceived as unilateral and outside accepted legal and diplomatic frameworks could further weaken the Western- and U.S.-led rules‑based international order. Such developments may accelerate the ongoing shift toward a more multipolar system, expand the role of non‑Western powers, and deepen distrust toward existing international mechanisms.
Overall, if Iran manages to navigate such a war successfully, its consequences may become visible at four levels: domestically, in the strengthening of the discourse of independence and deterrence; in foreign policy, through a shift toward conditional engagement with the West; within the internal power structure, through the increased influence of security institutions and pragmatic actors; and at the regional and global levels, through an enhanced position for Iran and the acceleration of broader trends such as the multipolarization of the international system.