By Adem Kılıç, Political Scientist
The talks held in Islamabad under Pakistan’s mediation were, in fact, less a ceasefire negotiation and more of a probing process in which both sides gauged each other’s intentions.
The topics discussed, aside from the Strait of Hormuz, were no different from those in the Geneva talks prior to the war. This naturally led to the question: “Then why did this 40-day bloody war happen?”
The talks in Islamabad broadly centered on three main issues: the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the establishment of inspection mechanisms regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, and the limitation of regional engagement.
However, each of these issues immediately hit a wall of mistrust between the parties from the very first contact.
While the U.S. insisted on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a “precondition,” Iran countered by stating that it would only consider this if sanctions were eased and attacks were completely halted—presenting this as its own “precondition.”
On the nuclear front, the U.S. demanded that Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium be placed under international supervision and removed from the country. Iran, however, stated it would not accept this, asserting that it viewed it as a direct intervention in its national sovereignty.
Thus, the negotiations—reported to have lasted 21 hours—transformed into a strategic deadlock rather than a technical disagreement due to these issues.
This is because, although the parties were looking at the same text, they were interpreting a distinctly different future.
For the U.S., this process could be described as an effort to regain lost initiative, while for Iran, it could be seen as an opportunity to consolidate the advantages gained on the ground at the negotiating table.
Consequently, rather than a compromise, the negotiations revealed reflexes aimed at buying time and the fragility of the ceasefire.
The evaporation of strategic objectives
At the negotiating table, where both sides arrived feeling both exhausted and convinced they had achieved their own gains, there were undoubtedly clear reasons for their respective perspectives.
For while Iran had suffered heavy losses in 40 days of attacks, it had turned the conflict into a war that raised the stakes—particularly through retaliatory strikes against U.S. bases in Gulf countries and, more importantly, by blocking the Strait of Hormuz—while the U.S., though it had not achieved regime change, had dealt significant blows to the Iranian government and considerably weakened Iran militarily.
On the other hand, the fact that the assumptions Trump relied on when entering the war were effectively being dispelled one by one on the ground had an impact on the negotiations.
While Trump’s expectation of regime change went unfulfilled, the political structure within Iran, on the contrary, became even more consolidated in the face of perceived external threats. Militarily, while it is true that Iran suffered significant capacity losses, these losses did not produce a decisive turning point that would determine the course of the war, as Trump claimed.
Before the war, the fundamental objectives of the U.S. and Israel could be summarized under three headings.
These were: irreversibly halting Iran’s nuclear program, dismantling its regional proxy network, and eliminating the nuclear threat. However, at this stage, not only have none of these objectives been fully realized, but the Hormuz issue has also been added to the mix.
The Strait of Hormuz has become a powerful lever in Iran’s hands, effectively both drawing the U.S. to the negotiating table and enabling it to escalate the conflict onto the global stage.
In other words, the core issue for the U.S. and Israel has crystallized as the failure of tactical successes to translate into strategic outcomes and the escalating cost of the war.
Thus, the 40-day war has reached a deadlock, marking a new chapter in the tension between conventional power projection and asymmetric resistance.
A blow to the Western-centered global order!
On the other hand, this war has undoubtedly transcended being merely a conflict between two countries, taking on the nature of a tremor that touches the nerves of the global order.
The U.S.’s failure to rally its allies has made the cracks within the Western alliance and the global system even more visible than during the Gaza war.
While the U.S. and Israel continued their attacks and issued calls for help at deadlocked points, Europe remained cautious, Asia remained prudent, and the Gulf states were left in a state of anxious anticipation.
More importantly, the effective transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool of pressure has redefined the concept of global energy security, shifting the war’s outcomes from an expectation of military success to a geopolitical turning point.
This scenario undoubtedly created an opportunity for actors like China and Russia—who, despite not providing direct military support, could be characterized as part of an anti-U.S. and anti-Western bloc aligned with Iran.
In addition to the U.S. having its attention diverted from key global competitive fronts, its military wear and tear has been recorded as a development that accelerates the momentum toward a multipolar order.
Conclusion
This war has already taken its place in history as a process worthy of academic analysis, serving as a mirror reflecting the limits of modern power dynamics.
Following the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, it has been fully established that seemingly fundamental elements such as technological superiority, economic capacity, and military power are now effective only to a certain extent in new concepts of warfare.
The Trump administration’s greatest mistake was viewing this war as a quick and manageable process. However, at this stage, the U.S. has neither achieved a complete victory nor is it in a position to easily withdraw from the field—a position from which it is increasingly distancing itself.
The world, meanwhile, has been dragged into a search for a new balance amidst this landscape.
Perhaps the real question has now shifted from “How is this war won?” to “How do we get out of this war?”