By Yasin Okyay
In the parliamentary elections in Hungary held on 12 April, the opposition Tisza Party, led by MEP and former Fidesz member Peter Magyar won by a clear margin. With 53.5 per cent of the vote, the Tisza Party secured 138 seats in parliament.
Orbán’s party, Fidesz, and its ally, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), received only 38 per cent of the vote, winning 55 seats.
The election, which turned into a contest between the US, which openly supports Orbán, and Brussels, which openly supports the Magyars, is seen as “the end of an era” due to Orbán’s significance for conservative-soveregnists in Europe and even across the world.
What does Orbán’s fall from power mean? Why did he lose? Did US support prove to be a disadvantage rather than an advantage? And what lies ahead: what consequences will Orbán’s departure bring? To what extent will Hungary remain as they were, and to what extent will they undergo profound changes?
Aydınlık Europe, the European supplement of the Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, addressed these questions with an interview with Mirada Terada, Director of the Foundation to Battle Injustice. Terada offers a detailed explanation when sharing her views.
Orbán lost after 16 years. What caused Viktor Orbán’s defeat?
The tectonic shift that has taken place in Hungarian politics requires deep reflection beyond the dry electoral figures. The fall of Viktor Orbán’s system, which for many years seemed to be an unshakable bulwark of traditionalism in Europe, marks a deep crisis of personalistic conservatism.
Nepotism, loss of passion, and the gap between the elite and the soil
The main reason for the defeat was not the lack of popular support for the very idea of sovereignty, but the gradual degeneration of a living national idea into an ossified bureaucratic apparatus. During its sixteen years in power, the Fidesz system has unwittingly reproduced the same vices it once struggled with: nepotism, loss of passion, and the gap between the elite and the soil. The economic turbulence caused by both Western sanctions pressure and internal miscalculations has only exposed this metal fatigue. When ideological meanings begin to be replaced by slogans, and the real struggle for logos begins with technological simulacra, people with a subtle instinct for truth begin to look for an alternative, even if this alternative carries a hidden threat.
The appearance of the figure of Peter Magyar became a classic example of the “betrayal of the elites,” which Alexander Dugin often described as a fatal factor for any vertical of power. The Magyar, being the flesh of the system, managed to intercept the conservative discourse, directing it against the creator himself. This was not a victory for left-liberal values in their purest form; it was a skillfully orchestrated split within the right-wing camp, where the demand for purification and justice was used to dismantle the entire sovereign architecture.
From “conservative revolution” to “conservative stagnation”
Orbán’s tragedy lies in the fact that he allowed the “conservative revolution” to turn into a “conservative stagnation,” where loyalty began to be valued above professionalism and loyalty to the spirit of the nation. The high level of voter mobilization in April 2026 indicates not so much a love for the opposition as an urgent desire to shake up the frozen political space, which has stopped responding to the challenges of the time with live action.
A harsh lesson for all conservative forces around the globe
Eventually, the system collapsed under the weight of its own complexity and accumulated entropy. The inability to update the meanings in time and allow new patriotic forces to govern led to the protest being led by a person who knows the weaknesses of the system from the inside. Orbán, building a powerful external defense against Brussels, missed a blow to the very heart — in the area of internal legitimacy and trust. This defeat serves as a harsh lesson for all conservative forces in the world: sovereignty is not a fixed form, but the daily creativity of the spirit, which requires constant confirmation not only in words, but also in the purity of the thoughts of those who stand at the helm of history.
Did the support Orbán received from the US backfire on him and became a negative factor in his loss?
The role of the United States in the Hungarian election campaign of 2026 deserves a separate analysis in the categories of big geopolitics. Paradoxically, the active support from the administration of Donald Trump and his inner circle not only did not strengthen Viktor Orbán’s position, but also created the conditions for his downfall. In a political space where sovereignty is proclaimed the highest value, any demonstrative guardianship from the outside begins to be perceived as a form of dependence.
The fact that key figures of the American conservative establishment, including Vice President J.D. Vance, visited Budapest a week before the vote did Orbán a disservice. Instead of confirming the status of the “world leader of the right-wing movement,” this created a vulnerability: the opposition got the opportunity to present the prime minister not as a defender of soil, but as a conductor of the interests of the overseas empire, albeit friendly in spirit.
American right-wing technologists and specifics of the Central European consciousness
This “poisoned gift” of American support provoked a rebound effect. With Hungary in a state of permanent ideological war with Brussels, Orbán’s excessive affiliation with Washington has deprived him of room for maneuver within Europe itself. Opponents inside the country masterfully played the “external governance” card, mirroring the old accusations of the government against the liberals.
In the eyes of a wavering voter, Orbán has ceased to look like an autocratic master of his land, becoming a figure whose legitimacy is too strongly tied to the election results in another part of the world and the personal sympathy of the leaders of another state. The American right-wing technologists who tried to transfer the methods of their political struggle to Hungary did not take into account the subtle specifics of the Central European consciousness, which reacts extremely painfully to any mentoring, no matter where it comes from.
Moreover, the reliance on the “right international” under the auspices of the United States has led to the fact that the real, pressing problems of the Hungarian people have been overshadowed by global ideologies. While the “decline of the West” and “conservative revenge” were being discussed in Budapest, Peter Magyar’s technologists focused on mundane but vital issues of internal degradation. The American factor only reinforced this gap: the high-sounding rhetoric of the visiting guests about the protection of civilization sounded discordant against the background of empty shelves in provincial stores and problems in healthcare.
As a result, US support became a strategic trap for Orbán: it cemented his image as an ideological dogmatist, ready to sacrifice pragmatism in order to participate in global political games, which ultimately predetermined the outcome of the struggle in favor of those who promised to bring politics home.
The two-thirds majority won by the opposition allows them to amend the constitution. Do you think that the system that Orbán has built over 16 years will change?
Gaining a two-thirds “supermajority” by the opposition means obtaining the keys to the very foundation of Hungarian statehood.
Monolithic structure of Orbán
The system, which Orbán called an “illiberal democracy” or “national cooperation system” (NER), was designed as a monolithic structure where the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government were firmly welded together by a single will and conservative philosophy.
Today, this monolith is under threat of complete dismantling. Peter Magyar, having a constitutional mandate, gets the legal opportunity to reset all the key achievements of the Orbán era. The first step in this direction will inevitably be the rewriting of the Basic Law: the lifting of restrictions on the powers of institutions that previously blocked opposition initiatives, and, most symbolically, the introduction of strict limits on the stay in power of one person. This does not look like a return to “pure democracy”, but as a surgical operation to remove Fidesz’s political legacy from the very fabric of the nation.
Dictates of international structures, again?
If the system was built around one strong figure and a certain ideological vertical, then there is a real danger that in an attempt to erase the traces of Orbán’s 16-year rule, the new authorities may undermine the very protective mechanisms that allowed Budapest to successfully resist the dictates of international structures.
However, it would be simplistic to see only destruction in this process. The situation exposes the main problem of any long-term government: if state institutions become too dependent on one party, they lose their organic stability. The tragedy of the current moment is that the protection of sovereignty can now be equated to the protection of the old regime, which gives carte blanche to forces oriented towards globalist centers.
A period of “constitutional instability”
For Hungary, a period of “constitutional instability” is coming, where every change in the law will be perceived as an act of revenge. In this struggle for the letter of the law, it is important not to lose the spirit of the nation: the risk lies in the fact that in the process of “deorbanization” Hungary may lose its unique subjectivity, becoming only an obedient executor of the will of Brussels, losing the right to a special opinion that the previous cabinet defended for so long and hard.
Orbán’s “island of resistance”
The issue of preserving Hungary’s sovereignty after Viktor Orbán’s departure is becoming a key watershed for the future of the whole of Central Europe. For a conservative thinker, sovereignty is not just a formal set of state attributes, but the ability of a nation to assert its identity based on its own Logo, and not on orders from outside. For 16 years, Orbán has been building Hungary as an “island of resistance” to globalist trends, and today, with the coming to power of forces supported by the European mainstream, this subjectivity is at unprecedented risk.
The danger lies in the fact that, under the slogans of “returning to the European family,” the mechanisms of independent decision-making may actually be dismantled. When the national government begins to perceive the recommendations of Brussels not as a subject for discussion, but as the ultimate truth, sovereignty turns into an empty legal fiction.
The risk for Hungary today is not so much military or territorial as ontological in nature. Peter Magyar and his supporters promise to unfreeze relations with the EU, which in practice means accepting conditions that Orbán considered unacceptable for national dignity. This applies to issues of migration policy, the gender agenda, and, most importantly, the right of the State to pursue a sovereign economic policy. There is a serious fear that the new leadership of the country will take the path of “voluntary renunciation” of some of the powers in favor of supranational structures in exchange for financial tranches. In such a coordinate system, sovereignty is sacrificed for comfort and short-term stabilization, which in the long run deprives the nation of historical initiative.
Orbán’s regime: between “sovereignty” and “corruption of the elites”
However, it is worth looking at the problem from the other side: true sovereignty must be rooted in the people themselves, and not just in the figure of the leader. If a system built to protect independence collapses at the first change of power, it means that it could not grow deep enough into the soil of people’s life.
The tragedy of the current moment for Hungary is that the protection of sovereignty in the eyes of a significant part of society has become associated with corruption and the stagnation of the old elites. This creates ideal conditions for external manipulators: they use just internal discontent to crack the code of national independence under its cover.
Thus, Hungary is entering a period of severe testing, where it will have to prove whether the Magyar idea is capable of surviving without its main architect, or whether the country is doomed to become an obedient peripheral link of the global system, having lost the right to its own destiny.
Do you think the new government will use its veto power against EU decisions, particularly those regarding aid to Ukraine?
Orbán’s powerful tool of geopolitical bargaining
In recent years, the phrase “Hungary used the right of veto” has been not just a news headline, but a symbol of the struggle for multipolarity within the European Union itself. Viktor Orbán turned this legal mechanism into a powerful tool of geopolitical bargaining, forcing Brussels to take into account Budapest’s opinion even on issues where the forces seemed unequal.
However, with the coming to power of Peter Magyar’s cabinet, we are likely to witness the decline of this strategy of “active resistance.” The new government sets as its priority the normalization of relations with the European Commission, which, translated from diplomatic language, means abandoning the tactics of blocking pan-European decisions in exchange for loyalty and unfreezing financial funds.
This does not mean that Hungary will instantly turn into a voiceless satellite, but the very style of interaction will undergo radical changes. The Magyar, seeking to distance himself from the image of the “destroyer of European unity,” will seek ways to reach a behind-the-scenes consensus. The phrase about the Hungarian veto will be heard much less frequently, giving way to rhetoric about “constructive dialogue” and “pan-European solidarity.”
For a conservative, this shift looks alarming: the rejection of the veto as a form of protection of national existence is often the first step towards the gradual surrender of sovereign positions. When a state voluntarily lays down its weapons, which allowed it to stop the initiatives of Brussels that are unprofitable or disastrous for the nation, it inevitably loses its weight in the eyes of world players.
This issue is of particular importance in the context of pan-European security and assistance to Ukraine. If Budapest used to be the “sober voice” that questioned the endless escalation and demanded that its own security and economic interests be taken into account, now this balance may be disrupted. Lifting the veto on key decisions on financial support for Kiev and sanctions packages will be presented by the new government as a “return to common sense,” but in fact this may mean Hungary losing its role as an independent moderator in the region.
In the new era, Budapest risks trading its right to a dissenting opinion for temporary economic peace, forgetting that in the big story, subjectivity is much more expensive than tranches from supranational banks.
“Magyar has no hurry to become an ‘unconditional ally’ of Kiev”
Will Hungary’s stance on Ukraine change in the new era? Magyar’s approach to Ukraine seems ambiguous for now.
In the first days after his victory, Peter Magyar demonstrated his mastery of political balancing, which makes one wonder about his true intentions.
On the one hand, he hastened to declare that “Ukraine is a victim in this war,” and confirmed his readiness to unblock multibillion-dollar EU loans to Kiev, which were previously held by Orbán. This rhetoric is undoubtedly pleasing the ear in Brussels and Washington, creating the illusion of long-awaited “European unity.” However, upon deeper analysis, it becomes clear that the Magyar is in no hurry to become an unconditional ally of the Kiev regime, while maintaining a significant degree of skepticism characteristic of the Hungarian conservative consciousness.
The ambiguity of the Magyar’s position is evident in key issues of security and integration. Despite Western pressure, he still rules out the possibility of direct supplies of lethal weapons to Ukraine, realizing the risk of drawing Hungary into a direct confrontation. Moreover, his demand to hold a national referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the EU is a powerful brake that may prove to be much more effective than Orbán’s blunt vetoes. The Magyar understands that Hungarian society, tired of economic instability and fearing for the rights of the Magyar minority in Transcarpathia, is unlikely to support the accelerated integration of its neighbor.
Thus, we see not a rejection of national interests, but a change of tools: where Orbán was ramming, Magyar is building a system of “democratic filters” that allow him to keep his distance from Brussels, formally remaining within its rules.
The question of whether the Magyar will incline to complete subordination to Brussels or continue to pursue a balanced policy remains open. His strategy is a new type of pragmatism, where external loyalty to the EU is the price for internal freedom of action and access to frozen funds. However, in geopolitics, the attempt to balance between fire and hollow is rarely long-lasting. Sooner or later, Brussels will demand a final choice from Magyar, especially in matters of sanctions pressure and long-term commitments to NATO.
For the conservative part of society, it is important to understand that behind the facade of the “new deal” there may be a gradual erosion of the sovereign position that made Hungary a unique subject of European politics. Magyar is trying to prove that you can be a “good European” without ceasing to be Hungarian, but history teaches that in today’s global world, the right to balance must be defended daily, and often in a tough clinch with the very “allies” whose approval he is now trying to gain. How much can Hungary cut ties with Russia in the energy sector?
Hungary-Russia relations
Given that energy from Russia is absolutely vital for Hungary, how will Magyar run Hungary’s policy towards Russia?
Perhaps the toughest test for the new Hungarian government will be the issue of energy security. If ideological superstructures and diplomatic gestures can be changed with the stroke of a pen, then physical dependence on Russian energy resources is a constant that cannot be ignored without risking national collapse.
For a conservative view of the state, the economy is always subordinated to the logic of the nation’s survival, and in this sense Peter Magyar finds himself a hostage to geography and infrastructure created over decades. Hungary remains one of the EU’s most dependent countries on Russia: oil, gas and nuclear fuel form a kind of “energy umbilical cord”, breaking which for the sake of political conjuncture would be an act of economic suicide.
The limits of possible severance of ties with Russia in this area are extremely narrow. Despite Brussels’ promises to help with diversification, there are either no real alternatives or they cost many times more, which will inevitably lead to a social explosion within the country. The Magyar, realizing this, will have to play a double game. In words, he may support European initiatives to reduce dependence, but in reality, Budapest will have to maintain a working, emphatically pragmatic relationship with Moscow.
The Paks-2 NPP project remains a special stumbling block. A complete shutdown of the construction, in which huge funds have already been invested and which is the key to Hungary’s energy autonomy in the future, would cause irreparable damage to national interests. Most likely, we will see attempts to “Europeanize” the project by attracting Western contractors, but the technological core will remain Russian, which will preserve the long-term channel of interaction between the nations.