By Adem Kılıç, Political Scientist
The developments of the past several years, which began with October 7 and continued with the US-Iran war, have reached a point where they can no longer be interpreted merely as a conflict dynamic.
Indeed, although these conflicts have their own internal balances, they have, in general, triggered the beginning of a fundamental transformation.
While these wars have completely changed the balance of power in the region and the security perceptions of countries, they have also demonstrated the necessity of revising the approximately century-old global order established after World War II.
The fact that the United States, which has provided unconditional support for Israel’s occupations, genocide and aggression, has also failed to achieve a decisive victory against Iran despite carrying out some of the largest attacks in modern history has revealed that the security architecture Washington has built in the region over decades has collapsed.
Following all these developments, regional countries have therefore begun seeking to establish alternative centers of power rather than entrusting their security to the United States.
New security perceptions and a new center of power
The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan envisages treating an attack against any of the three countries as a common threat, while also covering the development of cooperation mechanisms in political and military coordination, joint exercises, intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and the defense industry.
Under normal circumstances, on all the issues I have listed, regional countries would tend to make agreements with the United States, as well as with Russia and China.
But the balance has now changed.
Of course, the most important point here is not simply that three countries have signed a defense agreement. More importantly, the agreement has effectively declared that confidence in US security guarantees in the region has weakened.
But this reality did not emerge overnight.
First; the inability of any international institution, including UN structures, to effectively respond to Israel’s decades-long occupation policies, and the fact that decision-makers within the Western-centered system, led by the United States, have rendered international institutions, including the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council, ineffective when it comes to Israel, have disturbed countries with a conscience.
Second; the support provided by these same countries for Israel’s genocide in Gaza has prompted both their populations and regional countries to rethink the situation.
And third; despite the paper-based military superiority of the United States and Israel, their inability to force Iran to surrender, combined with Washington disregarding all its other allies in the region when it comes to Israel, demonstrated to regional countries that the US security umbrella is no longer “safe.”
As I said at the beginning of the analysis, these developments over only a few years have made the reshaping of regional and global alliances, security perceptions and doctrines inevitable.
Why has the American security umbrella been shaken?
For years, Gulf countries have relied on US bases, American air defense systems, intelligence capabilities, fighter aircraft and naval power.
However, the picture that emerged during the Iran war exposed two weaknesses in this system.
First; regional countries can be forced to pay the price of an American war on their own territory.
Second; when it comes to Israel, the security of another country has no meaning for the United States.
Iran’s attacks against American bases in Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain demonstrated the reality that standing alongside the United States for Israel’s security means paying a price.
This is where the fundamental strategic motivations behind the Mecca Defense Agreement emerged alongside all these developments.
For this reason, I stated and continue to emphasize that it would be wrong to interpret the agreement merely as “military cooperation among Muslim countries.”
The real meaning of the Mecca Defense Pact
It is easy to describe the Mecca Defense Agreement as a “Muslim NATO,” but that would be somewhat superficial.
Because the strategic potential of the agreement lies in its capacity to transform the complementary capabilities of the three countries into a new center of power within an equation in which US influence in the region is declining.
With the agreement, Türkiye’s military capacity, defense industry, unmanned systems, electronic warfare and conventional military capabilities are combined with Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence, extensive military experience, and Saudi Arabia’s economic power, energy resources and high defense budget.
And when these three elements are linked within the same strategic framework, an entirely different level of capacity emerges.
Why is Türkiye at the center of the equation?
The foundation of Türkiye’s rising role is not merely military power. The real issue is Türkiye’s capacity and strength to connect several different areas simultaneously.
Türkiye is both a NATO member, can speak with the United States, Russia and China, can maintain direct channels of communication with Iran, and can develop strategic relations with the Gulf countries.
At the same time, it forms a geographical center between Europe, Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
In other words, the new reality in which President Erdoğan has not built Türkiye’s regional role in the classical sense of “choosing a side,” and has managed to make this approach accepted by all of its interlocutors, is creating a strong security and power sphere around Türkiye itself.
Türkiye’s growing strength in the defense industry could be the most important carrier of this model.
Because the needs of the Gulf countries are no longer limited to purchasing fighter aircraft or air defense systems. The need is for radars, early warning, electronic warfare, UAVs/UCAVs, missile defense, command and control, cybersecurity, and the ability to operate all of these systems within a common network.
Türkiye is increasingly developing capabilities precisely in these areas and therefore, the long-term success of the Mecca Defense Pact depends on Türkiye moving to the center of the equation.
A “Hexagonal Alliance” against the Mecca Defense Pact?
From Israel’s perspective, the emergence of the Mecca Defense Pact is one of the most important developments showing that the balance in the Middle East is not moving in the direction Israel wants.
The idea of a “Hexagonal Alliance” previously raised by Netanyahu aims to bring Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and some Arab countries that have moved closer to Israel through the Abraham Accords together within the same strategic framework.
However, there are serious and major problems for Israel here.
First; looking at Netanyahu’s recent statements, his declaration that “We must build a defense industry that no longer needs anyone” is significant. At this point, the balances I have described throughout this analysis are already forcing Israel to prepare for such an option.
Second; although the “Hexagonal Alliance” appears broad on paper, it does not possess the strategic depth of the Mecca Pact.
Because Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan coming together in Mecca are not merely three countries; they represent the combination of three different geographies, three different military capabilities and three different strategic advantages.
Türkiye possesses one of NATO’s largest armies and an increasingly independent defense industry. Pakistan possesses nuclear deterrence capabilities. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, gives the pact financial and geopolitical weight through its enormous economic power, energy resources and strategic position in the Gulf.
The fact that the Mecca agreement considers an armed attack against one member to be an attack against all parties also links these three capabilities to the same security equation.
The greatest weakness of Israel’s “Hexagonal Project” is that its common threat perception is not as strong as that of the Mecca Pact.
India’s primary strategic priority is balancing Pakistan. The priorities of Greece and Cyprus are to constrain Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s priorities are the Iranian threat, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and preserving its regional military superiority.
Some Arab countries in the Gulf, meanwhile, do not want to become direct participants in Israel’s regional wars, even if they maintain relations with Israel.
Therefore, bringing these countries into the same military chain is not as easy as it appears, and it does not seem possible for such a structure to produce an impact comparable to that of the Mecca Defense Pact.
Moreover, the emergence of the Mecca Pact makes this equation even more difficult.
In other words, for all these reasons, it does not appear easy for Israel’s Hexagonal Alliance to directly balance the Mecca Defense Pact.
In fact, in my view, the Hexagonal Alliance that Israel is attempting to establish could paradoxically contribute to strengthening the Mecca Pact as well. I believe the coming period will show us whether this is indeed the case.