By Yıldıran Acar, Political Scientist
In Japan, the anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki once again provided an opportunity this year to commemorate the war, and the devastation caused by nuclear weapons. However, the language used at the ceremonies was not limited to merely commemorating the pains of the past. In particular, the fact that the US’s role was downplayed in official discourse in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whilst criticism of Russia was emphasized, has brought Japan’s post-war foreign policy choices back into the spotlight.
In her speeches in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi did not mention the name of the country that dropped the atomic bombs. In contrast, Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui criticized the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and Russia’s policies towards Ukraine. Nagasaki Mayor Shiro Suzuki, for his part, explicitly recalled that the bomb was dropped from an American military aircraft on 9 August 1945.
This divergence does not mean that Japan’s historical memory has faded. On the contrary, Japanese society’s memory of 1945 remains very much alive. This is the key point highlighted in assessments made in Moscow.
According to Oleg Kazakov, a senior researcher at the Centre for Japanese Studies at the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Japanese citizens are aware that the atomic bombs were dropped by the US. The real issue is how this historical fact is framed within state discourse. Kazakov attributes Tokyo’s reluctance to directly accuse Washington to the post-war US-Japanese security architecture and the US nuclear umbrella.
This is where Japan’s fundamental contradiction comes to light. Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the strongest symbols of the country’s anti-nuclear identity. Yet the same Japan is increasing its defence capabilities and taking military cooperation with the US to a higher level, citing the changing security environment.
Consequently, the way 1945 is remembered in Japan is not merely a historical issue; it also reveals the limits of today’s security policy.
From historical memory to security policy
What is striking from Moscow’s perspective is that, whilst Japan is adopting a more cautious approach in its official discourse regarding the historical legacy of the war with the US, its criticism of Russia is becoming increasingly harsh.
Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, described the failure of Japanese officials to mention the US’s role in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as ‘shameful’. Maria Zakharova, Spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, also strongly criticized Tokyo’s approach.
However, interpreting the assessments in Moscow solely through the lens of political reaction would be incomplete. Kazakov’s analysis points to the security calculus underlying Japan’s stance: from Tokyo’s perspective, the alliance with Washington is not merely a diplomatic choice of the present, but one of the fundamental elements of post-war Japan’s security order.
For this reason, it is insufficient to assess the issues between Moscow and Tokyo solely through the lens of differing historical interpretations of 1945. The key determining factor is the convergence of historical disputes with today’s security rivalries.
The most concrete example of this is the Kuril Islands.
The crux of Moscow-Tokyo relations: the Kuril Islands
The unresolved issue of the Southern Kuril Islands following the Second World War remains the most fundamental point of contention in Russia-Japan relations.
Tokyo refers to the Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai groups as the ‘Northern Territories’ and maintains its claim to sovereignty over these islands. Moscow, however, argues that the islands belong to Russia on the basis of the outcomes of the war and relevant international documents. This dispute has also prevented the signing of a comprehensive peace treaty between the two countries.
Relations have become even more strained since 2022. Following Japan’s participation in sanctions against Russia, Moscow suspended peace treaty negotiations and ended dialogue on joint economic activities in the Southern Kuril Islands.
Consequently, the prospect of a rapid normalization of relations between Moscow and Tokyo is currently very limited.
Nevertheless, a complete breakdown in relations does not appear inevitable. Valeriy Kistanov, Head of the Centre for Japanese Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, views Japan’s protest against Putin’s visit primarily as a political reaction. According to Kistanov, Tokyo’s means of exerting pressure on Moscow are limited, and despite the parties’ current disagreements, diplomatic channels are not expected to cease entirely.
What does Putin’s visit to Iturup signify?
Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iturup Island on 13 August has brought the Kuril Islands issue back to the forefront of the agenda.
As this was Putin’s first visit to the Southern Kuril Islands in his capacity as head of state, the move was met with a strong reaction from Japan. Whilst Prime Minister Takaichi described the visit as “unacceptable”, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russia’s Ambassador to Tokyo, Nikolay Nozdrev.
Moscow’s stance, however, remains unchanged. Russia regards the Southern Kuril Islands as an integral part of its territory and maintains that visits by the head of state to Russian territory cannot be subject to the approval of another country.
The timing of the visit is also significant. Putin travelled to Iturup following exercises by the Pacific Fleet. In doing so, Moscow has combined a political message with a military one within the same framework.
It would be more accurate to say that the message conveyed here is not so much a direct military threat to Japan as a statement that Russia will not back down on issues of sovereignty and will maintain its military presence in the Far East.
Japan’s militarization could create a new area of tension
However, it is no longer sufficient to interpret the competition between Moscow and Tokyo solely through the prism of the Kuril Islands.
Whilst Japan has been increasing its defense spending and military capabilities in recent years, it has also been expanding its security cooperation with the US. Tokyo regards this transformation as necessary in the face of regional security threats, primarily from China and North Korea, as well as risks stemming from Russia.
Moscow, however, does not view Japan’s transformation merely as a consequence of Tokyo’s own defense policy. From Russia’s perspective, the increase in Japan’s military capabilities is part of the expansion of the US’s security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.
The risk that arises at this point is that the parties may perceive each other’s defense measures as a threat.
As Japan perceives its security environment as increasingly risky, it is bolstering its defense capabilities. This increase in capability is viewed by Russia as a new security pressure. Meanwhile, Moscow’s strengthening of its military presence in the Far East is fueling Tokyo’s perception of threat.
Thus, a classic security dilemma emerges: a step taken by one party to protect itself is interpreted as a new threat by the other.
Moreover, this dynamic no longer operates solely between the two countries. China’s growing regional influence, the deepening of Russia-China relations and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance are making the military and political balances in the Far East even more complex.
The joint statement by the Russian and Chinese ambassadors opposing the reopening of discussions on the outcomes of the Second World War and the militarization of the Asia-Pacific region is also one of the signs of this expanding rivalry.
Is a new front forming in the Far East?
There are currently insufficient grounds to claim that a new military front has opened between Russia and Japan. However, it cannot be ignored that security competition in the Far East has become more visible and more enduring.
The Kuril Islands dispute, Japan’s defense policy, the US–Japan alliance, China’s rising regional influence and Russia’s military presence in the Pacific are no longer independent developments. A change in one area affects the others.
Putin’s visit to Iturup may not, in itself, constitute a turning point in this regard. However, it is significant in demonstrating that Moscow will not back down on the Kuril Islands issue and will maintain its strategic position in the Far East.
From Tokyo’s perspective, the issue is increasingly being framed within a broader security context. Whilst Russia has become one of the actors assessed alongside China and North Korea in Japan’s threat perception, security cooperation with the US continues to be one of the key pillars underpinning Tokyo’s approach.
The main risk here is not that Russia and Japan will go to war in the short term, but rather the normalization of a lower-intensity yet sustained military rivalry.
This is because what is truly changing in the Far East is not merely how countries view one another, but the way in which their security policies shape one another. Japan’s enhancement of its defense capabilities is influencing Russia’s military planning; conversely, Russia’s military presence in the Far East can justify Japan’s increased defense spending.
Although 81 years have passed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the legacy of 1945 has not faded from regional politics. However, today this legacy is not discussed solely in terms of the destruction wrought by nuclear weapons. Historical memory, the sovereignty dispute over the Kuril Islands and the transformation of Japan’s defense policy are once again intersecting within the same strategic equation.
The decisive development on the Moscow–Tokyo axis in the coming period will not be whether diplomatic relations will be completely severed, but rather to what extent both sides will continue to increase their military capabilities. Should Japan’s trend towards rearmament and Russia’s military presence in the Far East turn into a mutually reinforcing cycle, the likelihood of disputes that are currently manageable at the diplomatic level escalating into a regional security issue may increase.
For this reason, it is not yet accurate to speak of a new front in the Far East. However, the military balance in the region is shifting, and the issues along the Russia–Japan axis are no longer confined solely to relations between the two countries. When the Kuril Islands dispute, Japan’s defence policy and the US military presence in the region are considered together, it is clear that the Far East will require greater attention in the coming period.