The American empire seems to be sinking deeper into a quagmire of war with Iran, with only bad options on the horizon. Donald Trump is now being urged to resolve this disaster as quickly as possible. Perhaps the decisive factor is that the war has begun to strain the lives of Americans. Once again, the lesson of “economy, stupid” resurfaces, along with the risk of becoming embroiled in an endless war in the Middle East. Complicating matters further is that Trump has long been aware of this, having come to power mocking senseless wars and championing peace and conflict resolution. Yet, he has failed to achieve this and has instead become embroiled in an even more dangerous war, one that his predecessors refused to wage.
This fourth gulf war was not just another battle in the Middle East conflicts, but a major turning point that shook several concepts related to war, peace, and the balance of power. It demonstrated that managing conflicts in the modern international system is based on a complex mix of power, economics, and diplomacy, and that any party that ignores any one of these dimensions pays a heavy price. What are the lessons of the current crisis, and what are its repercussions for the Middle East region?
Voices against the war
Voices against the war began to rise within the United States, and instead of seeing Trump succeed in “making America great again,” American writer Christopher Caldwell bitterly penned an article in The New York Times titled “America Officially: An Empire in Decline.”
Caldwell argues that the American-Israeli attack on Iran was not merely a bad idea, but a turning point in the decline of the American empire. Some might prefer to call the US-led world order “hegemony,” given that its flag does not usually fly over the territories it protects or exploits.
“But the rules are the same,” the writer laments. “Imperial regimes, whatever they are called, only last as long as their means are sufficient to achieve their ends. With the war on Iran, President Trump has dangerously expanded the empire.”
A failed military adventure in the Middle East is the last thing any casual observer would have expected from the failings of Mr. Trump’s presidency. The problems he alluded to in his three presidential campaigns were largely the result of our leaders overreaching their capabilities, according to the American writer.
Heavy price
The United States is mired in a war it started. It has options. But whichever option it chooses, it will pay a heavy price. It could stop intervening in Iran, having demonstrated, without any justification, that its military is far less dominant than the world believed. Or it could divert resources from fronts of vital national importance to America, such as Europe and East Asia, to fund what the president calls an “invasion” of Iran. Or it could resort to the extreme military options that Mr. Trump vaguely hinted at in social media posts beginning in early April, which, as Caldwell argues in his article, would bring eternal shame to the country he leads. The American writer Christopher Caldwell concludes with a bitter assessment of the war: “The United States risks losing its reputation, its friends, or even its very essence.”
State Survival
Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy offers one of the important lessons of the war, arguing that national security has never been a static concept. Its scope has expanded over time, from protecting territory and ensuring the survival of the political system to encompassing economic resilience, technological capability, information security, social cohesion, and even supply chains.
In our multipolar era, the boundaries of regional and global security have become inextricably intertwined. At the same time, the increasing reliance on force as an instrument of governance is likely to lead to a more fragmented, competitive, and ultimately less governable international system.
National security, at its core, reflects a state’s relentless pursuit of maintaining its political authority, territorial integrity, and the conditions necessary for its survival. In earlier periods, this was largely understood from a military perspective—defense against invasion and, occasionally, the protection of imperial or colonial influence. However, states have come to realize over time that war is not the only source of threat. Economic shocks, internal instability, ideological competition, cyber intrusions, and energy dependence are all factors that can undermine a state’s ability to survive.
Seven Strategic Lessons
The Iranian crisis with the United States, with its nuclear, regional, and economic dimensions, has presented a set of important lessons in international politics. The seven most prominent lessons can be summarized concisely:
1. The Limits of Hard Power Alone:
Possessing military tools or regional influence is not enough to achieve stability or international acceptance without political and diplomatic backing.
2. Sanctions Do Not Easily Topple Regimes:
Despite harsh sanctions, Iran has demonstrated an ability to adapt and persevere, confirming that economic pressure alone rarely achieves rapid and radical change.
3. The Importance of the “Deep State” in Resilience:
The existence of powerful institutions like the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has played a pivotal role in maintaining the cohesion of the regime and managing crises.
4. Geopolitics cannot be ignored:
Iran’s location between the Gulf and Central Asia makes it an indispensable player, no matter how intense the pressure becomes.
5. Proxy wars are less costly… but protracted:
Relying on regional allies reduces the cost of direct confrontation, but it prolongs and complicates conflicts.
6. The economy is the biggest vulnerability:
Despite political resilience, the economy—inflation, currency, and investment—remains the most fragile and impactful front domestically.
7. There is no alternative to political settlements:
All escalations have ended or will end at the negotiating table, as happened with the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, confirming that final solutions are political, not military.
Iran’s inability
Iran’s crisis, spanning years of nuclear tensions and regional conflicts, reveals the limitations of hard power when divorced from political and diplomatic legitimacy. Despite Tehran’s military influence and extensive regional networks, it has been unable to translate this influence into lasting stability or broad international acceptance, reflecting the reality that power alone is insufficient in a world governed by complex balances. Conversely, economic sanctions—however severe—have proven incapable of bringing about rapid and radical change in the regime’s structure. Iran has been able to adapt through internal mechanisms and alternative networks. The existence of robust institutions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has played a crucial role in bolstering this resilience, underscoring that the cohesion of the “deep state” remains a critical factor in confronting external pressures, especially when it rests on geographical considerations that grant the state a position that cannot be easily bypassed or isolated.
Proxy Wars
At the same time, the crisis highlights another facet of conflict: proxy wars, while less costly than direct confrontation, are far more draining in the long run, keeping the region in a state of flux and open-ended conflict. Despite its success in expanding influence, this approach exacerbates internal vulnerabilities, particularly as the economy remains the weakest link, burdened by inflation, currency devaluation, and eroding investments. This underscores a central truth: major crises are not resolved on the battlefield, but at the negotiating table, as exemplified by the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement. This agreement reflected an international understanding that political settlements—however fraught—remain the only path capable of producing sustainable solutions. Thus, the Iranian crisis offers a highly significant lesson: managing conflict in the modern international system is not a zero-sum game, but rather a delicate balance between power, economics, and diplomacy.
The importance of waterways
The Iranian crisis clearly reveals the crucial strategic importance of waterways in shaping the global balance of power, with the Strait of Hormuz becoming a geopolitical pressure point no less influential than conventional military force.
This narrow waterway, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil trade passes, grants Tehran the potential to influence the international economy without resorting to direct confrontation. This means that any escalation there would have repercussions extending beyond the region to global markets and energy prices. Thus, it is clear that controlling or even being able to threaten vital waterways grants states disproportionate influence compared to their conventional capabilities.
However, it is also a double-edged sword, as it could provoke broad international responses to protect freedom of navigation. Therefore, the lesson of waterways emerges as one of the most important determinants of contemporary conflict, where geography, economics, and security intersect in a delicate equation that cannot tolerate reckless gambles.
The Suez Canal Faces Uncertainty
Faced with an escalation that has spread from the Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal has been under threat in recent days. However, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, which reached a sharp peak on April 13, has had the opposite effect.
With more than 800 cargo ships stranded in the Gulf, the canal has once again emerged as the only vital artery for trade between Europe and Asia. Alternative land and sea routes through the Gulf have become perilous. For more than a century, the Suez Canal has been a cornerstone of globalization, a narrow waterway through Egypt that has quietly connected the economies of Europe and Asia.
Shortening distances, reducing costs
Geography was at its most decisive: shortening distances, reducing costs, and facilitating trade. But in the spring of 2026, this logic began to unravel.
For decades, global trade has rested on a simple premise: the shortest route is the most efficient. This has been the foundation upon which the canal’s modern importance has been built. However, the events of 2026 suggest that this assumption no longer holds true.
We are entering an era where efficiency is being sacrificed for flexibility. The most valuable trade routes are no longer those that minimize distance, but those that minimize uncertainty. In other words, predictability has become the new currency of globalization.
This shift is subtle yet profound. It means that the value of any route is increasingly determined not only by its geographical location, but also by a broader ecosystem encompassing security, insurance, digital infrastructure, and geopolitical stability. Herein lies the canal’s fundamental dilemma: it remains geographically essential, but its systemic importance is no longer guaranteed.
The behavior of the major powers underscores this shift. The United States, still the dominant force in global finance, exerts its influence less through its maritime presence alone and more through what might be termed a “risk architecture.” By influencing insurance markets, financial flows, and regulatory frameworks, Washington can indirectly determine which routes are viable and which are not.
Reshaping the surrounding ecosystem
Meanwhile, regional actors such as the Gulf states, Iran, and Türkiye are actively reshaping the surrounding ecosystem. Their investments and interventions are gradually eroding what was once considered an automatic reliance on the Suez Canal.
Taken together, these dynamics point to a world where no single route can guarantee viability. Perhaps the most significant change, however, lies not in geopolitics, but in technology. The vulnerabilities of global maritime shipping are no longer primarily physical, but increasingly digital.
Modern maritime navigation relies on a complex data architecture of GPS signals, satellite communications, and real-time logistics platforms. Disrupting these systems could cripple trade without firing a single shot.
This introduces a new concept into strategic terminology: digital sovereignty. A state may control the physical geography of a route, but if it relies on external systems to manage it, its control is incomplete.
In the face of transformations
Dr. Ahmed Kandil, Head of the Energy Studies Program at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, poses a fundamental question: Regarding the Suez Canal: Can it guarantee what might be termed “navigational certainty” in the age of cyber risks? If not, its value will not be determined by its location, but by the reliability of the systems that support it.
In the face of these transformations, the Suez Canal cannot remain a passive conduit; it must evolve into an effective value-creation platform. One way to achieve this is by fostering integration between industrial and logistical activities along the canal’s banks. The Suez Canal Economic Zone offers a model for this transformation. By linking manufacturing, energy processing, and advanced logistics to the canal’s periphery, Egypt can transform Suez into a pivotal hub in global supply chains, rather than simply a transit point.
A strategic opportunity also emerges in the energy sector. As Europe seeks to diversify its energy sources and reduce its reliance on Russian supplies, the canal can serve as a vital link between Gulf producers and European consumers, not only for oil but also for emerging energy carriers such as hydrogen.
Natural Iran
Perhaps the most important concern regarding the developments of the war concerns the shape of Iran after the current conflict between Tehran, the United States, and Israel ends. Will neighboring countries face a wounded Iran or a victorious one? Meanwhile, the Arab world and the Gulf states yearn for a normal Iran.
However, it must be noted that since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has been shaped as a revolutionary state that transcends the boundaries of the traditional nation-state. Ideology and politics are intertwined, and religious authority is intertwined with strategic decision-making under the leadership of the late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. This structure has granted Tehran an active regional role, but at the same time, it has limited its ability to transform into a “normal” state focused solely on national interests.
Nevertheless, more pragmatic tendencies are emerging within Iranian society, particularly among the younger generations. These tendencies push for economic openness and a softening of ideological rhetoric, which was partially reflected in previous reformist experiments, such as those of former President Mohammad Khatami and current President Masoud Pezeshkian. However, the radical wing has constrained the actions of both men. In light of this, the transition from a “revolutionary state” to a “normal state” appears to remain a complex and constrained path, primarily due to the structure of the regime itself and the interests of the elites associated with it, as well as a turbulent regional environment that reinforces the logic of conflict more than the logic of compromise.
Nevertheless, the experiences of countries like China, which redrew its priorities under the leadership of the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping without abandoning the core of the system, offer a possible model for a gradual shift toward greater pragmatism.
Between economic pressures and changing social sentiment, the question remains: Will Tehran choose to redefine itself as a normal state, or will it continue to cling to its revolutionary role regardless of the circumstances?
The Question of the Day After
The question of “the day after” in Iran is no longer limited to Israel; it has become a topic of discussion in America, Europe, and even globally, especially in the Arab world. What will Iran be like after the war? What are the possible scenarios? And what about the prospects for change in Iran? Susan Maloney, Vice President of the Brookings Institution and one of the most prominent American researchers in international affairs, attempted to answer this question.
Perhaps her most significant observation was: “It seems that we are living through a ‘Suez moment’ in some respects,” a significant and telling indication that we are facing the possibility of the fall of a major empire—the “American Empire”—in parallel with the fall of the British Empire after the Suez War with Egypt.
Just as the Suez War heralded the rise of the Arab nationalist project led by Egypt, writer Mohamed El-Sayed Idris believes that a war on Iran could signal the collapse of the Iranian project amidst the power struggles for influence in the world among the major powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia. In an article titled “What Iran After the Day After?”, Idris acknowledges that this doesn’t mean the Iranian project’s ambitions will be “rosy,” but it will inevitably face serious obstacles and challenges from its traditional arch-enemy, Israel, which will wage an “existential, annihilating struggle” against Iran to remain the sole dominant power in the Middle East.
Malony’s observations appear significant in their vision of the future. She observes:
– If America withdraws from the conflict, the Israelis will likely continue trying to strike Iran, thus the conflict will not end, and America will not be isolated from this dynamic.
– Netanyahu wanted to realize his dream of destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran, and if he fails, he will be deeply disappointed. He is prepared to wage a long and hot war against Iran. The Israelis will continue to “mow the lawn,” preventing any signs of an Iranian threat from emerging whenever the opportunity arises.
– Netanyahu is not alone in this view; most of the Israeli national security establishment shares it. This is the project they serve. In response to these Israeli indicators, Maloney presents other counter-indicators from Iran, most notably:
– Iran will not easily accept a “mowing the lawn” scenario, and this policy will not ensure Israel’s future security.
– The Iranians are not inclined to make concessions and believe they have the upper hand in the war. Tehran currently holds the reins of power; with each passing day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, Iranian influence on the global economy, as well as on President Trump and the American public, grows, harming all of America’s allies in the Gulf region, the Middle East, and the world.
Ultimately, the Iranian objective, which crystallized during the war, is to break out of isolation. Tehran sought to establish a dangerous principle: that neither the Gulf nor the global economy can be stable without a stable Iran.
Gulf Concerns
However, Iranian behavior has sparked fears among the Gulf states and the rest of the world that Iran will jeopardize the stability of these countries and the vital interests of the world every time it engages in a conflict.
This perhaps explains the outcry from the Gulf, the Arab states, and the rest of the world, sending a message that “Enough is enough… Iran will not achieve stability but will remain under serious threat” if the threats to the Gulf states and the vital interests of the rest of the world continue.
Some experts believe that the current regime’s actions in Iran are not those of a regime in a state of chaos, but rather a regime implementing a deliberate, multi-layered strategy aimed at paralyzing Western and Arab decision-making processes.
Some experts argue that the current “political impasse” in Tehran is merely a tactical mask, not a structural flaw. It is akin to a scene from Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”: feigning chaos to incite hesitation in the adversary.
This is precisely what former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz warned against in their critical assessment of the Obama administration’s nuclear negotiations. Kissinger and Schultz argued that Iran had outmaneuvered the West by portraying its mere willingness to negotiate as a major concession. While the world awaited a breakthrough, Tehran used diplomatic cover to legitimize its nuclear infrastructure, bolster its ballistic missile capabilities, and solidify its support for its proxies: Hamas and Hezbollah.
Ultimately, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) now holds the moderate faction hostage, much like it holds global trade hostage. Trump and regional states recognize that Iran is under immense pressure, but diplomacy must not be allowed to serve as a safety valve for the continuation of a pre-war Iran.
There is growing pressure on Washington to begin directly confronting the IRGC’s war machine. However, there are also calls in the Arab world and the Gulf to abandon the mirage of a “moderate” Tehran.
Amid this debate and the conflicting calls for engagement with the current Iranian regime, there is a consensus in the Arab world and the Gulf that a “business as usual” approach to relations with post-war Iran is no longer viable. There is an urgent need for binding understandings with Iran, a normal state, and although this is an Arab need, it is an “inevitable development” for the continuation of the regime in Iran.
The Council of Wise Men of the Gulf Cooperation Council!
Former Kuwaiti Information Minister Sami Abdul Latif Al-Nisf offers an important perspective on the war crisis. He believes that one of the lessons learned from the bitter experience of the current situation—and what is worse than what is yet to come in terms of major events—is the need, after the dust of war settles (assuming good intentions) between the eastern, northern, and western shores of the Gulf, to form a council of wise men from the eight Gulf states: the six GCC countries, Iran, and Iraq. This is contingent on the damage inflicted by Iran and its proxies being limited and on Iran not having burned all bridges with our countries.
Ideally, the members of this council should be ministers and advisors directly involved in decision-making, chosen for their competence, wisdom, and pragmatism. Meetings should be held regularly, either monthly or quarterly, without necessarily being covered by the media. The core function of this council of wise men would be to examine existing and unresolved problems between the eight countries, both individually and collectively with other nations, as well as to anticipate future problems that might arise between them or with other countries. They would then develop realistic and applicable solutions to be submitted to the leaders. Undoubtedly, such a council, if staffed with the best capabilities of the countries concerned, and the genuine desire to activate its role, will have a profoundly positive impact. The alternative to communication, dialogue, and negotiation between countries is always… hostility, hatred, tension, and… devastating wars!
The Future of War
The American intelligence firm Palantir recently published a document titled “Global Political Analysis,” offering predictions about the “future of war,” or how military operations will be conducted in the coming years.
Palantir is fully involved in the war against Iran, contributing to the planning and execution of operations, a fact confirmed by the White House. However, many military experts worldwide acknowledge the changing nature of warfare and the United States’ unpreparedness for these new realities.
Palantir indicates that future weapons will be manufactured using artificial intelligence: “The question is not whether AI-powered weapons will be built, but who will build them and for what purpose,” the document states. This includes the creation of a networked army.
In this scenario, artificial intelligence coordinates the actions of combat units, each of which, thanks to its independent access to information, commands itself. The objective of this war is not territorial conquest, but rather the destruction of the enemy’s power structure and the infliction of maximum damage on its economy. This is precisely what Washington and Tel Aviv are striving for.
At the same time, experts emphasize that future wars also expand the opportunities for regional powers, who, even without nuclear weapons, will be able to inflict significant damage on larger and more economically advanced adversaries while maintaining their own stability. This is precisely what Iran is doing now, and by all indications, it is achieving remarkable success in this regard.
Several questions remain
Ultimately, several questions remain about what might happen if a war with Iran ends without an agreement, or if the status quo remains unchanged. Many regional experts believe that such an outcome would open the door for Tehran to tighten its grip on the Middle East’s energy lifelines, while the oil- and gas-producing Gulf states find themselves caught in the crossfire of a conflict they neither instigated nor orchestrated. Instead of weakening the Iranian regime as hoped, Iranian leaders might emerge from this confrontation more resilient after weeks of withstanding pressure. A Carnegie Endowment report suggests that the prevailing sentiment indicates any attempts at rapprochement between Iran and its Gulf neighbors after the war will be extremely difficult. The report notes that “Iran is now viewed not just as a potential threat, but as an actual one that requires addressing by strengthening the Gulf states’ military capabilities and isolating Tehran politically and economically.”
There is a consensus in the region that the post-war Middle East is heading towards a geopolitical reshaping focused on marginalizing Iranian influence, countering Israeli hegemonic ambitions, and fostering regional security and economic integration among Arab states, Türkiye, and Pakistan. Internal conflict within the Iranian regime is anticipated, along with power struggles among regional forces, amidst the ongoing risks of a frozen conflict and security crises.
Cover graph: Mother Jones Illustration / Getty
