Editorial note: The reported conference was conducted before the recent restart of attacks in the war – UWI.
The ceasefire between Iran and the US remains in place for now, but it is still highly fragile.
How does Iran view the negotiations? What is it hoping to achieve? What is it prepared to accept, and what are its red lines?
And if the war resumes, what strategy is Tehran likely to pursue?
These questions were covered at a recent roundtable discussion hosted by The Center for Iranian Studies (İran Araştırmaları Merkezi – İRAM) in Türkiye.
The first speaker at the discussion was Dr. Rahim Farzam.
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Dr. Farzam begins by outlining what he described as Iran’s two primary objectives in the negotiations.
Ending the war, but in a more “permanent sense”
Regarding the first, he says:
“Iran wants this war to come to an end. However, as we have discussed on many occasions before, Tehran is looking for an end to the conflict in a more permanent sense. This is where the issue of guarantees becomes important. Such guarantees might take the form of mechanisms backed by the United Nations, or perhaps a non-aggression arrangement involving countries that Iran trusts, such as China.”
Iran’s second objective is the substantial easing of the sanctions imposed on the country for decades.
Why Iran needs after the war
Farzam argues that these two objectives are closely intertwined and reflect what Iran believes it will need in the period after the war:
“The country had been grappling with severe economic difficulties long before the war, and the conflict surely has only made them worse. As soon as the war ends, the new administration will have to confront these challenges head-on. To do so, it will need both financial resources and a stable environment. That’s why Iran needs sanctions relief and a period of stability.”
Farzam adds that financial needs after the war might be the reason for Iran to be interested in collecting fees from vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
According to Farzam, Iran has two key bargaining chips in its effort to secure these objectives: the Strait of Hormuz and its stockpile of roughly 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity.
Iran’s maximalist position
Viewed as a whole, Iran’s negotiating stance may appear maximalist, Farzam says. Given the considerable imbalance of power between the parties of the war, the question naturally arises: why is Tehran advancing such maximalist demands when the threat of renewed war remains high and this very war would almost certainly inflict serious damage on the country?
Farzam offers the following explanation:
“From Iran’s perspective, ending the war without achieving these objectives, that is, a fragile ceasefire coupled with no meaningful sanctions relief, is not fundamentally different from the continuation of the war itself. In fact, Tehran believes that such an end to this war would be worse than the continuation of the war. In other words, Iran sees little value in ending the war unless the outcome addresses its core strategic concerns.”
According to Dr. Rahim Farzam, a second factor underpinning Iran’s “maximalist” stance is Tehran’s belief that it currently holds a stronger hand than its adversaries. In Iran’s assessment, it is in a relatively favorable position because of both its capacity to inflict damage on the other side and its ability to withstand the war. Taking this belief into account, Farzam argues, Iran’s approach at the negotiating table becomes easier to understand.
Iran’s war preparations
But what exactly is Iran hoping for? Does it believe the negotiations will ultimately produce a meaningful agreement for Iran? Farzam says the following:
“Despite the lengthy negotiations, I think expectations for a deal are low on the Iranian side. For the Iranians, the likelihood of the war resuming is 60 to 70 percent. In other words, they are anticipating another round of war. In fact, they are already making preparations for that possibility.”
Those preparations offer a glimpse into how Tehran views the next phase of the war, its expectations, its threat assessments, and the strategy it is developing in response.
Intense and short-duration war
Farzam explains that, unlike the previous war, Iran is now expecting an attack characterized by intense and short-duration strikes. Its military planning has been shaped accordingly. Farzam notes that Iran has conducted exercises designed to prepare for two scenarios in particular: a potential ground operation and a military operation aimed at removing the country’s enriched uranium stockpiles from Iranian territory.
That expectation of an “intense war” is also what shapes Iran’s military planning.
According to Farzam, Tehran’s strategy in the event of a renewed war would differ significantly from its approach during the two previous wars. Because Iranian planners anticipate a shorter but far more intense confrontation, they are preparing to respond accordingly. (Farzam here refers to information leaked by US intelligence agencies that Iran has already replenished between 70 and 80 percent of the missiles it expended in the last war). Farzam reminds that during the last war, Iran had to use its missile arsenal cautiously because the duration of the war was difficult to predict.
Iran’s response: massive retaliation
Thus, the first pillar of Iran’s strategy is massive retaliation. Farzam suggests that, unlike the previous conflict, Iranian strikes would be directed more heavily at Israel and would likely involve missiles with greater destructive power. In addition to attacks focused on Israel, Tehran is considering targeting the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain as part of its retaliatory response.
Iran-Saudi Arabia talks?
Farzam makes a point of highlighting Saudi Arabia:
“There is talk in Iran about a diplomatic channel behind the scenes with Saudi Arabia. It is said that Riyadh has asked Tehran not to be targeted. There has even been talk of a non-aggression pact, and reports of such discussions have appeared in the media. We have also seen numerous Pakistani delegations visiting Iran. Pakistan’s role should be viewed not only in terms of mediating Iran-US talks, but also in relation to dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”
Opening new fronts
According to Dr. Farzam, the second component of Iran’s strategy in the event of renewed war would be the opening of additional fronts across the region.
He expects these additional fronts to be a heavy retaliation to US targets in Iraq, renewed military activity by Hezbollah against Israel, and more importantly, shutting down of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait by the Houthis.